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Abstract
The implementation and enforcement of international maritime safety standards by
Member States has always represented a key objective for both the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the European Commission (EC). In spite of a
strong global legal framework for safety at sea, harmonisation has always been a
challenge. Two points are relevant here: firstly, the level of implementation and
enforcement with international regulations varies significantly among countries;
secondly, it is a challenge to determine and/or quantify this level of compliance.
Several attempts have been made by the maritime industry, academic studies and
policy-makers to develop an appropriate set of criteria and/or measurements to
benchmark the performance of Flag States. Currently, the White, Grey and Black
list (WGB) list of the Tokyo and Paris Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on Port
State Control are the most widely used indicators. While the list was initially
developed solely for targeting purposes, it has been recently criticised in recent
academic publications and by the industry for being unsuitable to benchmarking
Flag States with a small fleet and to be susceptible to a lack of harmonisation.
Moreover, the author argues that, given the way the list has been used, it reduces
the overall concept of Flag State Performance (FSP) to an overly simplified
detention/inspection ratio.
This dissertation begins with an investigation and examination of Flag State
Performance by looking into its underlying concept and connected components. The
main aim is to contribute to the general knowledge on the performance of complex
systems according to policymakers. Subsequently, this dissertation makes an
assessment of an inspection’s results as a tool to evaluate the performance,
shortcomings and benefits of the complex system under examination. Four research
questions have therefore been formulated: (1) What is Flag State Performance? (2)
What are the contemporary issues of Port State Control (PSC)? (3) How do
discrepancies in the Port State Control regime affect the inspection output? (4) To
what extent is Port State Control a suitable instrument to measure Flag State
Performance?
The dissertation is divided into two main parts. Part I presents the main research
questions, the methodological and theoretical discussion, the main findings; and a
round-up discussion. Part II contains the four research papers based on data gathered
throughout the study.
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1. Introduction

1.1. Historical Background
The implementation and enforcement of international standards by Member States
has always been a concern for the International Maritime Organisation and the
European Commission (Özçayır, 2009). While some states have a robust
administrative structure that supports an effective implementation and a strong
enforcement mechanism, others seem to be lacking in that respect. Accidents, such
as the Amoco Cadiz (1978), Aegean Sea (1992), Braer (1993), Erika (1999),
Prestige (2002), among others, caused a strong political and public outcry which
fostered the perception of the inability of some registries to maintain a functioning
administration and a legal framework in order to meet their implementation and
enforcement obligations under international law (Kovats, 2006).
The IMO Member States’ initial response was to adopt a resolution regulating,
among other maritime tasks, the delegation of authority (IMO, 1993) to so-called
recognized organizations. Over the years more guidelines were adopted leading to
a more comprehensive approach, which was a self-assessment of the performance
of a Flag State (IMO, 1999). Unfortunately, this voluntary approach did not elicit
the anticipated response among Flag States given that as at November 2003 only 18
self-assessment forms were received (Mansell, 2009b, pp. 141-143). It was
therefore necessary to shift the effort towards harmonised implementation and
enforcement provisions to a higher level. This was achieved with the adoption of
the first version of the Code for the Implementation of the IMO Instruments (III
Code) in 2005 (IMO, 2005), which was amended several times until it was made
mandatory in 2013 (IMO, 2013), with an expected effect on compliance and
harmonisation from 2016 onwards, when it became mandatory.
In parallel, the European Union (EU) was always supportive of any development
related to the implementation and enforcement of maritime safety standards.
However, the extended periods of time that it took to discuss developments in IMO
have always been of concern to EU Member States (Nengye & Maes, 2012).
Maritime safety regulations1 had first been established in EEC at the end of the
1

In response to the oil spill cause by the Amoco Cadiz in 1978, the Council adopted Resolution OJ
C162 of 08/07/1978, setting up an action programme on the control and reduction of pollution
caused by hydrocarbons discharged at sea. On 21 December 1978, the Council also adopted
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1970s, although more effectively in the 1990s, thereby strongly encouraging EU
Member States to ratify outstanding IMO conventions. The focus of the EU changed
after the Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002) accidents when the EC, with the ERIKA
packages2, started to work more proactively and more independently from the
regulatory trends in the IMO. Since then important decisions have been taken, such
as the development of a dedicated European Maritime Safety Agency (European
Parliament and the Council, 2002).
However, the main initiative intended to fill the vacuum left by Flag States and
the industry in ensuring proper monitoring and control of their fleet, was the
emergence of the various regional agreements on Port State Control, an inspection
of foreign-flagged vessels in national ports to ensure that safety, pollution
prevention and labour standards are met. The precursor of this initiative was the
Hague Memorandum of Understanding that was signed in 1978 by eight North
European States. They decided that the recently adopted International Labour
Organization (ILO) 147 Convention3 deserved a proper follow-up (Özçayır, 2009).
The ink on the Hague Memorandum had hardly dried when the Amoco Cadiz ran
aground off the coast of France, spilling more than 200,000 tons of oil. This made
it loud and clear that the shipping industry had failed to cope with new challenges
and, more importantly, in self-controlling its vessels (David Anderson, 1998; Bell,
1993; Mansell, 2009b; Vorbach, 2001; Özçayır, 2004). It was at the Ministerial
Conference held in Paris in 1982 that 14 European states conceived of the first
regional-coordinated system of ship inspections by signing the Paris Memorandum
of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU) in the attempt to stem the
proliferation of substandard shipping.
The efforts of the Paris MoU continued almost in isolation until the beginning of
the nineties when the International Maritime Organization, first adopted Resolution
A.682 (17) on “Regional co-operation in the control of ships and discharges” (IMO,
1991). This measure caused governments to sign regional agreements on Port State
Control, and, secondly, to set up the Flag State Implementation Committee, dealing
with common criteria and inspection standards, among other tasks (Bell, 1993).
Henceforth, nine regional agreements on PSC have been signed, with different
degrees of success. Nonetheless, the Paris MoU is not only the first of the regional
Directive 79/115/EEC regulating compulsory high-sea pilotage in sensitive maritime areas, such
as the English Channel and the North Sea.
2

Following the Erika accident off the Atlantic coast in December 1999, on 21 March 2000 the
European Commission adopted a first set of proposals (the ERIKA I package) which was
followed by a second set of measures in December 200 (the ERIKA II package).

3

The 147 Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention (C147) was adopted in 1976 during
at the 62nd ILO Conference, Geneva. The Convention encompasses 12 Articles and, among
various provisions, aims at inspecting foreign-flagged vessels entering port. The C147 was
updated by Protocol 147 to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976
(P147) which was adopted in 1996 during the 64th ILO Conference, Geneva
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agreements aimed at fighting substandard shipping, it also enjoys a special “status”
within the borders of the EU. While MoUs are administrative procedures, ipso facto
non-binding gentlemen’s agreements, since 1995 Port State Control became an EU
initiative with the implementation of Directive 1995/21/EC (Council of the
European Union, 1995). This made the Paris MoU system mandatory for EU
Member States. The Directive is the predecessor of the current legislative
instrument in force since 1 January 2011 and introduces the New Inspection Regime
(NIR): Directive 2009/16/EC (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a), as
amended by Directive 2013/38/EU (European Parliament and the Council, 2013).
The directive updated the earlier Port State Control system by introducing new
provisions for the targeting/selection of ships, regional commitments, ship-risk
profiles, among others.

1.2. Problem Statement and Research Questions
The nature of the shipping industry is inherently international. Vessels engaged in
commercial activities far away from their Port of Registry have throughout the years
sometimes shown a missing “link” between the vessel and the Flag State4. The MV
Erika, which sank during heavy weather in the Gulf of Biscay in 1999 for example,
was flying the flag of Malta, managed by an Italian company and chartered by a
French one. The fact that the vessel was carrying the required certificates and had
been inspected several times by Port States, Flag States and Classification Society
(Özçayır, 2009) did not prevent the ship from slipping through the various safety
nets and from spilling heavy fuel oil along the coast of France.
Since the beginning of the nineties with the establishment of the Flag State
Implementation Subcommittee5, the IMO acknowledged that two challenges facing
the organisation was the development of new policies and regulations and the need
to guarantee that the already existing ones were seriously taken into account and
correctly implemented and enforced (Mansell, 2009b). These fundamental
challenges remain today. The different levels of compliance with international
standards are not a mystery; indeed, some of the differences became even more
evident after the first round of the Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme

4

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 91, refers to the
“genuine link” between owner and Flag States.

5

As of July 2014, The FSI Subcommittee has been renamed the III (Implementation of IMO
Instruments) Subcommittee.
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(VIMSAS)6 and the White, Grey and Black list (European Commission, 2010) of
the Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU.
Measuring and benchmarking IMO Member States performance when it comes
to implementation and enforcement of international standards has recently become
mandatory under the III Code (IMO, 2013) which entered into force on 1 January
2016. Through Part II (Flag State) paragraph 42 and 43, the Code point out that:
A Flag State should, on a periodic basis, evaluate its performance with respect to the
implementation of administrative processes, procedures and resources necessary to
meet its obligations as required by the international instruments to which it is a party.
Measures to evaluate the performance of flag States should include, inter alia, Port
State Control detention rates, flag State inspection results, casualty statistics,
communication and information processes, annual loss statistics (excluding
constructive total losses (CTLs)) and other performance indicators as may be
appropriate, in order to determine whether staffing, resources and administrative
procedures are adequate to meet its Flag State obligations.

Shipping professionals, involved in maritime operations for years, have already
developed their own qualitative indicators on where Flag States stand with their
performance (Corres & Pallis, 2008). The turning point was the development of
quantitative indicators that would allow operators and administrators to have a clear
picture of their performance.
Currently, two main initiatives are broadly utilized to measure Flag State
Performance:
1. The International Chamber of Shipping Flag State Performance Table.
2. The White, Grey and Black list, published by the Paris MoU and the
Tokyo MoU.
The former (Figure 1), is an attempt developed by the industry that represents a
qualitative performance table which evaluates Flag State Performance in terms of
Port State Control performance, ratification of international conventions, a fleet’s
average age, the STCW White List7 and ILO reporting and attendance at IMO
meetings (ICS, 2016). Beside the flawed assumption that ratification implies
effective implementation and enforcement (Mansell, 2009b), the extent to which
these categories exhaust all elements in effectively assessing Flag State
Performance was questioned given that they do not cover the various characteristics
of Flag State Performance (Corres & Pallis, 2008). In addition, the table gives only

6

Since 1 January 2016, the IMO Member State Audit Scheme has become mandatory with the entry
into force of the III Code.

7 The International Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW)
Convention.
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a binary quantification of performance since each category can either be green (well
performing) or red (bad performing).

Figure 1 –
Extract from the Shipping Industry Flag State Performance Table 2015/2016 (www.ics-shipping.org)

The latter, the White, Grey and Black list, represents policy-makers' attempt to
measure Flag State Performance in the context of Port State Control. Each year ship
registries are classified into three groups (black, grey and white) according to the
numbers of detentions incurred (ParisMoU, 2015). In the past years, the formula
utilized to determine the White, Grey and Black list has been severely criticized by
the industry and by several academic publications (Degré, 2007, 2008; Perepelkin,
Knapp, Perepelkin, & de Pooter, 2010; Özçayır, 2009) due to the following reasons:
•
•
•

It is unable to handle a small sample size.
It does not take into account other meaningful factors (e.g. number
of deficiencies, severity of deficiencies).
It is susceptible to lack harmonisation criteria (deficiency
assessment criteria, detention criteria, inspection procedures).

In addition, two considerations need to be taken into account. Firstly, the initial
purpose of the White, Grey and Black list was to determine weighting points for the
19

selection criteria of vessels to be inspected by the interested port state authority. The
wider use of the list to determine Flag State Performance, and even rank Flag States,
does not fall into the initial scope of the list. Secondly, the overall determination of
this concept is based on the ratio between detentions and inspection of a specific
country. While this may be of great interest for a port state authority during the
process of targeting vessels, it is the author’s contention that the concept is much
broader and complex in scope.
This dissertation has a threefold aim. In the first part of the study, an answer to
the following research question is sought: What is and what constitutes the concept
of Flag State Performance? This exploratory part of the study aims at developing a
clear understanding of the features and components underpinning this concept. New
qualitative indicators which comprise Flag State Performance are investigated. In
other words, the author determines what to measure before attempting to measure
it.
Given the fact that Port State Control is the most widely used indicator to
determine Flag State Performance, the second part of the study investigates both the
adequacies as well as inadequacies of Port State Control. This phase aims at the
following: (1) Determining the main inconsistencies, if any, of this regime in the
EU region; (2) determining the causes for these inconsistencies; and (3) providing
evidence of these inconsistencies. The third and last section summarizes and
combines the results of the previous two parts and gives recommendations on how
Port State Control results may affect Flag State Performance.
To investigate the three factors identified above, four research questions were
formulated:
1. What is and what constitutes Flag State Performance?
2. What are the contemporary issues of Port State Control in Europe?
3. How do discrepancies in Port State Control affect the inspection
output?
4. To what extent is Port State Control a suitable instrument to
measure flag State performance?
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1.3. Limitations
Within this section, the author discusses the three main limitations of his research.
Several have largely to do with the sharp focus of the topic addressed. The three
main limitations are:
•
•
•

Time frame
Geographic area
Corruption

In terms of the time frame, the inspection data to be analysed and collected were
selected in the time frame 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015. This choice is
justified by the entry into force of the European Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended,
on Port State Control on the 1 January 2011. As part of the Third Maritime Safety
Package, the Directive introduced the so-called New Inspection Regime across
European coastal waters, as well as the above-mentioned formula to determine Flag
State Performance. Since the New Inspection Regime introduced the new targeting
criteria by classifying vessels as High, Standard and Low-risk vessels and as a new
rationale for the Member States’ commitment8 to inspection, it was considered
suitable to use information from inspections only from that date onwards. This
strategy would allow comparison among findings, since all the inspection’s
activities before the 1 January 2011 were performed under a different legal
framework (e.g. different procedures, inspection quotas, a vessel’s priority, inter
alia).
The second main limitation to the study was identified by considering a restricted
geographic area for the Port State Control inspection regime. Why is the Paris MoU
unique? The fact that the Paris MoU regime is mandatory for EU Member States,
which need to abide by the rules of Directive 2009/16/EC as amended, makes it the
ideal candidate to be treated for critical case sampling. Critical cases are those that
have particular relevance for the topic under analysis and where results can be easily
generalised (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In other words, critical cases follow the philosophy
“if it happens there, it will happen anywhere” or “if it doesn’t happen here, it won’t
happen anywhere” (Patton, 2015, p.275).
This methodology, successfully used by Goldthorpe et al. (1969) in a famous
study on the sociology of different workers, has demonstrated its efficiency in cases
where resource constraints (e.g. economics, time) (Patton, 2015, p.276) could affect
the generalisation of results. The rationale behind this choice is to eventually
produce logical deductions following the line of thought: if it does not work where
a legal binding framework is present, it will probably not work where only a
8 This mechanism, namely “fair-share", was set up to determine each country quota to the overall
inspection regime in a year (Lagoni et al., 2010, p.83).
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gentlemen’s agreement is in place. A more extensive discussion on this approach
will be given in the methodological section of this dissertation.
The third main criticism made relates to the topic of corruption. Although many
episodes of corruption have been reported within Port State Control in general,
however, hitherto few charges of corruption have been levelled against the Paris
MoU. In order to cover this aspect, specific questions pertaining to episodes of
corruption within the EU were put to the participants of the interview study that was
conducted with policy-makers, maritime industry officials and seafarers’
representatives. As a result of this inquiry, the author concluded that all data
findings, which have been collected and discussed, do not reveal any episode of
corruption in Europe. Thus, corruption does not seem to be an issue for the Paris
MoU.

1.4. Summary of the Papers
Paper I focuses on findings and answers to the first research question and on
determining the so-called Whats, Whys and How’s of Flag State Performance. In
other words, the paper aims to explore the perceptual construction of this concept
as articulated by EU policy-makers through two Focus Groups. The findings of two
focus groups (n=13) involving officials of the European Maritime Safety Agency
are presented. The general results of the study suggest that Flag State Performance
appears to be multidimensional in nature and encompasses a wide range of elements
pertaining to both vessel and administrative performance. While Port State Control
still represents the only currently available and transparent indicator, which
determines Flag State Performance, the White, Grey and Black list alone seems too
narrow to determine the full spectrum of the concept under examination. Moreover,
a need to address factors that led to uncertainty in respect of Port State Control
results had arisen.
Paper II seeks answers to the second research question and builds upon some of
the results found in the first part of the study and on relevant literature. This paper
examines the point of view of key maritime stakeholders with regard to the Port
State Control regime in the European Union aiming at determining factors leading
to the difference in treatment among EU Member States. Elite interviews (n=14)
were conducted with subject-matter experts ranging from policy-makers, to industry
and seafarers’ representatives. While the paper concludes that Port State Control in
Europe seems to be the most efficient and reliable of the regional agreements on this
regime, some discrepancies that were identified during the inspection process and
the outcome can be highlighted as being due to differences at the inspector and
Member State level.
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Paper III focuses on the implementation and enforcement of Port State Control
among EU Member States. This study collected and analysed 25 reports compiled
by the European Maritime Safety Agency at the end of statutory visits to determine
the level of implementation of Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended, in the various
Member States. This paper summarizes the main shortcomings and observations, as
identified in the inspection reports, and concludes that while the Directive has been
properly implemented by the Member States, there are areas where harmonisation
is yet to be achieved. Those include areas such as Inspection
Commitment/Information, Quality of Inspections and Training of port state control
officers.
Paper IV focuses on the ramifications of an inspector’s number and background
on the inspection outcomes. The study is based on a set of data set which covers all
inspections carried out from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015 within the EU.
Overall, the sample comprises 32,206 Port State Control of inspections. On the
Member State level, the study identified that differences in detecting at least one
deficiency and/or detaining a vessel are significant across countries. On the
operational level, the results have shown that team composition and background
have an influence on the inspection outcome. The former correlates to the number
of deficiencies and detentions and the latter correlates to detecting a certain type of
deficiencies according to the specific inspector’s backgrounds. However, the
significance pertaining the inspector’s background is not always consistent.

23

24

2. Literature Review

This chapter introduces the literature pertaining to the framework of the topic under
investigation. A definition of performance and Flag State Performance is given.
Moreover, relevant literature pertaining to Port State Control, the concept of
harmonisation and the highlighted discrepancies in the regime will be discussed.

2.1. Flag State Performance
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has always
placed the Flag State at the centre of the implementation and enforcement of the
international maritime regulations and, by extension, as the core of the whole
maritime industry. As the holder of rights and duties, the Flag State has to ensure
the effective exercise of its jurisdiction and control over ships to which it has granted
its flags. By registering the ship, the State grants to the ship a nationality, which is
required before any maritime navigation takes place. In return, it must ensure its
jurisdiction and control over those ships flying its flag. While the word “effectively”
of Article 94 can be interpreted as a direct link to the concept of performance, Flag
State performance is never visibly mentioned in the Law of the Sea
There is no shortage of literature covering the topic of performance in the
shipping industry. However, determining what performance for a Flag State
comprises is a challenging task. That is mainly due to the complexity of the system
under analysis. While common criteria to determine the efforts and performance of
a Flag are scarce (Ji, Brinkhuis, & Knapp, 2015), criteria for port performance
(Brooks & Pallis, 2008; Brooks & Schellinck, 2015; Da Cruz, Ferreira, & Azevedo,
2013; De & Ghosh, 2003; Dragović, Park, & Radmilović, 2006; Lin & Tseng, 2007;
Pantouvakis & Dimas, 2010; Schellinck & Brooks, 2014; Turner, 2000), and
shipping companies performance (Chou & Liang, 2001; Giannakopoulou,
Thalassinos, & Stamatopoulos, 2016; Jenssen & Randøy, 2006; Lagoudis, Lalwani,
& Naim, 2006; Lirn, Lin, & Shang, 2014; Lun, Lai, Wong, & Cheng, 2014;
Pantouvakis & Karakasnaki, 2016; Rialland, Nesheim, Norbeck, & Rødseth, 2014;
Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2011; Triantafylli & Ballas, 2010; Valdez Banda,
Hänninen, Lappalainen, Kujala, & Goerlandt, 2016; Yuen, Thai, & Wong, 2016),
in terms of business, environmental, financial, operational, organizational, quality
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and safety criteria, are abundant. A definition of performance, however, is still
missing.
According to the Oxford Dictionary, performance is associated with “the action
or process of performing a task or function” or “a task or operation seen in terms of
how successful it is performed”. Furthermore, according to the Oxford Advanced
Learner’s Dictionary, it also means “how well or badly you do something; how well
or badly something works”. Since a task can be defined as the activity or work that
is deemed necessary to achieve a specific goal (Bye, Brendeford, Hollnagel,
Hoffmann, & Mohn, 1998; Hollnagel, 2012a, 2012b; Stanton, 2006), one can infer
that system performance depends on the goal the system wants to achieve. A similar
conclusion can be reached through the literature on port and company performance.
In general, the author has identified two main streams characterizing the concept
of performance, which may be useful to determine what underpins the concept of
Flag State Performance: efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency measures relate to
the “physical quantities” of products or services (e.g. time, income, throughput,
production, inter alia), while effectiveness measures relate to how well the system
(whether a company, port, or state) uses its strategies and resources to meet its
mission and goals and ultimately satisfy the end-user (Brooks & Pallis, 2008).
If the Flag State is the system subject of our inquiry, the goal and/or objective
will be defined in order to define the performance associated with it. The
International Commission on Shipping of 2000, (Mansell, 2009b, p.3) refers to
“demands for nations registering ships to be held more accountable in performance
of their responsibilities” thereby indicating how performance is a concept
underpinned by the responsibilities of a Flag State. For this purpose, the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1982) helps us to
delineate the main responsibilities of the Flag State. In general, Article 91 of
UNCLOS defines a Flag State as “the state in whose territory a ship is registered”.
Regardless of the concepts of nationality and sovereignty linked to the definition,
the Convention requires Flag States to “effectively exercise jurisdiction and control
in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying their flag” (United
Nations 1982, Art.94). The word “effectively” in Article 94 can be interpreted as a
direct link to the idea of Flag State Performance (Brooks & Pallis, 2008) if related
to the goal of ensuring that water transport of goods and/or people does not pose
any hazard to safety, environment and health by executing at its best the task of
“control and jurisdiction”. Therefore, the following definition for Flag State
Performance will be used throughout the dissertation:
How effectively a Flag State uses its resources, whether human or financial, to ensure
safety, environmental protection and proper labour conditions on board its vessels
via the exercise of its obligations, as established by the international legal framework
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2.2. Evaluating Flag State Performance
As outlined above, the body of literature focusing on Member States is, to the best
of the authors’ knowledge, limited, and the number of publications identifying
possible indicators is equally scarce. Measuring and benchmarking IMO Member
States performance when it comes to implementation and enforcement of
international standards has recently become mandatory under the III Code (IMO,
2013) which entered into force on 1 January 2016.
In the academic domain, several attempts to determine Flag State performance
have been made. Takei (2013) and Mansell (2009b) suggested that the concept of
performance should be grounded in the legal responsibilities of Flag States. These
encompass exercising jurisdiction and control over administrative, technical and
social matters; fisheries; security; and underwater cultural heritage. However, many
of these obligations do not require the Flag State to achieve a prescribed goal, rather
to exercise its best possible effort (Takei, 2013). Thus, quantification might be
difficult.
An initial attempt to determine Flag States’ capacity to effectively implement and
enforce relevant maritime legislation was performed by Alderton & Winchester
(2002) which created an index (FLASCI) based on the weighting of several factors,
grouped into seven categories:
1. The fleet
2. Administrative capacity
3. Maritime law
4. Seafarers’ safety and welfare
5. Trade union law
6. Corruption
7. Company and corporate practice
In parallel, the industry developed its own qualitative performance table by
evaluating Flag State Performance in terms of Port State Control performance, the
ratification of international conventions, fleet average age, the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers
and International Labour Organization reporting and attendance of International
Maritime Organization meetings (ICS, 2016). Beside the flawed assumption that
ratification implies effective implementation and enforcement (Mansell, 2009b), the
extent to which these categories exhaust all elements needed to properly assess Flag
State Performance was examined by Corres & Pallis (2008) who added subjective
weighting factors to quantitatively rank countries.
From an EU perspective, the measurement of this concept was first adopted in
the context of Port State Control. Each year ship registries are classified into three
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groups (black, grey and white) - according to the numbers of detentions incurred –
in the so called White, Grey and Black list (ParisMoU, 2015). Inspired by the White,
Grey and Black list, Perepelkin et al. (2010) proposed a new methodology, which
incorporates new factors other than detentions, such as deficiencies and casualties,
in order to overcome the shortcomings of the list. A similar approach was also
followed by Ji et al. (2015).
Using a different methodology than that suggested by Alderton & Winchester
(2002), Corres & Pallis (2008) and Takei (2013) with regard to the White, Grey and
Black list, Perepelkin et al. (2010) merge the concept of Flag State Performance
with that of vessel performance, discarding the characteristics of maritime
administrations. While one could argue that the quality of the fleet is the output of
the quality of its maritime administration, the reader should be aware that the shipowner is responsible for the application of international law.
It is true that shipping professionals, who have been involved in maritime
operations for years, have already developed their own qualitative indicators on
where Flag States stand with their performance. The turning point was the
development of quantitative indicators, which would allow operators and
administrators to have a clear picture of their performance. The Baltic and
International Maritime Council Shipping key performance indicator, for example,
was developed to propose a global shipping industry standard for defining,
measuring and monitoring information on ships operational performance by
operators.
Currently, two main initiatives are broadly utilized to measure Flag State
Performance:
•

The Ship Industry Flag Performance Table, published by the
International Chamber of Shipping.
The White, Grey and Black list, published by the Paris MoU and
the Tokyo MoU.

•

The former, is an industry attempt that shows a qualitative performance table used
to evaluate Flag State Performance in terms of the following criteria (ICS, 2016):
Port State Control
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Paris MoU White List
Not on Paris MoU Black List
Tokyo MoU White List
Not on Tokyo MoU Black List
United States Coast Guard quality shipping for the 21st century
(USCG QUALSHIP 21)
Not on USCG Target List (Safety)

Ratification of Conventions
•

•
•

1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS 74) (and 88 Protocol)
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL) Including Annexes I-II
MARPOL Including Annexes III-VI
International Convention on Load Lines 66 (and 88 Protocol)
The International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCW) 78
ILO Maritime Labour Convention (2006)
1992 Fund Convention and Supplementary Fund Protocol

•

Recognized Organizations

•

Age of the Fleet

•
•

STCW 95 White List
Completed ILO Reports

•

IMO Meetings Attendance

•
•
•
•

A 739

Age

Reports

IMO

The table is an initial attempt to attribute six different areas to the concept of Flag
State Performance. The International Chamber of Shipping links this concept to
fleet performance under the Port State Control regime in the Tokyo and Paris MoUs
and the United States Coast Guard. In the area of Ratification of Conventions, the
table reports whether the Flag State has ratified the main relevant international
conventions. Under A 739 the table refers to IMO Resolution A.739 (18) (IMO,
1993), amended by IMO Resolution MSC.208 (81) (IMO, 2006), which requires
Flag States to establish control over EU Recognized Organizations.
Since the Paris and Tokyo MoUs submit a report entitled “Performance of Flag
Administrations and Recognized Organizations” annually, the table positively list
those Flag States which do not appear on the list and have submitted the EU
Recognized Organizatioin data to the Global Integrated Shipping Information
29

System. Under Age, the International Chamber of Shipping positively indicates “the
90 per cent of flags whose ships have the lowest average age, among those listed, in
terms of ship numbers’ (ICS, 2016). With Reports the table indicates those Flag
States which comply with ILO reporting obligations and those Flag States included
in the STCW “White List”. Lastly, under IMO, the table positively indicates those
Flag States which generally attend the main IMO meetings, such as the Maritime
Safety Committee, the Marine Environment Protection Committee and the Legal
Committee.
As mentioned in the problem statement, various academic publications (Degré,
2007, 2008; Perepelkin et al., 2010; Özçayır, 2009) and industry operators have
criticized the formula. Beside the technical issues affecting the formula (points 1
and 2 highlighted in the introduction), this research study focuses on issues in
harmonisation, that is, point 3 highlighted in the introduction). If issues in
harmonisation exist, then there is uncertainty on the inspection outcomes
(detentions) which are the building blocks for the White, Grey and Black list. This
means that the formula may not give the same measurement on the same situation
when it uses data collected by different inspectors in different countries. If the list
of requirements for measurement instruments in science is recalled, as developed
by Hale (2009), then the WBG list formula has issues of reliability. According to
the author, a performance indicator is reliable if it answers the following question
in the affirmative:
Does it give the same measurement when used by different people on the same
situation, or on different occasions by one person on that same situation? (Hale, 2009)

While there is no discussion as to whether Port State Control helps to spot
substandard shipping, the question remains if this current system is effective and
reliable in portraying Flag State Performance through the White, Grey and Black
list. However, before detailing the Port State Control regime and the issues in
harmonisation found in the literature, a definition of “harmonisation” in EU law is
given in the next section.

30

2.3. Harmonisation
The concept of harmonisation is widely used in the context of the EU, and especially
when drafting EU Community Law. In general terms, harmonisation can be defined
as a:
… process in which diverse elements are combined or adapted to each other so as to
form a coherent whole while retaining their individuality. In its relative sense,
harmonisation is the creation of a relationship between diverse things. Its absolute
and most common meaning, however, implies the creation of a relationship of accord
or consonance (Boodman, 1991).

When discussing European Community law, the meaning of harmonisation is rather
imprecise and, in some measure, undefined, which leaves a fluid and complex
notion (Lohse, 2011). In the legal text of the European Union, “approximation”,
“coordination” and “harmonisation” are used synonymously and generally to
determine the process of developing rules and standards for the internal market
(Kurcz, 2001; Lohse, 2011). This approach generates more confusion when trying
to develop a uniform definition. A thorough review on the current available
literature shows that harmonisation is referred to by several aspects of European
Community law, such as taxation (Trandafir, 2013), food (Terlicka & Jukes, 2014),
copyright (Hugenholtz, 2012); immigration (Givens & Luedtke, 2004); internal
market (Dougan, 2000; Dzabirova, 2009); customs (Dmitriy, 2013); among others.
However, while a definition suitable for this research work will be elaborated in the
following section, the different forms of harmonisations, such as minimum, total,
partial, optional, horizontal, soft, hard or mutual, will not be investigated.
Due to the complexity, heterogeneity and enlargement of the EU as an
aggregation of States, the approach of recent policies has involved a flexible
development and application of Community law which would ensure “community”
and “autonomy” (Scharpf, 1994 as cited by Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, & Leiber,
2005) or, paraphrasing Kurcz (2001), “integration” measures. Given that we are
pursuing a definition suitable to the research project, one should keep in mind that
harmonisation was considered a prime goal for the achievement of a common
market whereas “differences in the legal orders are seen as obstacles to the free
movement of product factors” (Lohse, 2011). When unveiling the functioning of the
common market, Kurcz (2001) assigns to harmonisation a double objective: To
eliminate any eventual differences among Member States in order to promote the
common market and free movement and to avoid distortion of competition. These
two points will be further discussed when debating the need for a harmonized Port
State Control regime across Europe.
Briefly, harmonisation can be considered as an “act” of EU legislation which aims
to set a common European standard, also known as “Euro-Standard”, and modify or
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replace domestic law accordingly. Furthermore, this standard-setting process is not
carried out only at the European level since it demands a direct involvement of
Member States which have to implement and enforce those standards (Lohse, 2011).
It is a multistage process which involves decision-making, implementation
(transposition and enforcement), application and monitoring (Falkner et al., 2005,
p.32).
In simple terms, harmonisation is a process expected to set a “common floor of
standards” (Falkner et al., 2005, p.2) and is a path towards integration. It is a task
usually achieved through the adoption of Directives (Twigg-Flesner, 2011).
By means of Directives, EU Community law takes the form of a binding legal
instrument which lays out certain results (stage one) to be achieved by Member
States that are free to choose how to pursue implementation (stage two). This
twofold approach represents an advantage for some authors (Kurcz, 2001), while
being a disadvantage for others (Twigg-Flesner, 2011). In this sense, on the one
hand the use of Directives gives flexibility to Member States as to the forms and
methods through which they intend to achieve the prescribed results. On the other,
it gives them considerable freedom in the process of transposing EU community law
into national law which could lead to different implementation and enforcement
patterns among Member States. This is an issue that was emphasized in recent years
by the European Court of Justice in several of its rulings (Lohse, 2011).
In this sense, a more homogeneous implementation could be solved by means of
Regulations, since they bring the “advantages of clarity, predictability and
effectiveness” (Monti, 2010). This is a strategy which is slowly being used when
legal acts entail the single market. Furthermore, another effective strategy pertains
to the adoption of Directives containing “detailed and sometimes quite technical
rules” (Twigg-Flesner, 2011) which makes it difficult for individual Member States
to modify the text during the transposition phase (Lohse, 2011).
In conclusion, harmonisation may represent both a soft approach to ensure a
common set of criteria among fragmented approaches and the path to creating a
single unique, sometimes rigid, standard. According to Terpan (2015), transport,
together with the internal market, trade, agriculture, fisheries, inter alia, belongs to
the class of policies where hard law applies. In this sense, the author adopts the latter
of the two-abovementioned perspective and will try to isolate harmonisation within
the Port State Control Directive context.

2.4. Port State Control
The body of literature covering Port State Control is quite broad and encompasses
various elements from law, effectiveness, international policy, implementation,
discrepancies in implementation, jurisdiction, among others. In order to use a

32

consistent meaning throughout the text, the definition given by Özçayır (2009)
defines Port State Control as “the control of foreign flagged ships in national ports
by Port State Control Officers” will be used. Port State Control contributes to
ensuring compliance with international regulatory efforts (Ademuni-Odeke, 1997;
Bell, 1993; McDorman, 2000; Molenaar, 2007; Payoyo, 1994); to increase safety
standards (Li & Zheng, 2008; van Leeuwen, 2015); and to prevent pollution (Bang,
2008; Cuttler, 1995).

Figure 2
Author’s own graphical visualization of Port State Control

The inspection of foreign flagged vessels in national ports is not a novel exercise.
Provisions for the inspection or control of foreign vessels by port states have been
a feature of enforcement since the 1929 International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) (Article 54); the 1930 International Load Line Convention
(Article 16); the 1960 International Load Line Convention (Article 21); the 1975
IMO Resolution A.321(IX) “Procedures for the Control of Ships”; and the Protocol
of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL 1978 Protocol) which included control provisions in Annex
I, Annex II, Annex III, Annex IV and Annex V.
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Moreover, provisions of control were also included in UNCLOS under Article
218 “Enforcement by Port States” (United Nations, 1982). The difference between
Port State Jurisdiction and Port State Control is that Port State Jurisdiction entails
the prosecution of the vessels in case of alleged breach of international applicable
legislation, while Port State Control is limited to the administrative measure of
control until various corrective measures have been taken before allowing the ship
to sail again (Bang, 2008, 2009, 2013; Bang & Jang, 2012). However, it is not until
the emergence of a regional agreement on Port State Control that such an exercise
became a common practice in the maritime domain. As mentioned by Özçayır
(2004, p.1): “the powers used by port state control officers are not new; it is the
willingness to use the power which is new”.
The range of action of Port State Control was largely enhanced in the aftermath
of the serious ship accidents9 that occurred in the last decades as they caused a strong
political and public outcry for more stringent regulations regarding the safety of
ships, protection of the maritime environment and living and working conditions
(Özçayır, 2004, 2009). According to many authors, these accidents showed the
inability of some Flag States in discharging their obligations on vessels flying their
flag which left an enforcement vacuum (Ademuni-Odeke, 1997; David Anderson,
1998; Bell, 1993; Bloor, Datta, Gilinskiy, & Horlick-Jones, 2006; Molenaar, 2007;
van Leeuwen, 2015; Özçayır, 2009).
In response to the appeal from the civil society and given the diverse (and often
unsatisfactory) degree of enforcement of certain maritime administrations (Bell,
1993), eight North European states signed the Hague Memorandum of
Understanding in 1978. The main aim of the MoU was to ensure proper
implementation of the ILO 147, SOLAS 66 & 74 and Load Line 66 through regional
organisations and harmonisation. On a formal level, an MoU is not a treaty (Bang
& Jang, 2012; Vorbach, 2001) but an administrative agreement (Bang & Jang, 2012;
Özçayır, 2009). In this way, States Parties of the MoU establish a regional regime
for information-sharing on vessels without the delays and implementation
difficulties that would characterize a formal treaty negotiation (Vorbach, 2001).
Only two weeks after the Hague Memorandum, the Amoco Cadiz ran aground off
the coast of France spilling more than 200,000 tons of oil making it clear that the
shipping industry had failed in dealing with new challenges, and, more importantly,
in self-controlling its vessels (David Anderson, 1998; Bell, 1993; Mansell, 2009a;
Mansell, 2009b; Vorbach, 2001; Özçayır, 2004). It was at the Ministerial
Conference held in Paris in 1982 that 14 European states conceived of the first
regional coordinated system of ship inspections by signing the Paris Memorandum
of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU, 2017b) in the attempt to stem
the proliferation of substandard shipping.
9

The Amoco Cadiz (1978), Aegean Sea (1992), Braer (1993), Estonia (1994), Erika (1999) and
Prestige (2002), among others.

34

However, it was not until 1995 that Port State Control was integrated within the
European Union framework with the implementation of Directive 1995/21/EC
(Council of the European Union, 1995) on Port State Control which made the Paris
MoU system mandatory for EU Member States. The development of this Directive
directly followed the adoption in 1993 of the European Union’s A Common Policy
on Safe Seas which included a “coherent action programme on priority measures to
be taken by the Community and its Member States to enhance maritime safety and
pollution prevention” (Council of the European Communities, 1993b). With this
policy, the European Commission decided to approve a series of legislation aimed
at improving the safety level of ships sailing across European waters and calling at
European ports. One of the key pieces of legislation was Directive 95/21/EC
(Council of the European Union, 1995) that established a common set of criteria for
the control of ships calling in EU ports and harmonized procedures for their
inspection and detention, Directive95/21/EC has been recast several times, the latest
version being Directive 2009/16/EC (European Parliament and the Council,
2009a)10, in force since 1 January 2011 and a key element of this dissertation.
At the global level, the introduction of the Paris MoU received tepid support by
the international community with some international actors even considering the
Paris MoU as “discriminatory enforcement” of the IMO Convention (BlancoBazán, 2004). However, in the early nineties the IMO recognised the success of
such a regional approach and adopted Resolution A.682 (17) on Regional CoOperation in the Control of Ships and Discharges.
Firstly, the resolution invited governments to conclude regional agreements on
the application of Port State Control measures, and recognised the contribution of
the Paris MoU to maritime safety and pollution prevention (Molenaar & Pons, 1996;
Vorbach, 2001). Secondly, in 1993 the IMO set up the Flag State Implementation
Subcommittee, dealing with common criteria and inspection standards, among other
tasks (Bell, 1993). Henceforth, nine regional agreements on PSC have been signed:
Europe and the North Atlantic (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU);
Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean MoU); West and
Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the
Mediterranean (Mediterranean MoU); the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU); and
the Riyadh MoU.
The main aim of the Memorandums of Understanding on Port State Control is the
elimination of substandard ships, which may represent a threat to safety, security
and the environment, by using harmonised procedures for targeting and detection
(European Parliament and the Council, 2009a). Two of the main reasons to develop
regional cooperation for PSC were undoubtedly the need for sharing information
between states about the safety records of vessels and to avoid the inspection of a
10 The Directive was amended by Directive 2013/38/EU to accommodate the Maritime Labour
Convention provisions for Port State Control.
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vessel at every port within a same region (Hare, 1997). This was underpinned by
providing harmonised rules and standards for targeting and inspection procedures.
PSC is transparent through the name and shame policy and system of peer-review
(Bloor et al., 2006; Sampson & Bloor, 2007). This makes non-compliance with
international legislation by shipowners not as economically advantageous as before
since deficiencies and detentions are publicly available (Özçayır, 2009).

2.5. Harmonisation and Port State Control in the
European Union
When it comes to Port State Control, the Directive 2009/16/EC on Port State
Control, as amended by Directive 2013/38/EU, uses the term “harmonised” seven
times in the overall text.
Harmonisation is used specifically when pertaining to the “training and
assessment of competences of Port State Control inspectors” in title 10, 25 and
Article 22.7 suggesting that Member States, the European Maritime Safety Agency
and the EU Commission, shall work together to promote and develop a “harmonised
Community scheme” for training. Article 18(a).7 and 23.5, however, introduced
with the amendment of 2013, touches upon conferring implementing powers to the
European Commission to set up “harmonised procedures for … follow-up actions
taken by Member States.” The articles are strictly related to the correct
implementation of the rate provision under the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006.
In a different approach, Recital (7), awaits that “a harmonised approach to the
effective enforcement of (these) international standards by Member States in respect
of ships sailing in the waters under their jurisdiction and using their ports should
avoid distortion of competition” and, continuing, Recital (16) states further that “the
rules and procedures for Port State Control inspections, including criteria for
detention of ships, should be harmonised to ensure consistent effectiveness in all
ports (…).” Lastly, in article 1 (b), it is clearly stated that one the three key objectives
of the Directive is “establishing common criteria for control of ships and
harmonising procedures on inspections and detention, ….”
To conclude, harmonisation in Port State Control can be characterised by a threedimensional concept (Figure 4) delimited by: training, inspections and detention.
Moreover, the operationalization of the concept should take into account that the
purpose is as follows: studying and analysing the level of harmonisation as to how
the procedures on training, inspection and detention of vessels are followed among
the actors asked to interpret the standards set by the Directive above (Member States
and port state control officers). The purpose of such operationalization just referred
to was not intended as the harmonisation of law as a high-level objective of the
European Union, as explained in paragraph 2.5). Although PSC has been introduced
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for several years as a second line of defence against substandard vessels, though
some even argue that it is the fourth line of defence (Mejia Jr., 2005), the
harmonisation of such activities is still paramount. In fact, policy-makers strive to
achieve harmonisation due to the different degree of application of procedures and
activities across the various regimes (Özçayır, 2009). Despite the introduction of
single international (or regional) standards for inspections, the variety of countries
belonging to a single MoU may lead to different interpretations of such standards
(Özçayır, 2009) which results in lack of harmonisation and effectiveness when it
comes to identifying substandard vessels.

Figure 3
Graphic Representation of Harmonisation in Port State Control as Reported in the Text of Directive 2009/16/EC as
Amended

2.6. Discrepancies in Harmonisation
In the years following the emergence of the Paris MoU, several scholars investigated
the effectiveness of Port State Control (Darryl Anderson, 2002; Bang, 2008; Bell,
1993; Bijwaard & Knapp, 2009; Bloor et al., 2006; Cariou, Mejia, & Wolff, 2007,
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2008; Cariou & Wolff, 2011; Cuttler, 1995; Heij, Bijwaard, & Knapp, 2011; Knapp
& Franses, 2007c, 2008; Mansell, 2009a; Payoyo, 1994; Plaza, 1994; Özçayır,
2009) and its legal foundation (Bang, 2008, 2009, 2013; Churchill, 2016; Keselj,
1999; McDorman, 1997; Molenaar, 2007; Ryngaert & Ringbom, 2016). While
criticisms in this sphere still appear, it is “conventional wisdom” (Bang, 2008) that
Port State Control plays a critical role in ensuring safety, pollution prevention and
labour conditions on board a vessel.
Despite the positive reputation of Port State Control gained over the years and its
positive effects, which have been highlighted above by many authors, issues in
harmonisation have been observed since the early stages of the various MoUs.
According to the literature, there are inconsistencies between regions (Bloor et al.,
2006; Cariou, Mejia, & Wolff, 2009; Keselj, 1999; Knapp & Franses, 2007b; Knapp
& van de Velden, 2009; Knudsen & Hassler, 2011; Mansell, 2009a; Sampson &
Bloor, 2007) and sometimes even within the same MoU (Özçayır, 2009).
Given the main objective of guaranteeing harmonized rules and a level playing
field in the region, discrepancies in the inspection practices and outcomes can have
a profound impact on the credibility of the regional MoUs on Port State Control. By
setting a common standard, an MoU’s goal is to avoid unilateral and arbitrary action
by Port States which could have a negative impact on the neighbourhood ports
within the same region, reducing their commercial attractiveness (McDorman,
2000; Molenaar, 2007) and distorting the market (Knapp & Franses, 2007c). An
outcome of such behaviour is the so-called “port-shopping”, a strategic practice by
some operators who choose certain ports and/or regions (Bang & Jang, 2012;
Knudsen & Hassler, 2011; McDorman, 2000) over others because of their less
stringent safety enforcement standards.
The reason for differences in Port State Control enforcement practices may be
endemic to a region, a country or be of a more operational nature. For example,
some studies recognize cross-regional differences. Knapp & Franses (2007a) and
Knapp & van de Velden (2009) investigated differences across the Paris MoU,
Tokyo MoU, Caribbean MoU, the Viña del Mar Agreement, Australian Maritime
Safety Agency and the United States Coast Guard.
Other authors dedicated their studies to cross-national rather than cross-regional
discrepancies. This is the case of Mansell (2009b) who highlighted issues and
challenges within the Tokyo MoU. Bloor et al. (2006) and Sampson & Bloor (2007)
instead identified differences between India, Russia and the United Kingdom, while
Cariou et al. (2009) focused on differences across Australia, India, South Africa and
Russia.
As far as the underlying conditions of why discrepancies may appear, Darryl
Anderson (2002) suggests that at the regional level some MoUs face several
challenges in terms of lack of resources, which many countries encounter, and in
ensuring the equal and active participation of all members within the same region.
This suggests that “substandard vessels trading in the poor regions of the world have
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a significantly lower chance of being detained by Port State Control” (Darryl
Anderson, 2002). The scarcity of resources (whether financial or human), as a
contributory factor, is also reinforced by Özçayır (2009) and Knudsen & Hassler
(2011). For Bang & Jang (2012), the issue is more multifaceted given that some
regions lack the infrastructure, technology, financial capacity and action plans or
policies necessary for the effective operation of regional MoUs.
On a more operational level, Mansell (2009b) found that some countries in the
Tokyo MoU, for example, refused to accept inspections carried out by other states
“due to known widely varying standards of Port State Control inspections among
members,” while others refrained from conducting follow-up inspections to close
out issued deficiencies by other countries. Similarly, Knapp & Franses (2007b)
found that certain deficiencies weigh more in the detention process in some regimes
compared to others. This was explained either by a different country philosophy
(Knapp & Franses, 2007b), or differing priorities (Bloor et al., 2006) in enforcing
certain regulations rather than others. In that way, only certain deficiencies were
recorded.
As far as inspection practices are concerned, Bloor et al. (2006) found the root of
all evil in the subjectivity of the Port State Control regime itself, which is regarded
as a discretionary system, given its reliance on the “professional judgment” of the
port state control officer (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a; Paris MoU,
2017a). The definition suggested by Coles (2002) states that professional judgment
is exercised when a practitioner, in this case the port state control officer, makes
judgment calls in an uncertain situation. Discretion, subjectivity, individuality,
professional judgment and other equivalent concepts have broadly been interpreted
as one of the circumstances leading to differences in treatment across countries and
ports (Bloor et al., 2006; Sampson & Bloor, 2007; Özçayır, 2009):
While the flexibility of discretion can be valuable in individualizing the application
of the law, its subjectivism can also be the cause of inconsistency in decision
outcomes: apparently similar cases may not be treated in the same way by decisionmakers . . . An obvious corollary . . . is that discretion can impose similar outcomes
on apparently different cases (Keith Hawkins, 1992, pp. 15-16, as cited by Bloor et
al., 2006)

Although procedures on detention and inspection practices are clearly defined in the
international legal framework (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a; IMO,
2011; Paris MoU, 2017a), making the harmonisation exercise dependent upon the
professional judgment of port state control officers may lead to discrepancies due to
subjective factors. Among these, their background (Knapp & Franses, 2007a; Ravira
& Piniella, 2016), their number on board (Ravira & Piniella, 2016) and the quality
of their training (Graziano, Schröder-Hinrichs, & Ölcer, 2017) may be considered.
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3. Methodology

The following chapter explains the research strategy adopted to seek answers to the
four research questions. One must keep in mind that “the thesis is problem driven
and not methodologically driven in the way that it uses the methods that will provide
the best help to answer the research question” (Flyvbjerg, 2006).
1. What is and what constitutes Flag State Performance?
2. What are the contemporary issues of Port State Control in Europe?
3. How do discrepancies in the Port State Control regime affect the
inspection output?
4. To what extent is Port State Control a suitable instrument to measure
Flag State Performance?

3.1. Philosophical bent
The researcher holds the assumption that to explore and solve a contemporary and
practical issue, the emphasis should be put on the research problem and the available
data collection techniques rather than focus only on method (J.W. Creswell, 2014,
p.9). In the same vein the author has no intention of engaging in the controversial
debate on the effectiveness of one data collection technique over another. On
another level, the researcher strongly believes that the integration of qualitative and
quantitative methods in a single study reflects the need to construct knowledge and
enhance the research results (Rossman & Wilson, 1985). Lund (2012) characterises
mixed methods as a practical/pragmatic attitude through which the “research
questions in empirical studies are given high priority, not the philosophy of science,
and in that quest qualitative and quantitative methods are used in combination with
answering such questions”. In other words, following the definition given by
Creswell, Clark, Gutmann and Hanson (2003, as cited by Lund, 2012, p.212):
A mixed method study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and
qualitative data in a single study, in which the data are collected concurrently or
sequentially. They, are given priority, and involve the integration of the data at one
or more stages in the process of research.
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Since the author strives for an integration of both research strategies, neither of
the two opposite or traditional paradigms could be embraced as absolute
worldviews. Furthermore, it is the author’s personal belief that even if an objective
reality was attainable, personal views, experiences and background can shape
knowledge and views in a constellation of truths that is worth investigating. The
practical nature of the research questions and its day-to-day implications, coupled
with the desire to portray the objective of this research from multiple angles,
strongly influenced the philosophical bent and the methodology adopted.
(…), Pragmatism, is typically associated with mixed methods research. The focus is
on the consequences of research, on the primary importance of the question asked
rather than methods, and on the use of multiple methods of data collection to inform
the problems under study. Thus, it is pluralistic and oriented towards ‘what works’
and practice. (John W. Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p.46)

One of the philosophical perspectives underpinning the use of a mixed method is
called pragmatism. It was adopted to support the current research design given the
striving towards real-world practice.

3.2. The European Union scenario, a lesson for a critical
case study?
The reason for the focus of this dissertation on the European Union lies in the
idiosyncratic nature of the region which makes it arguably a “critical case” scenario
(Goldthorpe, 1968). On their study on whether empirical evidence would support
the emergence of the notion of embourgeoisement, the authors designed the most
favourable setting. They argued that should embourgeoisement not to be found in
the most favourable setting, it would be safe to say that it would be unlikely to occur
in less favourable settings. In other words, “if it happens here, it will happen
anywhere” or “if it doesn’t happen here, it won’t happen anywhere” (Patton, 2015;
p.275).
Similarly, the nature of the Paris MoU itself suggests that the regime constitutes
a critical case study for four main reasons:
1. Since the Paris MoU is the first regional agreement on Port State
Control, signed in 1982, the level of experience and maturity is more
extensive than in other more recently signed MoUs.
2. While MoUs are, ipso facto, gentlemen’s agreements, the Paris MoU is
supported by the EU Directive 2009/16/EC as amended, which is legally
binding for all the EU Member States.
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3. Lastly, the Paris MoU benefits from a set of tools, such as a targeting
database system (THETIS), an online distance-learning programme, an
inspection support software (RuleCheck) and others, which have only
recently been adopted by some other MoUs.
4. All other MoUs have observer status in the Paris MoU meetings and
trainings, and routinely receive information on all instructions,
guidelines and other information. Although these arrangements are
reciprocal, they are highly conducive to the dissemination of the Paris
MoU way of working.
Recalling the discrepancies in inspection practices highlighted by Plaza (1994),
when discussing the European Union region, the author mentioned that:
Indeed, the establishment of the various regional Port State Control regimes above,
essential as it is, is only the beginning. Problems already identified within the
European MOU, which after all is composed of quite homogeneous maritime
administrations, will be accentuated in other regions where European conformity and
affinity does not exist. (Plaza, 1994)

For the four main reasons highlighted above, one can assume that if discrepancies
can be found in the EU region, they are more likely to be found in more recent MoUs
with less homogeneous political settings.

3.3. Research Approach
As shown in the introduction, the study was divided into four main research
questions. For every question, a three-tier approach was followed (Kumar, 2011,
p.39):
1. Deciding – “What do I want to find?”;
2. Planning – “How do I find information?”
3. Undertaking – “Collecting needed information”
However, the study was divided in a first exploratory phase (first research question),
which then led to the emergence of the following research questions and to
embracing a mixed method approach duly honed to provide answers to the inquiry.
On a more practical level, when the researcher selects a mixed method design, some
key factors need to be taken into account: weighting/priority, timing and approach
to mixing the two strands (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p.80; Creswell, 2009, p.
206).
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When considering the weighting, in other words which method to prioritize, the
researcher should always bear in mind the worldview, the resources available and
the audience for the research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p.82). In this research,
neither the qualitative nor quantitative strands prevailed over the other. In other
words, the two strands were equally important in seeking an answer to the research
questions. In terms of timing, the research adopted a sequential course of actions
towards data collection and analysis. Lastly, among the three main strategies11 used
to mix the two data types, the author has chosen to merge the data set during the
interpretation phase rather than during the data analysis phase.
To conclude, this research adopted a design which John W. Creswell & Plano
Clark (2011, p.71) term an Exploratory Sequential Design, one which first
prioritises qualitative data and then builds from the exploratory results of the initial
phase through a second quantitative phase to generalize and confirm the initial
results. In fact, in the first two questions, the author is mainly interested in beliefs,
understandings, perceptions and meaning pertaining to two very broad topics (Flag
State Performance and Port State Control) which are collected through inductive
reasoning (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008, p.17). Subsequently, the results of the
initial phase are confirmed through quantitative data. An overall overview of the
research methodology can be found in Figure 4.
While the overall research project involves both the use of quantitative and
qualitative data, the four different research questions do not always use a mixed
method of inquiry. In brief, questions 1 and 2 utilize exclusively qualitative data,
questions 3 and 4 quantitative data. More details can be found below.

3.3.1. Focus Groups
Question one, for example, has the primary aim of identifying the main definition
of Flag State Performance, a topic with a dearth of literature; determining the most
optimum indicators; and how to improve the existing ones. This question is
exploratory in nature (since little is known of this particular subject), but it is also
akin to a descriptive study, since the Flag State Performance’s state of the art will
also be investigated together with available data.
A focus group can be defined as a moderated group interview, which generally
involves a small group of individuals with similar backgrounds and experiences
focusing on a specific topic (Lavrakas, 2008, p.643; Patton, 2015, p.284). The main
motivation for using focus groups to define Flag State Performance is to explore the
perceptions, understandings and experiences of a specific group of people. Focus
groups are extensively used to create a broad framework for additional discussion
11

1. Merging a data set; 2. Embedding data at the design level; and 3. Connecting from data
analysis to data collection.
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and they represent the baseline for this research study. By gathering first-hand
information on the topic of Flag State Performance, the researcher aims to introduce
new themes in the current discussion on performance and new, original indicators.

Figure 4
PhD Framework

The participants of the two groups were chosen by taking into account their
respective memberships to a specifically selected sector of the Agency dealing
mainly with Flag States responsibilities. Although focus groups can be difficult to
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steer, they provide several insights on the attitudes, thoughts, perceptions, ideas and
feelings of the participants on a specific topic (Krueger & Casey, 2009, p.20).

3.3.2. Elite Interviews
Question two aims to systematically determine the contemporary issues of Port State
Control, an approach that could be easily related to explanatory studies (e.g. using
literature), but also to exploratory studies (e.g. interviews). Interviews were chosen
to conduct in-depth inquiries on the topic and to more closely examine this complex
issue (Kumar, 2011; Patton, 2015; Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). Due to the
explanatory nature of the research question, an interview study was considered more
suitable as its starting point.
More specifically, the researcher used elite interviews, a type of interview mainly
used in political science to understand hidden elements of policies and/or legislation
by interviewing high-officials or people holding a prestigious role in society (for
example, politicians, civil servants, legislators) (Boucher, Maboob, & Dutcher,
2013 citing Dexter 1970; Richards, 1996). For this reason, “elite interview samples
tend to be a lot smaller” (Richards, 1996) than other types of interviews. Therefore,
a purposive sampling was deemed appropriate for this study due to the narrow
research focus and the specific and unique context/case (Miles, Huberman, &
Saldaña, 2013).

3.3.3. Analysis of Reports and frequencies of the findings
The documents examined in this research project consist of 25 reports from visits
and inspections conducted by the European Maritime Safety Agency in EU Member
States. These visits are conducted under the framework of Article 3.1 of Regulation
(EC) No. 1406/2002 which states that:
in order to perform the tasks entrusted to it and to assist the Commission in fulfilling
its duties under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in
particular the assessment of the effective implementation of relevant Union law, the
Agency shall carry out visits to Member States in accordance with the methodology
established by the Administrative Board.

The reports analysed were drafted between March 2012 and April 2016 and
summarize the level of implementation of the provisions of Directive 2009/16/EC
in the EU Member States. The author used document analysis to analyse the
inspection reports provided in this study. Following Bowen (2009), the analysis
procedure included a selection, aggregation and interpretation of the data. These
data included amount and type of shortcomings and observations. While the analysis
of content, frequency and meaning of words was excluded by the methodology, the
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author was attentive to the textual structure of the reports (Coffey, 2014). All
shortcomings and observations were aggregated into a table and commented by
themes.

3.3.4. Statistical Analysis
For the last research question, the author employed a linear probability model to
determine whether differences exist across Member States in terms of any
deficiencies and any detentions. Moreover, in order to determine the number of
deficiencies and apply linear model estimated, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
method was used. That means that it is assumed that it exists a linear relationship
between the amount of deficiencies observed and the covariate explaining such
number of deficiencies. OLS was then used to find the best relationship in the
knowledge that the main aim was to minimize the distance between the line and real
point (error terms).
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4. Results

The main initial driver for this endeavour was the exploration and operationalization
of the concept of Flag State Performance. However, like in many inductive-inspired
studies, the subject slowly transitioned towards verifying the adequacy of Port State
Control as an indicator to determine Flag State Performance. The framework of this
study was presented in Figure 4 to address the four main research questions. In
addition, Table 1 reports the main focus of each paper.
Paper I presents findings from an exploratory study on the conceptualisation of
Flag State Performance and it highlights the initial shortcomings of Port State
Control. Paper II reports on the findings of the elite interview study on the
challenges of European Port State Control. Paper III reports on the implementation
of the EU Directive 2009/16/EC on Port State Control, as amended, across EU
Member States based on European Maritime Safety Agency visit’s reports. Lastly,
Paper IV builds upon EU Port State Control inspections’ reports and reports the
results on the analysis of such inspection reports from EU and verifies the impact of
the inspector’s numbers and background.
Table 1
Overview of the publication encosed in this Thesis.
Paper I

Paper II

Paper III

Paper IV

Main aim of
the paper

Explore concept
of Flag State
Performance

Overall perception
on Port State
Control in the EU

Analyse the
implementation of
Directive
2009/16/EC

Analyse
discrepancies across
EU Member States
and the impact of
inspectors’ number
and background

Data

2 Focus Groups

14 Interviewees

25 Reports

140, 000
inspections’ results

Method

Focus Groups

Elite Interviews

Document Analysis
and frequency of the
findings

Binary Regression

Methodology

Qualitative

Qualitative

Quantitative

Quantitative

Inquiry

What is and
what constitutes
Flag State
Performance?

What are the
discrepancies, if
any, in the EU Port
State Control?

What discrepancies
are at the
implementation
level?

What discrepancies
exist at the
operational level?

Relation to
the thesis

Entry point of
the research

Explorative phase
of the mixed
method design

Confirmation of
literature and
interviews’ findings

Confirmation of
literature and
interviews’ findings
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4.1. Two sides of the same coin. Flag State Performance
as a combination of administrative and fleet performance
Paper I sets the tone of the whole inquiry. It presents the results of two focus groups
held at the European Maritime Safety Agency in Portugal involving 13 EU policymakers. The aim of the study was to define the concept of Flag State Performance
by establishing what it represents in the eyes of the participants; how should it be
measured; and why is it important.
Figure 5 presents the main result of the study by breaking down the concept of
Flag State Performance into two tangible vertical regions, Administration and
Fleet, and three conceptual horizontal regions which depict why the topic under
inquiry should be investigated (Why?), what comprises Flag State Performance
(What?) and, ultimately, how to measure it (How?).

Figure 5
Conceptualization of Flag State Performance as a Result of the Focus Groups.

The majority of the respondents believed that Flag State Performance should be
perceived and treated as a bidimensional concept, which suggests a strong
interdependence between administration and fleet performance. While the
individual components of both administration and fleet performance are extensively
discussed in Paper I, the game-changing finding, which shifted the focus of this
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study towards Port State Control, was the evaluation of how to measure the two
performances. It is clear that both an internal/external assessment would be
beneficial to ensure a certain degree of independence, but at the same time the
commitment by the maritime administration bears scrutiny. Moreover, the
transparency of such instruments is somehow questionable.
In reality, the results from internal assessments conducted by the member states
on their maritime administrations and fleet (e.g. Flag State inspections) are not
publicly available. This is also the case for the external assessments on maritime
administrations, such as those conducted by the IMO in the context of the IMO
Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS), since only a handful of member states
publish their results.
However, external assessments are performed on the fleets of Flag States, such
as those conducted by the Port State Authorities across the world. Since the
emergence of the regional MoUs on Port State Control, in fact, the “name and
shame” approach to assessment gives public visibility to vessels with poor safety
records making it easier to determine their performance.
The participants of the focus groups deemed Port State Control as the only
publicly available and transparent indicator, which is an indicator on the fleet
performance of a Flag State. Table 2 summarizes the positive and negative aspects
of Port State Control according to the participants.
Table 2
Positive and Negative Aspects of Port State Control.
Positive Aspects
It is the most practical indicator
It is a “safety net” against substandard vessels
It is a defensive line which sorts the bad from the
very bad
It is a good output to understand how vessels
perform
It is almost the only indicator we have
It is not the best indicator, but it is effective to
measure Flag State Performance
It is a proactive measure
It is transparent
It is independent (external)

Negative Aspects
It is not multifaceted enough to verify compliance
It is subjective and relies too much on expert judgment
It has a limited coverage as not all vessels are subject
to Port State Control
There is lack of harmonisation in Port State Control
implementation
There are different levels of inspection quality among
Port State Control regimes
It is a reactive measure
It is fallible
It lacks effectiveness
It is a sample inspection, it does not inspect all vessels
It does not cover domestic vessels
It underestimates detentions for Flags with a large
fleet
It should have more subcategories, not only White,
Grey and Black
It is static and should be updated every week and be
dynamic
It was created for targeting purposes, not to determine
performance
It does not consider the number, nature and severity
of the deficiencies
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A cursory examination of Table 2 indicates that the negative aspects of Port State
Control clearly outnumber the positive ones. Some of those, such as lack of
harmonisation, subjectivity, among others, seem to question the foundation of Port
State Control as the third “safety net” of shipping. For this reason and given the
discrepancies highlighted by the literature of the past 30 years, the bulk of the
dissertation has focused on the adequacy of this mechanism.

4.2. Adequacy and Inadequacy of Port State Control in
the European Union
The assessment of EU Port State Control has been conducted through three different
methods of research: interviews, document analysis and quantitative analysis of
inspection reports. This section of Chapter IV highlights the main results of this
inquiry.

4.2.1. Interview Study
The results of the interview study are described in Paper II and outline the main
discrepancies of EU Port State Control according to 14 participants associated with
three main stakeholder groups: policy-makers, maritime industry officials and
seafarers.
Figure 6 illustrates the main findings. In general, the interviewees pointed out that
the main discrepancies could emerge either at the Member States level or at the
Inspector level. Those circumstances, if deemed relevant, may compromise the Ship
Inspection operations and, ultimately, influence the procedures and/or the output of
a Port State Control. Given the goal of developing a harmonised system of Port State
Control across Europe, some of those dissimilarities were further highlighted by the
interviewees. In particular, the diversity in the quota of port state control officers
used during Port State Control inspections and in the number of hours allocated for
their training was significant at the Member State level. In parallel, the diversity in
the background of port state control officers across countries and the reliance on
professional judgment were flagged at the Inspector level.
When looking into the group of countries as a whole, slight differences were
observed among EU countries from the North and from the South in what has been
called the “north-south” slope. As a rule of thumb, some participants have portrayed
the southern countries of Europe as the keenest on detaining ships while in the
northern Europe, Member States tend to perform an inspection less strictly. This is
mainly due to the background of the inspectors employed by the maritime
administrations. While port state control officers with a seafaring background
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mainly employed in the north EU countries have a less stringent approach towards
rules and procedures; their technical knowledge seems more robust. Conversely,
port state control officers with different backgrounds, mainly employed in the south
EU countries, seem stricter in terms of applying inspection rules and procedures,
but lack solid technical knowledge. Hence, the approach towards inspection and the
inspection’s output, whether involving detentions or the type or number of
deficiencies, may vary from Member State to Member State.

Figure 6
Summary of the findings of Elite Interviews.

4.2.2. Analysis of Reports and frequencies of the findings
The results of the document analysis are shown in
Table 3. These results are
mainly related to the discrepancies at the Member State level and it summarizes the
number of shortcomings (S) and observations (O) for each of the articles of
Directive 2009/16/EC for each of the Member States. Shortcomings are represented
in red, while observations are in orange; where neither shortcomings nor
observations were found, the cell is left green. In circumstances where two or more
findings were recorded, the number logged in the cell indicates the total.
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The analysis clearly shows areas of the Directive where Member States have
struggled and may be struggling with its implementation. Those articles were
underlined in the table and grouped into three main areas of interest:
•
•
•

Inspection Commitment/Information: Article 5, Article 8 and
Article 24
Quality of Inspections: Article 15.1, Article 15.2 and Article 14
Training of port state control officers: Article 22

As already emerged through the interview study, the quality of inspections in terms
of procedures and the training of port state control officers have been highlighted as
one of the issues in the harmonisation process. Issues in inspection
commitment/information may appear to be of a more organizational nature, while
in reality they have a steady impact on the allocation of inspections across the region
and could influence the inspection burden on some Member States.

4.2.3. Analysis of the inspections’ results
Lastly, the outcomes of the previous data collection have been triangulated through
an econometric analysis of the effect of the inspectors’ teams, their members’
profiles and their background on the output of Port State Control inspections.
On a Member States level, the results of the analysis made it clear that there were
significant variations among them as to detecting at least one deficiency and/or
detaining a vessel. Significantly, some Member States showed a 40 per cent lower
probability of reporting zero deficiencies compared to others. The results also
emphasized that differences in Port State Control outcomes were much more
important within each Member States than, on average, between them.
Regardless of the characteristics of the vessel, considerable differences emerge
when the composition of the team carrying out an inspection on board a vessel
varies. Moreover, the probability of finding deficiencies on board and/or detaining
a vessel is higher when three inspectors are on board rather than one or two. The
probability of finding any deficiencies is 8.8 percentage points higher when there
are two inspectors rather than one. The figure rises to 13.4 per cent with three
inspectors. Similarly, the probability of having a vessel detained is 3.8 percentage
points higher with two inspectors rather than one, and 14.0 percentage points with
three inspectors.
The results were not always consistent as regards the extent to which an
inspector’s particular professional background helped him to detect certain type of
deficiencies. However, it was clear that some professional backgrounds were more
likely to detect these (e.g. inspectors with a seagoing (engine) background were
more likely to detect propulsion and auxiliary machinery deficiencies compared to
other inspectors).
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No Finding

Observation

Shortcoming

Table 3
Summary of shortcomings and observations concerning the implementation of Directive 2009/16/EC (Paper III).
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5. Discussion

This chapter summarizes the significance of the research carried out and its impact
on day-to-day policy and maritime operations.
The findings of the literature highlighted in Chapter 2 together with the results of
the explorative part of this study lead one to ask whether Port State Control
represents a valid, independent and reliable tool to determine Flag State
Performance.
As mentioned earlier, the exploratory approach to this research study initially
aimed at identifying performance indicators for Flag State Performance. Given the
strong ties between Flag State Performance and ship safety inspections, the research
efforts quickly shifted towards a holistic analysis of Port State Control within the
European Union. While Paper I sets the ground for questioning the European Port
State Control regime as a suitable tool to determine Flag State Performance, Paper
II, Paper III and Paper IV identified important discrepancies in the Port State Control
harmonisation process (either at the implementation and operational level) by using
different methods and data. Elite interviews, document analysis and regression
methods were used to this end. The main purpose for using a triangulation of
methods and data, both qualitative and quantitative, was to make raw data more
informative through stakeholders’ perceptions, and at the same time to make points
of view and opinions more robust through statistical evaluations. An overall
summary of the findings in the implementation and operation of Port State Control
can be found in Figure 7.
Some issues in the harmonisation process were already obtained in Paper I as one
of the results of the two focus groups conducted with policy-makers. However, it is
through the elite interviews of Paper II that the main points of controversy were
identified, although the EU regions are still deemed to be the most reliable regional
agreements on Port State Control. While the literature and practice have extensively
highlighted endemic issues in the regional agreement on Port State Control, the
differences in the EU region comprise key elements in the elaboration of this project.
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The binding nature of an EU Directive for its Member States and the EC
enforcement power suggests a higher effectiveness of the EU Port State Control
compared to the other MoUs (van Leeuwen, 2015). If the critical case study
approach is followed (Goldthorpe, 1968), discrepancies in harmonisation found in
an ideal setting, such as in the EU region, are also likely to be found in less
favourable contexts.

Figure 7
Summary of the Findings in Implementation and Operation of Port State Control in the EU

5.1. General considerations
The elite interviews represented the entry point for this investigation. Overall, it
appears that the maritime industry remains more positive towards the current Port
State Control regime in Europe than policy-makers. Some even suggested that the
quality of Port State Control has decreased over the years, while the regime still
enjoys a solid reputation which keeps it functioning.
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I think the Paris MoU today is still regarded as the most effective in the region, but I
do not think this is the case. What we have created is an area around us, a maritime
area, where there is a high level of self-control by shipping companies, by Flag States,
by ships in general because of the reputation of the Paris MoU. So that is the indirect
effect of the reputation of the Paris MoU. Nevertheless, ships get away with issues
because the inspectors have become more relaxed in dealing with problems

Paper II summarizes the results of the elite interview study. The outcome of the
analysis (Figure 6) shows two main areas which can lead to differences in
inspection’s procedures and inspection output: the Inspector and the Member
State. At the inspector level, background, cultural influence, professional judgment
and attitude/approach on board can impact the inspection process and its output. In
parallel, the use of teams on board, human and financial resources, local/national
legislation, training of port state control officers, internal administrative structures
and political influence/support are factors at the Member State level which can
influence the inspection process and its output.
While specific considerations on inspectors’ numbers and background will be
postponed in 5.2 and 5.3, general considerations on Port State Control as a
discretionary system are addressed here. As it is currently envisioned by the
international maritime system, Port State Control is subject to the professional
judgment of the port state control officers. The instructions found in the Paris MoU
and the IMO procedures for Port State Control refer to the use of professional
judgment as a key element in the inspection process. The latter states that the port
state control officers should use professional judgement “in carrying out all duties
and consider consulting with others as deemed appropriate” (2.3.1), but also that a
port state control officers should “determine whether to detain the ship until any
noted deficiencies are corrected or to permit a vessel to sail with deficiencies” (4.1)
(IMO, 2011).
Similarly, the former says that port state control officers should “exercise
professional judgment in determining whether to detain the ship until the
deficiencies are rectified or to allow it to sail with certain deficiencies without
unreasonable danger to the safety, health, or the environment, having regard to the
particular circumstances of the intended voyage.” (Paris MoU, 2017a). In the EU
legislation on Port State Control, professional judgment is used throughout the
Directive in regard to different situations. In article 13, for example, the inspector’s
professional judgment is the key to determine whether during an initial inspection
there are clear grounds that warrant a more detailed inspection. (European
Parliament and the Council, 2009a, Article 11) state in Article 11 of 2009 that:
“Clear grounds shall exist when the inspector finds evidence which in his
professional judgment warrants a more detailed inspection of the ship, its equipment
or its crew.”
Article 19 recalls the text of the Paris MoU and the IMO on vessels’ detention:
“When exercising his professional judgment as to whether or not a ship is to be
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detained, the inspector shall apply the criteria set out in Annex X” (European
Parliament and the Council, 2009a, Article 19). In Annex I Section II.2, the
Directive refers to professional judgment when discussing additional inspections:
“Ships, to which the following overriding or unexpected factors apply, are subject
to an inspection regardless of the period since their last periodic inspection.
However, the need to undertake an additional inspection on the basis of unexpected
factors is left to the professional judgment of the inspector” (European Parliament
and the Council, 2009a, Annex I).
Still in Annex I, Section II.3B (c), the Directive states that in case of an
unexpected factor: “A more detailed or an expanded inspection, according to the
professional judgment of the inspector, shall be carried out on any ship with a highrisk profile and on any passenger ship, oil tanker, gas or chemical tanker or bulk
carrier, older than 12 years of age” (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a,
Annex I). Although the procedures are clearly outlined in the texts cited above,
professional judgment and its intrinsic subjectivity in the decision-making process
is crucial to determine the seriousness of the deficiencies (Bloor et al., 2006).
In their analysis on the Port State Control system, Bloor et al. (2006) regard it as
a discretionary system as opposed to a binding system. In his discussion on strategic
spatial planning, Albrechts (2004) outlines the difference between the two systems
given that “whereas in the binding system the focus is on legal certainty, there is a
notable absence of certainty in the discretionary system”. Binding/regulatory/fixed
systems and discretionary systems are widely described in the academic literature:
the first is underpinned by the “desire to maximise certainty” and the second by “the
desire to allow maximum flexibility” (Booth, 1995). Binding systems are inherently
rigid and tend to provide consistent and predictable decisions (Murphy, 1991)
although they have difficulties in adapting to unforeseen scenarios (Booth, 1995).
A regulatory system of control gives the least possible opportunity for decisions to
be made according to whim, chance, or political expediency. (Booth, 1995)

In contrast, discretionary systems are extremely flexible but support vague and
indeterminate standards, which make room for arbitrary and sometimes
discriminatory decisions (Bloor et al., 2006; Booth, 1995; Murphy, 1991).
According to Murphy (1991), for example, reliance on a discretionary approach in
family law led to a series of unjust decisions which ultimately increased costs of
divorces and settlements.
Despite both systems having a plethora of weaknesses and strengths, the key
factor deciding which of the two approaches one selects is whether the system aims
at certainty or flexibility. In this context, the regional Port State Control remains
hostage to the desire of granting a certain degree of freedom to the Member States
and the need for harmonised rules and implementation to guarantee a level playing
field within the EU. While port state control officers have to follow a framework of
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rules and procedures, their decisions are left partially unconstrained which leaves
room for inconsistencies in decision outcomes. For example, a decision could be
biased by cultural influences and professional background, as mentioned above.
Here, the question arises as to why such strategy is adopted if its limitations are
well known. As far as the experts involved in the study are concerned, some have
argued that using fixed checklists, including a strict step-by-step approach, could
solve any issue of subjectivism in the decision-making process. Others have argued
that some flexibility is needed when dealing with a complex socio-technical system
such as a ship. However, all experts agreed that properly trained port state control
officers are less prone to subjectivity and “hobby-horses.”
Going back to the results of the elite interviews, the interviewees have concurred
that the training of port state control officers at the Member State level represents a
crucial aspect influencing the inspections’ outcome. Article 22, Recital 7 of
Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended, requires the Commission to develop and
promote, in collaboration with the Member States, a “harmonised Community
scheme for the training and assessment of competences of port state control
inspectors by Member States”. Ultimately, the scheme was developed by the Paris
MoU Task Force 34 under the name “Paris MoU Policy on the training of the new
entrant port state control officers and the professional development scheme for port
state control officers” (Paris MoU, 2017c) which establishes a training policy for
both new and experienced such officers and specific activities for maintaining their
port state control officer qualifications.
These activities translate into points. In order to complete the Professional
Development Scheme, the port state control officers “must gain a minimum of 30
points within a 5-year period” (Paris MoU, 2017c, page 20). Among these activities,
the policy proposes attending European Maritime Safety Agency/Paris MoU
Seminars, National Seminars on Port State Control, completing the Paris MoU
Distance Learning Modules and undertaking Port State Control inspections, inter
alia. With regard to the content of the training scheme, the Paris MoU policy clearly
outlines the learning objectives and the syllabus of competency for new entrants.
However, it neither specifies how to conduct the training nor the number of hours
required to complete the syllabus.
The implementation of the training policy, as also noted by several policymakers, is still a Member State’s responsibility, which allows the latter to decide the
extent to which the policy is implemented and the learning objectives achieved. As
pointed out in Paper II and Paper III, the training procedures among EU Member
States are not harmonised. In Paper II, some of the participants considered the
training policy of the different Member States a “black hole”, while others pointed
to the clear-cut differences between those countries with developed training
schemes and those with a “training on the job” policy.
Similarly, Paper III clearly shows that national training efforts are not consistent
across the 25 Member States analysed, with some countries focusing more on
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theoretical trainings than on practical ones and other countries doing the reverse.
Overall, with the exception of some Member States, the majority invest less than
500 hours in training for entry-level port state control officers. The interviewees, for
examples, agreed that a harmonised training policy is paramount to ensure a
consistent and fair treatment across the region. Trainings, in fact, are deemed vital
to instil knowledge and a methodological approach to ship inspections.
For many experts, the training policy is connected to the port state control
officers’ background. Some interviewees, for example, expressed the view that
inspectors with a seagoing background needed less training hours compared to
inspectors with a different background. While this may be valid for maritime-related
subjects, the author disagrees with this rationale since procedures and inspection
methods are unknown to new port state control officers regardless of whether they
have a seagoing background or not.

5.2. The background
Many authors dealing with the Port State Control domain have already emphasised
that training of port state control officers and their background may influence the
outcome of a Port State Control inspection procedures (Bloor et al., 2006; Knapp &
Franses, 2007a; Ravira & Piniella, 2016).
On a more qualitative level, the results of Paper II show that the interviewees did
not share a common position on the approach on board a ship and the inspection’s
outcome based on whether the port state control officers have had seagoing
experience or not. It appears that inspectors with no seagoing background were more
inclined to follow the inspection procedures by the rules, preferring less technical
rules and procedures and operational knowledge yet a very good knowledge of the
inspection procedures of their MoU. In contrast, ex-seafarers tended to be more
empathetic with the crew and therefore more indulgent in case of a deficiency and
trusting in their abilities to solve a problem.
This attitude could be related to their past experience on board when facing a
deficiency, or worse a detention – factors that would promote a stressful
environment on board and tension with the company. While such a difference in
approach may easily explain the lack of harmonisation within the EU, it also fuels
a deeper divergence of views of the overall system of Port State Control as a control
strategy. By being more permissive with the crew, port state control officers with a
seagoing background tend to verify whether the vessel is seaworthy, therefore minor
deficiencies that are not an immediate threat to life or the marine environment could
be overlooked.
In contrast, port state control officers who tend to rigidly follow inspection
procedures and protocols, appear stricter in the eyes of the crew. However, in point
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of fact they are determining compliance of foreign flagged vessels with applicable
international standards. Following the same rationale, experts have also concluded
that the type of deficiencies found on board is probably dependent on the
professional/academic background of the port state control officers performing the
inspection. As an empirical proposition, the interviewees pointed out the plausibility
that, since an engineer finds himself/herself more comfortable in the Engine Room,
a Captain on the Bridge and a Naval Architect with the ship’s structure, the
inspections and eventual deficiencies identified would very likely reflect their
proficiency in these areas when performing an inspection on board a ship.
On a more quantitative level, Paper IV tries to verify the conclusions mentioned
above based on actual inspection data. The results showed that whether one takes
the average number of deficiencies or of detentions identified by port state control
officers, there is little variation in the inspectors’ backgrounds. However, as far as
the average percentage of detentions is concerned, inspectors listed under “other
university” background (e.g. law, economics) have a slightly higher probability of
being part of an inspection leading to a detention. However, for all outcomes, the
background of an inspector overall has an inconsiderable effect on the final Port
State Control outcome.
As to the whether the background of the port state control officers is related to
the type of deficiencies recorded, the analysis shows a certain dependence on the
two variables. For instance, inspectors with either a seagoing (deck) or seagoing
(engine) background more often report deficiencies related to safety or navigation.
The reverse pattern is found for inspectors who are either architects, engineers or
with another university diploma. Architects or engineers more often report
deficiencies related to labour conditions, while inspectors from other university
backgrounds more often report deficiencies related to certification and
documentation. However, when the analysis moves towards linear probability
models to take into account a vessel’s characteristics, the results are less significant.
The only results, which are consistent across the different analyses, are those
related to fire safety-related deficiencies. These are less likely to be identified by
inspectors with a university degree. Deficiencies in labour conditions are less likely
to be identified by inspectors with a nautical background. However, both groups are
more likely to identify deficiencies relating to living and working conditions-related
deficiencies. Lastly, as mentioned by the participants in Paper II, inspectors with a
seagoing (engine) background are more likely to detect propulsion and auxiliary
machinery-related deficiencies.
However, while the statistical analysis performed in Paper IV could not confirm
the hypothesis of the elite interviewees, it is clear that a certain dependency exists
between the port state control officers’ background and the type of deficiencies
recorded after an inspection. This is also reflected by the fact that the Member State
itself, if used as a controller, has an influence on the type of inspection detected.
Overall, other factors should be taken into consideration, such as, but not limited to,
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cultural influence, training and traffic in the port. However, gathering certain type
of data may be too complex a task and therefore a complete analysis was difficult
to undertake.

5.3. Teams
Ravira & Piniella (2016) were among the first authors to transpose many
practitioners’ voices into an academic premise: the number of inspectors on board
during an inspection has an influence on the type and quality of the inspection’s
outcome. Reducing the concept to a simple scenario, one can consider a vessel due
for inspection entering into port. If a single inspector is selected to perform a generic
inspection which is supposed to last approximately X hours, the port state control
officer will verify all the items related to that inspection by him/herself.
Instead, if two inspectors are selected, they might share the areas to be inspected
and conduct a more thorough inspection given the allocated X hours. Moreover,
recalling the discussion above, by adding the variable of having a port state control
officer with a marine engineering background and one with a nautical background,
the respective areas of proficiency may be different and the inspection would be
more complete rather than if conducted by a single inspector. The elite experts in
Paper II have pointed to such a scenario, adding that assigning two or more such
officers on board also has a twofold behavioural consequence on the individuals.
First, the crew and captain are less prone to challenge two port state control officers
who, inspecting as a team are more self-assured than when proceeding alone.
Secondly, an additional professional performing the inspection may work as a peerreview tool and encourage positive competition and thoroughness. In Paper IV, the
analysis has shown that regardless of the type of inspection (whether initial, more
detailed or expanded), inspections with two or more inspectors are more likely to
detect more deficiencies and result in a detention than those with a single port state
control officer. Detailed results per type of inspection confirm the positive
correlation between the number of inspectors and the Port State Control outcomes,
with large marginal effects for detention.
However, the decision to utilize one or more port state control officer during an
inspection remains a full prerogative of the Member State and it is subject to several
factors. These include but are not limited to the distance from the Port State Control
headquarters to the port of inspection, the length of the coastline and associated
allocation of resources on the territory and overall financial and human resources.
Although there is no fixed rule pertaining to the number of inspector to allocate for
a particular type of inspection, experts have recommended that for certain type of
inspections the presence of two or more inspectors is paramount to adequately
perform the activity.
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This is the case for expanded inspections given that the following areas shall be
inspected, according to Regulation No. 428/2010 Implementing Article 14 of
Directive 2009/16/EC (European Commission, 2010), as amended: Documentation,
structural condition, watertight/weather tight condition, emergency systems, radio
communication, fire safety, alarms, living and working conditions, lifesaving
appliances, pollution prevention and cargo operations. Such inspections not only
require several hours to be performed, but the support of multidisciplinary teams
would ensure the adequate coverage of all areas.

5.4. Differences across EU Member States
The principal objective of the second phase of this research is to see whether
differences between Member States exist. The above sections have mainly
addressed the possible causes and underlying factors leading to differences across
Member States following the evidence of the analysis. However, the questions
remain as to whether evidence of dissimilarities exists within the EU region. To
address such an inquiry, Paper II, Paper III and Paper IV have attempted to address
discrepancies in harmonisation among Member States on different levels and areas
of the implementation process.
On a subjective basis, elite interviewees have described the existence of a socalled “North-South” slope within the EU. Given that northern countries tend to
employ ex-seafarers as port state control officers, the latter have sound maritime
knowledge, although, at the same time, they lack the more robust approach towards
inspection’s procedures and guidelines of their counterparts in southern countries.
However, port state control officers in southern countries of the EU are criticised
for their inadequate seafaring experience, although they are respected for their
adherence to the common rules and procedures of the Paris MoU and the EU.
Nevertheless, such quality perception is reversed between industry and policymakers. Recalling the “divergence of views” briefly explained in Section 5.2, the
underlying objective of Port State Control can be perceived differently according to
stakeholders’ group. On the one hand, the industry tends to regard this concept as
an instrument to verify the seaworthiness of the vessel and avoid harm to humans
and the marine environment. On the other hand, policy-makers consider it as the
tool to verify compliance of foreign flagged vessels with applicable international
standards, as envisaged by the international legal framework.
On a more supranational level, the horizontal analysis of Directive 2009/16/EC,
as amended, has shown several discrepancies at the implementation level of the
Directive. According to the number of observations and shortcomings recorded by
the European Maritime Safety Agency team which were analysed in this study, the
areas of Inspection, Commitment/Information, Quality of Inspections, and Training
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of port state control officers still lack harmonisation. The amount of missing
information reported under Article 24 of the Directive, for example, has a significant
impact on the overall prediction of the fair share of the region. This is due to the fact
that the fair share is calculated by taking the average number of inspections required
in the previous 3 years in consideration. While this may appear a technicality, not
only same states could face unjustified costs related to additional inspections, but
also the Port State Control regime’s reputation would face extreme criticisms by the
industry for excess inspections. In addition, the high number of shortcomings and
observations in the area of quality of inspections has revealed that many Member
States tend to apply inspection procedures in an inconsistent manner which
contradicts the overall objective of achieving common practices in the region. This
was valid especially for the Safety and Security Guidelines procedures and the
procedures for expanded inspections.
Lastly, the analysis of the training policy of the various Member States for new
entrants and refresher port state control officers found that national training efforts
were not consistent across the region. This finding is concerning given that the Port
State Control system depends on their professional judgment, therefore a
harmonised training policy is the principle strategy to ensure a common application
of rules and procedures.
On a quantitative level, the analysis carried out in Paper IV demonstrated
noticeable discrepancies at the operational level. Overall, the analysis showed
dissimilarities in the likelihood of vessels’ being detained and the number of
deficiencies being recorded across the board. Although other authors had previously
shown the effect of vessels’ characteristics (such as age, type, flag) on the outcome
of the inspection process, the inconsistencies shown in Paper IV persist regardless
of the characteristics of the vessel. However, a ship’s characteristics are still the
most important factor explaining the Port State Control outcomes.
By taking Member State 1 as a reference, the disparity between this point of
reference and the other Member States is generally noteworthy and even remarkable
for certain ones. Some demonstrate the probability of their ships recording zero
deficiencies that reach -40% compared to Member State 1. Similar results are also
found in terms of number of deficiencies. Compared to MS1, inspections completed
in MS3, MS6, MS7, MS12, MS18 or MS24 are associated with less deficiencies
(with a gap exceeding 2.5 deficiencies per vessel). Lastly, the inquiry also verified
whether differences inside a country might appear. The results showed substantial
heterogeneity in the Port State Control outcomes within each country of inspection,
which requires further investigation by including information on ports as a variable.
In conclusion, the results of the different and parallel investigations have shown
inconsistencies at various levels of EU Port State Control. While Paper II has given
regional consideration to the EU Member State, according to elite interviewees,
Papers III and IV have extended the inquiry into both the areas of implementation
and operation. Initially, the outcomes of Paper III have shown a lack of
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harmonisation in the implementation of the cornerstone of EU Port State Control,
namely Directive 2009/16/EC. As already mentioned above, the results of Paper IV
have portrayed clear deviations in the inspections’ outcome across the EU in terms
of detentions and the number of deficiencies.

5.5. Policy Considerations
In terms of policy considerations, the results yield several useful outcomes. The first
main outcome concerns the suitability of Port State Control as a tool/indicator to
ascertain Flag State Performance. The second main outcome relates to the exercise
of Port State Control and its current implementation in the EU.
While this study has found it incontrovertible that in its 40 years of
implementation regional Port State Control has improved safety, pollution
prevention and labour conditions on board vessels, its application as an indicator to
measure Flag State Performance is a subject to be treated separately. The definition
and characterisation of the theoretical and practical framework underpinning this
concept has been tangentially broached in this research. Surprisingly, the majority
of the experts involved in the first phase of the research distanced themselves from
the current practice of tying Flag State Performance exclusively to the performance
of a fleet.
By keeping in mind the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development distinction between input, output and performance indicators (OECD,
2014), clearly the experts considered that the performance of a complex system like
the Flag State could be reduced solely to performance of its expected output, but
rather to the performance of its resources, activities, actions and controls producing
that output. Although the 360° implementation of Port State Control makes it a
transparent and continuous exercise to verify ships’ performance, the enormous
amount of data obtained annually through the inspection database THETIS pertains
only to some Flag States activities. Moreover, they do not specify areas of the Flag
State administration where improvements are needed.
Most of these activities are plainly identified in the international legal framework
and the III Code (IMO, 2013) and include delegation of authority, fleet monitoring,
training of staff, monitoring of EU Recognized Organizations, ratification and
implementation of international conventions, follow-up procedures, among others.
By using the White, Grey and Black list, which relies on the total number of
detentions compared to the total number of inspections, to define Flag State
Performance, all the information pertaining the various Flag States’ activities are
missed. Moreover, performance not only loses its all-encompassing attribute but, in
the end, may be inaccurate. For this reason, the distinction between fleet
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performance and administrative performance came to the forefront of our
investigation as key determinative elements.
This proposal proposed considering Flag State Performance as a multifaceted
concept resting on two inclusive pillars: the performance of the Administration, the
entity executing the activities to achieve performance, and the Fleet performance,
the tangible outcome of the administration’s activities. Consequently, the
development of a more complete set of Flag State Performance indicators which
includes, but is not limited to, Port State Control is strongly advocated, in light of
the policy instruments review, such as Directive 2009/21/EC on compliance with
Flag States requirements (European Parliament and the Council, 2009b).
The above considerations are relevant to the debate on the accurateness of the
White, Grey and Black list and its formula. Academia and the maritime industry
have strongly criticised it, as well as the reliability of Port State Control as a whole.
In the debate on Flag State Performance, many experts questioned the latter concept,
not on the basis of whether it is enough to portray the complexity of Flag State as a
system, but rather on the operational issues of Port State Control, namely, the lack
of harmonisation among regions and often within the same region.
These points were a caveat that resulted in a wide range of queries on whether
this concept was adequate to measure Flag State Performance or not. Since the
introduction of the Hague Memorandum in 1978, the regional MoUs on Port State
Control have faced similar obstacles in the implementation of their provisions. As
said, this was due to the differences between regions in terms of resources and
efforts, but also to the administrative nature of such agreements.
Given the compulsory nature of EU law, one would expect these issues to have
been overridden. However, this research has unveiled several aspects of the
harmonisation process that are in line with future policy debates. In the area of
implementation, for example, the results from the study have shown issues in the
current application of Directive 2009/16/EC as amended in some key areas. These
include Inspection commitment/information (Article 5, Article 8 and Article 24),
Quality of inspection (Article 15.1, Article 15.2 and Article 14) and Training of port
state control officers (Article 22).
While the first of the three may qualify as more administrative in nature and also
involve organizational issues (Article 9), the other two have strong repercussions on
the Port State Control operations, the reputation of the regime and the overall
objective of developing a level playing field in the region. Notably, the substantial
inconsistencies in the training policies of EU Member States should be highlighted
in future policy debates due to the direct link to two main aspects of an inspection,
which is a process that is openly reliant on the professional judgment of the port
state control officers. Firstly, their training expands their knowledge of the regional
procedures on Port State Control. Secondly, a port state control officer’s training
influences the quality of their professional judgment, hence the quality and
thoroughness of their inspections and decision-making.
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This conclusion is closely associated with the different numbers of detentions and
deficiencies, which vary according to the number of port state control officers taking
part in the inspection. This point has been highlighted in the analysis of the
inspection data from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015. Moreover, the same
analysis also showed wide diversities in the number of detentions and deficiencies,
according to the Member State where the inspection was conducted.
Although the Paris MoU and the EU Port State Control are regarded as one of the
most effective such regimes around the globe, the path towards harmonisation is yet
to be completely achieved. By recalling the three main objectives of harmonisation
as mentioned by Directive 2009/16/EC (training, inspections and detentions – see
Figure 3) the research has shown that these are not entirely met. On a higher level,
the development of a harmonised system of inspection and targeting procedures is
one of the most important goals of Port State Control regional agreements. Thus,
the existence of different standards for inspection can represent a failure of the
system as a whole.
On another level, the essence of the problem can be both technical and economic.
From a technical point of view, differences can undermine the targeting system,
based on previous inspection’s results and weaken the effective implementation of
international regulations. From an economics point of view, discrepancies may
promote the so-called “port shopping”. In every case, issues related to
harmonisation negatively impact the reputation of any regional system of Port State
Control.
Lastly, one last provocative question is whether this concept is a suitable indicator
for Flag State Performance. No one would expect a clear-cut answer to this complex
topic. It is true that issues in harmonisation, whether regarding the number and types
of deficiencies or of detentions, have an impact on the reliability of Port State
Control as an indicator. However, it is a 360 degrees instrument, which, even if it
lacks the thoroughness of a more targeted survey, works 24/7 and produces an
incredible amount of data and information on the well-being of vessels entering
European waters.
Despite the fact that some improvements are advocated, if paired with other
indicators coverings aspects of Flag States, which are not exclusively fleet-related,
Port State Control remains one of the most effective tools in terms of completeness
and transparency as far as fleet performance is concerned.
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6. Conclusions

After years of research, investigation and interpretation of data, then the question
“what is next?” arises. In other words, what can effectively be done after taking into
account the results of this work.
The initial aim of this dissertation was to formulate a new framework for Flag
State Performance. It can be said that both industry and policy makers should
acknowledge the necessity for more comprehensive performance instruments.
These should embrace the more encompassing role of Flag States. Overall, the
obsolete characterisation of Flag State Performance as the mirror of fleet
performance was abandoned and substituted with a more comprehensive and
inclusive framework, one which takes into account the multifaceted activities of
Flag States. By relinquishing the overreliance on fleet performance, actors such as
administrators, industry and policy makers can therefore address activities and
responsibilities of Flag States which are otherwise overlooked and left unanswered
by traditional Flag State Performance instruments. In addition, the additional focus
on administrative-related aspects mitigates the conundrum of whether poor vessel’s
conditions are to be attributed to the shipowner, which is responsible to maintain
vessels in compliance with the international legal framework, or the Flag State,
which is responsible to monitor that the vessel is in compliance with the
international legal framework.
Given the wide use of Port State Control to determine Flag State Performance,
the objective of the research slowly shifted to investigating the adequacy or
inadequacy of this instrument in an effort to determine its challenges and successes
after 40 years of implementation within EU waters. For this purpose, an analysis of
Port State Control was undertaken to determine if it was suitable to measure Flag
State Performance and to ascertain whether issues arise within this concept as a
system. In this regard, this research has shown that a series of inconsistencies in
implementation and enforcement of Port State Control activities, both at the
Member State and port state control officers level, arise within the EU region. The
findings, especially those in the training policy and inspection outcomes, are
paramount to highlight areas of further improvement at different levels but mainly
for policy makers and the harmonised implementation of the Directive 2009/16/EC,
as amended. More specifically, these inconsistencies may lead the way for a revision
and/or recast of this piece of legislation with the objective of enhancing even further
the process of harmonisation of Port State Control activities in the EU.
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A last source of reflection is given by the prospect of transferring the lessons
learnt from this work to other MoUs and regions in the World. As often advocated
in the text, the EU has been regarded as the most favourable region where
harmonisation of Port State Control activities may be achieved. Such conclusion is
based on a series of positive circumstances such as the binding nature of the
legislative framework, the level of maturity of Port State Control activities, the IT
support, amongst others. According to the critical case sampling strategy, through
which “if it does not work here, it does not work anywhere”, the results of this
research can be transferred to younger MoUs on Port State Control and foster further
cooperation and harmonisation.
In conclusion, it was made clear that Port State Control in the European Union is
still regarded as the most advanced and reliable of the MoUs. While it is true that
discrepancies in the inspection outcome can impair the reliability of Port State
Control as a suitable indicator for Flag State Performance, it still maintains its
continuous and transparent attributes which makes it easy to include in the
framework for Flag State Performance. Although it is unequivocal that Port State
Control has to be coupled with other indicators to provide a full picture of Flag State
Performance, policy makers should foster a culture of transparency in the shipping
industry and the maritime administrations. Instruments such as the IMSAS, Flag
State inspections, internal audits, level of delegations to Recognised Organisations,
near-misses, accidents, among others, would represent a richer source of
information to determine Flag State Performance compared to Port State Control
alone, if made publicly available. For this reason, the author does not only strongly
advocate for the development of multiple performance indicators to capture the
complexity of Flag State activities and responsibilities, but also for the transparency
and availability of information.
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Introduction
Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1
defĳines a flag State as “the state in whose territory a ship is registered.”
Regardless of the concepts of nationality and sovereignty linked to the defĳinition, Article 94 of UNCLOS requires flag States to “efffectively exercise jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships
* The authors wish to thank the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the maritime experts involved in the study for their support and invaluable contribution. This work
was supported by the European Commission and SAFEPEC project under Grant [number
605081]. The views presented in this article are the authors’ own opinions. Responsibility for
the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the authors.
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 United Nations
Treaty Series 3 [UNCLOS].
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flying their flag.” In this article, the word “efffectively” is treated as the degree
to which something is successful in producing a desired result. It is interpreted
as a direct link to the idea of performance and takes into account multiple
components in the same manner as exemplifĳied by Brooks and Pallis2 in the
context of ports.
The importance of such a concept is directly connected to the need for
coastal or port States to prevent or minimize undue risks in their waters presented by substandard shipping. Such concerns are typically manifested in
the follow-up to accidents resulting in severe marine pollution, such as the
Amoco Cadiz (1978), Estonia (1994), Erika (1999), and Prestige (2002) to name
only a few prominent examples. Issues that arise in the discussions following such accidents often relate to a perceived inability of some flag States to
maintain a functioning administration and a legal framework in order to meet
their implementation and enforcement obligations under international law.3
The weakness in performance highlighted by some of the above-mentioned
accidents pushed the maritime community to develop proactive measures to
determine the extent to which flag States and their vessels comply with international maritime safety and marine environmental pollution prevention
standards.4
This article explores the perceptual construction of flag State performance
(FSP) as articulated by European Union (EU) policy-makers through two focus
groups at the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). It must be noted that
when performing qualitative inquiries in a domain dominated by quantitative
studies, “the temptation of stakeholders and practitioners to summarize complex and sometime elusive processes (e.g., sustainability or a single-market
policy) into a single fĳigure to benchmark country performance for policy
consumption seems likewise irresistible.”5 The reader must be aware that the
study does not contribute to the literature promoting the concept of indicators, whether leading or lagging, outcome or activity, output or input, process
2 M.R. Brooks and A.A. Pallis, “Assessing port governance models: Process and performance
components,” Maritime Policy & Management 35, no. 4 (2008): 411–432.
3 L.J. Kovats, “How flag states lost the plot over shipping’s governance: Does a ship need a sovereign?,” Maritime Policy & Management 33, no. 1 (2006): 75–81; J. Kuronen and U. Tapaninen,
“Evaluation of maritime safety policy instruments,” WMU Journal of Maritime Afffairs 9, no. 1
(2010): 45–61.
4 J.N.K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2009).
5 M. Saisana, A. Saltelli and S. Tarantola, “Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis techniques as
tools for the quality assessment of composite indicators,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 168, no. 2 (2005): 307–323.
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or personnel among others.6 Rather, this inductive, inspired study contributes
to the body of research concerning the performance of maritime administrations and aims to build a clear understanding of the phenomenon to be
measured and its subcomponents. In other words, knowing what to measure
before attempting to measure it.7

Literature Review
There is no shortage of literature covering the topic of performance in the
shipping industry. While common criteria to determine the effforts and performance of a flag State are scarce,8 criteria for port performance9 and shipping
companies’ performance,10 in terms of business, environmental, fĳinancial, operational, organizational, quality, security, and safety abound.
6

7
8
9

10

0003442761.INDD 479

A. Hale, “Why safety performance indicators?,” Safety Science 47 (2009): 479–480;
A. Hopkins, “Thinking about process safety indicators,” Safety Science 47 (2009): 460–
465; K. Øien, I.B. Utne, and I.A. Herrera, “Building safety indicators: Part 1—Theoretical
foundation,” Safety Science 49 (2011): 148–161; K. Øien et al., “Building safety indicators:
Part 2—Application, practices and results,” Safety Science 49 (2011): 162–171; J. Wreathall,
“Leading? Lagging? Whatever!,” Safety Science 47, no. 4 (2009): 493–494.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators. Methodology and User Guide (Paris: OECD, 2008).
X. Ji, J. Brinkhuis and S. Knapp, “A method to measure enforcement efffort in shipping with
incomplete information,” Marine Policy 60 (2015): 162–170.
See n. 2 above; M.R. Brooks and T. Schellinck, “Measuring port efffectiveness: What really
determines cargo interests’ evaluations of port service delivery?,” Maritime Policy & Management 42, no. 7 (2015): 699–711; T. Schellinck and M.R. Brooks, “Improving port efffectiveness through determinance/performance gap analysis,” Maritime Policy & Management
41, no. 4 (2014): 328–345; R.P. Da Cruz, J.J.M. Ferreira, and S.G. Azevedo, “Logistics resources in seaport performance: Multi-criteria analysis,” Maritime Policy & Management 40, no.
6 (2013): 588–613; B. Dragović, N.K. Park and Z. Radmilović, “Ship-berth link performance
evaluation: Simulation and analytical approaches,” Maritime Policy & Management 33,
no. 3 (2006): 281–299; L.C. Lin and C.C. Tseng, “Operational performance evaluation of
major container ports in the Asia-Pacifĳic region,” Maritime Policy & Management 34, no. 6
(2007): 535–551; A. Pantouvakis and A. Dimas, “Does ISO 9000 series certifĳication matter
for the fĳinancial performance of ports? Some preliminary fĳindings from Europe,” Maritime Policy & Management 37, no. 5 (2010): 505–522; J. Mileski, M.Q. Mejia Jr. and T. Ferrell,
“Making lemonade out of lemons: Port operators’ perceptions of their port security regulation compliance,” wmu Journal of Maritime Afffairs 14, no. 1 (2015): 93–108.
T.-Y. Chou and G.-S. Liang, “Application of a fuzzy multi-criteria decision-making model for shipping company performance evaluation,” Maritime Policy & Management 28,
no. 4 (2001): 375–392; E.N. Giannakopoulou, E.I. Thalassinos, and T.V. Stamatopoulos,
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According to the Oxford Dictionary, “performance” is associated with “the
action or process of performing a task or function,” or “a task or operation seen
in terms of how successful it is performed.”11 Since a task can be defĳined as the
activity or work that is deemed to achieve a specifĳic goal,12 it can be inferred
that the performance of a system is dependent upon the goal the system aspires to achieve. A similar conclusion can be achieved through the literature
on port and company performance. The authors have identifĳied two main
streams characterizing the concept of performance, which may be useful to
determine what underpins the concept of FSP: efffĳiciency and efffectiveness.
Efffĳiciency measures relate to the physical quantities of products or services
(e.g., time, income, throughput, and production, etc.), while efffectiveness measures relate to how well the system (whether a company, port, or state) uses its
strategies and resources to meet its mission and goals and ultimately satisfy
the end-user.13 According to these defĳinitions and recalling the word “efffective”
in Article 94 of UNCLOS, evaluating the performance of a flag State is knowing what a flag State is supposed to do (the goal) and evaluating how well this
is carried out.
As outlined above, the body of literature focusing on FSP is, to the best of
the authors’ knowledge, limited; equally scarce is the number of publications
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of corporate social performance and business performance in maritime transport in
Singapore,” Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 95 (2016):
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Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 1156.
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identifying possible indicators. Takei,14 for example, suggests that the concept
of performance should be grounded in the legal responsibilities of flag States.
These encompass exercising jurisdiction and control over administrative,
technical and social matters, as well as fĳisheries, security, and underwater cultural heritage. However, many of these obligations do not require the flag State
to achieve a prescribed goal, but rather to exercise its best possible efffort;15
quantifĳication thus becomes a challenge.
An initial attempt to determine flag States’ capacity to efffectively implement and enforce relevant maritime legislation was performed by Alderton
and Winchester16 by determining a flag State conformance index (FLASCI)
based on the weighting of several factors grouped into seven categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The fleet
Administrative capacity
Maritime law
Seafarers’ safety and welfare
Trade union law
Corruption
Company and corporate practice

In parallel, the industry developed its own qualitative performance table by
evaluating FSP in terms of performance of port State control (PSC), ratifĳication of international conventions, average fleet age, STCW (standards of
training, certifĳication and watchkeeping for seafarers), and ILO (International
Labour Organization) reporting and attendance at IMO meetings.17 Besides
the flawed assumption that ratifĳication implies efffective implementation
and enforcement,18 the extent to which these categories exhaust all elements
assessing FSP was questioned by Corres and Pallis, who added subjective

14
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weighting factors to quantitatively rank countries.19 From an EU perspective,
the measurement of FSP was fĳirst adopted in the context of PSC. Each year
ship registries are classifĳied into three groups, white, black, and grey (the socalled WBG list), according to the numbers of detentions incurred.20 Inspired
by the WBG list, some authors proposed a new methodology, which incorporates new factors other than detentions, such as defĳiciencies and casualties, to
overcome the shortcomings of the list.21
Diffferent from the overarching methodology suggested by Alderton and
Winchester, Corres and Pallis, and Takei,22 the author Perepelkin et al., as
well as the list published by the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on
Port State Control (Paris MoU), merge the concept of FSP with that of vessel performance,23 discarding the characteristics of maritime administrations.
This article contributes to the body of literature identifying performance in
terms of efffectiveness and aims at supplementing the measurability of FSP in
future research.

Methodology Used in the Study
The following section introduces the overall methodological approach employed in this study. The exploratory nature of the study called for a type of
group interview covering a very specifĳic and defĳined topic, but using an unstructured design to allow participants to freely interact and describe their
thoughts and perceptions. In addition, this approach allowed people who
worked in the same organization, but in diffferent sectors, to challenge each
other’s views and reach a collective understanding and defĳinition, and enrich
the quality of the data at the same time.
Methodological Tools
Two focus group sessions were conducted. A focus group is defĳined as a
group interview with a predetermined topic that is aimed at collecting
views, perceptions, and experiences by fostering interactions between the
19
20
21

22
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participants.24 The two focus groups were held at the premises of EMSA, in
Lisbon, Portugal, for approximately two hours each.
Participants of the Focus Groups
Thirteen maritime professionals participated in the study. The choice of the
participants was driven by the aim to decompose maritime administrations
into their multifaceted obligations and tasks. All participants in the study are
involved with diffferent tasks and obligations of the EU maritime administrations, which vary according to the sector to which they belong in EMSA. The
participant demographics are given in Table 18.1. Each participant (P) was
Table 18.1 Demographics.
FG P

Age

Sector in EMSA

Years of
experience

I

P1 35–44 Accident Investigation 11–20

I
I
I
I
I
I

P2 35–44 Ship Safety & Marine
Equipment
P3 45–54 Classifĳication Societies
P4 45–54 Classifĳication Societies
P5 45–54 Standards for Seafarers
P6 45–54 PSC
P7 35–44 Marine Environment

II
II

P1 45–54 Accident Investigation 21–30
P2 55–64 Classifĳication Societies >40

II
II

P3 55–64 Classifĳication Societies
P4 35–44 Ship Safety & Marine
Equipment
P5 45–54 PSC
P6 55–64 Standards for Seafarers

II
II

24
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11–20
21–30
11–20
21–30
31–40
11–20

>40
11–20
11–20
>40

Background

Class.

Mar.
Adm.

Inspection
experience

Public
Administration
Naval Architect

N

Y

FSC, PSC

N

N

None

Naval Architect
Naval Architect
Nautical Sciences
Nautical Sciences
Naval Architect –
Mechanical
Engineer
Naval Architect
Marine Engineer –
Mechanical
Engineer
Nautical Sciences
Maritime
Administration
Coast Guard
Nautical Sciences

Y
Y
N
N
Y

N
N
Y
Y
Y

Class.
Class.
FSC, PSC
FSC, PSC
FSC, PSC,
Class.

N
N

Y
Y

FSC, PSC
FSC, PSC

N
N

Y
Y

FSC, PSC
None

N
N

Y
Y

FSC, PSC
None

M.Q. Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Practice, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2015).
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numbered by 1 to N according to the Focus Group (FG) they were involved in,
either FG I or FG II. Table 18.1 also identifĳies the sector to which they belong in
EMSA, their years of experience, their background, whether they have worked
for a classifĳication society or not (Class.), whether they have worked for a maritime administration or not (Mar. Adm.), and what type of inspection experience they have (port State control, flag State control (FSC), class, or none).
Procedure
The focus group was moderated by a researcher and began with a presentation
of the overall scope of the study. Participants were informed of their rights
prior to being asked to sign a consent form and complete the demographics
sheet. Both focus groups were recorded with the participants’ permission and
were organized to provide perceptions and opinions on three main questions:
1.
2.
3.

How would you defĳine the whats, whys, and hows of FSP? (60 minutes)
What elements would you consider to develop an indicator for FSP?
(30 minutes)
How would you consider PSC as an indicator to measure FSP? (30
minutes)

All questions were posed in plenary in chronological order. Question 2 was
fĳirst answered individually and then discussed in plenary. In order to explore
elements that should be taken into consideration for the determination of
FSP, respondents were engaged with the K-J method, also known as “afffĳinity
diagram.” This method helps participants of focus groups in brainstorming
and/or organizing random ideas in natural categories.25 Participants were
asked to work individually for approximately fĳifteen minutes and list all the
variables they considered necessary for determining FSP. The notes were then
shared on a white board and categorized and debated. At the end of each question, the moderator summarized the main conclusions to the participants. All
the notes were collected at the end of each session to support transcription
and further analysis of the collected data.
Data Analysis of the Results of the Focus Groups
All recordings were transcribed verbatim. Next, the collected data were analyzed by three researchers individually. Then concepts for FSP indicators and

25
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interactions with the various components were developed iteratively based on
the individual analyses.

Results of the Study
This section presents the results of this study. It starts by examining what constitutes FSP in the eyes of the participants, how should it be measured, and
why is it important. Further, the results of the afffĳinity diagram are presented.
Finally, an evaluation of PSC in the context of FSP is presented.
The Whats, Whys, and Hows of FSP
Figure 18.1 encompasses the participants’ perspectives and considerations on
the topic of FSP. In general, the fĳigure is organized into three horizontal levels
depicting, from the top, why FSP should be deemed a topic worth investigating
(Why?), what constitutes FSP (What?), and ultimately how to measure FSP
(How?). Moreover, the fĳigure is further arranged into two vertical regions: administration and fleet. The outer box suggests that every discussion pertaining
to FSP must be embedded in a political and economic context. Finally, the
Political and Economical Inf luence
Administration

Fleet
Why?

Flagging In/Out

Accidents &
Pollution

Less/More PSC
inspections

Flag State Performance

What?
Fleet Performance

Administration Performance
Safety Related Aspects

External
Assessment

Internal
Assessment

How?

Internal
Assessment

External
Assessment

Direct Relationship
Indirect Relationship

Figure 18.1 The whats, whys and hows of FSP.
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dashed lines indicate a simple influence (indirect) of one element on the other, while the solid line represents a direct relationship between the elements.
Conceptually, FSP is perceived to be a bi-dimensional concept characterized
by two main components: administration (on the left) and fleet (on the right).
This sharp categorization was suggested by the majority of the respondents in
order to highlight that a single measure, such as PSC, may not be sufffĳicient to
fully comprehend the complexity of FSP. It is the combined performance of
the two domains that leads to the overall FSP. At the same time, the lower part
of Figure 18.1 suggests that the performance of the two components is evaluated by means of external and internal assessments. For fleet performance, the
internal assessment would be conducted by the administration through flag
State inspections. In contrast, external assessments would be conducted by
third parties, such as PSC. Similarly, for administrative performance, the internal assessment would be conducted by the administration via internal audits
while the external assessments would be conducted by third parties through
IMO audits.
The extent to which fleet performance is a component of FSP was strongly
debated in the two focus groups. In Focus Group I (FG I), participants did
not correlate unsatisfactory vessel performance with a lack of enforcement
by flag States since PSC defĳiciencies and detentions, casualties, and incidents
were perceived to result from factors related to negligent shipowners and/or
insufffĳicient recognized organization (RO) activities. In contrast, a participant
in Focus Group II (FG II) noted, “On the majority of the ships, the port State
control fĳigures, detentions, inspections, defĳiciencies are not measuring the flag
State actions. We are measuring the RO actions and the company-crew actions. And then we are extrapolating to the Flag State.” Generally, FG II participants conceded that poor FSP erodes the performance of the vessels; the same
participant indicated that this was “because the work of the administration is
shown through the fleet situation.”
Regarding Figure 18.1, the upper part shows potential consequences of a
positive/negative FSP. The moderator of the focus groups concluded that the
administrators involved in the study did not feel that they would be able to
fully influence the fleet performance as there may be too many factors beyond
their control that could result in a negative fleet performance, despite good
administrative arrangements.
Elements for FSP
Table 18.2 provides a summary of the afffĳinity diagram exercise with respect to
the necessary measures to construct FSP and the relationships between the
diffferent measures. The table is organized in two main sections. The fĳirst three
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Table 18.2 Afffĳinity diagram results.

Category

Sub-Category

Element

Fleet
Performance

PSC Performance (2) Number of defĳiciencies/inspections
Number of detentions/inspections
FSC
Number of ISM defĳiciencies
Number of defĳiciencies
Accidents
Number of accidents compared to the fleet
Characteristics
Crewing considerations
Nationality of the crew on board
General age of the fleet compared to the
ship types
General distribution of ship type
Manning level
Administration RO Delegation &
Communication procedures with ROs
Performance Monitoring (5)
Tools for RO monitoring
Grade of delegation
Number of authorized RO
International Association of Classifĳication
Societies ROs?
Number of tasks delegated to the RO
Ratifĳication of IMO/ILO instruments
Ratifĳication/
Implementation of IMO/ILO/EU standards
Implementation/
EU infringement procedures
Enforcement
Quality System
Does the flag State hold and implement
quality management system for flag State
activities?
Stafff
Selection criteria for stafff personnel
Training procedures for flag State stafff
(administrative and surveyors)
Qualifĳication for flag State stafff
Quality of stafff
Accidents
Implementation of safety recommendations
from accident investigations
Conduct accident investigations &
follow-up
Fleet Monitoring (3) Frequency of flag State inspections
Number of inspectors compared to the size
of the fleet
ISM monitoring
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Freq. Imp.
6
6
1
1
3
1
1
1

7
6
2
2

1
2
1
1
1
1
3

1

1
4
5
1
6

1
8
1
4

1
3

4

3
1
2

3
1

1
1

2
5
1

4
1

1
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Table 18.2 Afffĳinity diagram results. (cont.)

Category

Sub-Category

Element

Freq. Imp.

General

Active monitoring and certifĳication of
maritime training centers
Criteria for selecting shipowners
Size of the administration compared to the
size of the fleet
Transparent procedures to implement
“safety fĳirst” policies
Number of equivalence of derogation
Activities in international fora (e.g. IMO)
Owners nationality
Clear organization profĳile and organigram
Results of IMO audit

1
1
2

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1

columns reveal the items deemed necessary by the participants. The resultant
classifĳication into categories and subcategories emerged through the data
analysis. The relationship among subcategories and variables were discussed
in plenary. Additionally, participants were asked to classify the fĳive most important elements from all the identifĳied items in the afffĳinity diagram exercise.
As a result, the last two columns illustrate how many times a single element
appeared in the afffĳinity diagram (Freq.), and how many experts perceived the
specifĳic element to be important (Imp.).
The results given in Table 18.2 support the fĳindings seen in Figure 18.1 concerning the bi-dimensional nature of FSP. In addition to the broad categorization into fleet performance and administration performance, the second
column indicates the main subcategories in which the two domains can be
classifĳied. As can be seen, the elements in the diffferent subcategories under
administration performance are more complex than the elements under fleet
performance. However, among the subcategories in administration performance, participants highlighted the importance of two subcategories in particular, RO delegation and monitoring, and fleet monitoring, to determine the
performance of a maritime administration. One of the participants in FG I
noted, “If the flag state does not have efffĳicient tools to monitor what the RO
does or how the company actually implements their procedures on board,
something (related) to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code to
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other tools, then probably the performance is low because of no monitor.” The
participants of the two focus groups reported that PSC performance is the
main subcategory for determining fleet performance.
As described above, the left section of the table summarizes the strength
of the identifĳied elements in terms of frequency and importance. The table
shows that within fleet performance, the elements number of defĳiciencies/inspections (Freq. 6; Imp. 6) and the number of detentions/inspections (Freq.
6; Imp. 6) have been ranked as the most frequent and important. Within fleet
performance, the second most frequent element is the number of accidents
(Freq. 3; Imp. 2).
Comparing the fĳindings in the category of administration performance, the
elements indicated as important by the participants are Implementation of
IMO/ILO/EU standards (Freq. 5; Imp. 8), followed by quality system (Freq. 6;
Imp. 4), training procedures for flag state stafff (Freq. 3; Imp. 4), frequency of
flag State inspections (Freq. 5; Imp. 4), and fĳinally quality of stafff (Freq. 1; Imp.
3). Participants made a clear diffferentiation between ratifĳication of international conventions and their implementation. The element implementation of
IMO/ILO/EU standards (Freq. 5; Imp. 8) is more frequently highlighted than
ratifĳication of IMO/ILO instruments (Freq. 4; Imp. 1).
Port State Control
Table 18.3 represents the general attitude of the participants toward the use of
PSC and the WBG list as a tool to measure FSP. The left side of the table summarizes the positive aspects of PSC while the right side shows the negative
ones. The words highlighted in italics in the table indicate aspects concerning
the WBG list.
A comparison of the two sides of the table shows that the negative elements
outnumber the positive ones, suggesting that PSC has some inconsistencies to
be considered. Among the negative elements, special attention should be given
to the subjectivity of the inspection procedures, suggesting an overreliance on
expert or professional judgment—something that some participants referred
to as lack of harmonization. This may afffect the possibility of the comparison
of inspections results and it appeared to be a common problem when discussing PSC in general. Overall, the inspection process itself was depicted as not
thorough enough to adequately detect certain types of non-compliance. One
of the participants in FG I remarked that there were certain pitfalls of noncompliance with regulations that the inspectors would “never be able to see.”
This participant further commented that because some of the non-compliance
is not visible, inspectors should look to materials such as drawings, standards
of equipment, or policy controls to see where they have been improved, but
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Table 18.3 Positive and negative aspects of PSC and the WBG List.

Positive Aspects

Negative Aspects

• It is the most practical indicator.
• It is a safety net from substandard
vessels.
• It is a defensive line that sorts the
bad from the very bad.
• It is a good output to understand
how vessels perform.
• It is almost the only indicator we
have.
• It is not the best indicator, but it is
efffective to measure fsp.
• It is a proactive measure.
• It is transparent.
• It is independent (external).

• It is not deep enough to verify
compliance.
• It is subjective and relies too much
on expert judgment.
• It has a limited coverage; not all
vessels are subject to PSC.
• There is lack of harmonization in
PSC implementation.
• There are diffferent inspection
qualities among PSC regimes.
• It is a reactive measure.
• It is fallible.
• It lacks efffectiveness.
• It is a sample inspection; it does not
inspect all vessels.
• It does not cover domestic vessels.
• It underestimates detentions for
flags with big fleets.
• It should have more subcategories,
not only white, grey, and black.
• It is static; it should be updated every
week and be dynamic.
• It was created for targeting purposes,
not to determine performance.
• It does not consider the number,
nature, and severity of the
defĳiciencies.

he/she noted, PSC is “not deep enough for that.” However, based on the overall
perceptions, it is safe to indicate that PSC seems to be the only easily accessible indicator to determine fleet performance, but it is not the only indicator.
As a participant in FG II summed up, “But there are other indicators of how
flag States are set up and how they delegate, and how they control and how
they implement.”
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Discussion
The stated aim of this study was to explore FSP by collecting experts’ perceptions and to develop a common understanding of the concept. This relates to
the concept of FSP as a bi-dimensional concept, the implication of FSP in the
context of PSC, and future options for further research on FSP.
Fleet and Administration: Two Sides of the Same Coin?
The emergence of a clear categorization of FSP into administration performance and fleet performance represents a new approach to the topic
(Figure 18.1). When considering the diffferent approaches to FSP indicated during the literature review, some scholars have combined both aspects of fleet
and administration performance,26 while others have concentrated entirely
on the tangible output of low performance of vessels.27 However, consensus
among the participants could not be found on whether the fleet performance
mirrors the performance of the administration and, ultimately, FSP. The debate
followed two main streams. On the one hand, some participants argued that the
fleet performance is the natural output of flag States’ control on their vessels. On
the other hand, other participants highlighted that the responsibility of keeping the vessels in compliance with international standards lies primarily with
the shipowner. In a context where vessel defĳiciencies, detentions, and accidents
are used to measure FSP, it appears challenging to draw the line at whether responsibilities apply to the flag State or shipping company. For this purpose, the
authors accept the approach suggested by Takei where “persistent pattern of
infractions by individual vessels gives rise to the presumption that the flag state
has not exerted its best effforts,” whereas isolated infractions cannot be considered flag States’ responsibility.28 In practice, limiting the complexity of FSP to
fleet performance alone was deemed advantageous, but not exhaustive.
A second point raised in the discussion can be summarized by the following question: to what extent can one measure administration performance if
part of the activities is delegated to an external organization, namely an RO?
According to applicable international rules and standards, a flag State may delegate statutory obligations such as surveys and certifĳication to authorized or
recognized organizations, which invariably are classifĳication societies.29 This
26
27
28
29
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feature of delegation, in fact, generated uncertainty among the participants of
the focus groups. Some experts argued that ROs’ performance is independent
of FSP, while others underlined the pitfalls of their public/private role when
surveying ships.30 The practice of delegating authority does not suggest that
a flag State washes its hands of its responsibility, but rather suggests quite the
opposite. According not only to the RO Code,31 but also to relevant EU legislation, flag States “must supervise, monitor and evaluate the work of those classifĳication societies acting on behalf of them.”32 For this reason, the subcategory
RO delegation and monitoring was included in the category of administration
performance and indicated by more than one-third of the participants.
Overall, it seemed clear that a link between fleet performance and FSP
exists. While one could argue that the responsibility of compliance with international maritime safety standards pertains to the shipowner, it should
be emphasized that oversight and enforcement still remain the fundamental
responsibilities of maritime administrations. Performance can only be optimized if both sides deliver on their respective mandates. It takes, as it were,
two to tango. The magnitude of oversight exercised by a maritime administration likewise produces efffects on the quality of its fleet.
Hence, in order to cover the full spectrum and complexity of flag States and
their responsibilities, the other side of the coin should be contemplated. The
assessment of the administration per se, for example, through the IMO Member States Audit Scheme (IMSAS),33 should lead the way to a new generation
of assessment of FSP based on the combination of elements from both administration and fleet performance.
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Port State Control
PSC represents the most used indicator to evaluate FSP through the WBG list
published annually by at least two regional MoU on PSC, namely, the Paris
MoU and the Tokyo MoU.34
Numerous weaknesses highlighted by the participants (Table 18.3) are corroborated by academic publications.35 These weaknesses may influence the
consistency and coverage of the adopted measure. For example, discrepancies
in harmonization and overreliance on expert judgment may introduce an element of uncertainty in the inspection results, which could ultimately bias the
risk profĳile of vessels. Additionally, the depth of the inspection and the exclusion of other parameters such as type, seriousness, and number of defĳiciencies
make us question whether data collected from PSC inspections affford people
in the fĳield the basis to assess, in qualitative terms, the complexity of FSP as a
whole.
Nevertheless, many participants emphasized the role of FSP inspection in
the attempt to evaluate performance. First, PSC results are publicly available
through the “name and shame” policy adopted by several MoUs. This implies
that PSC results, unlike other measures suggested in Figure 18.1, are transparent and readily accessible. One could also argue that accidents are publicly
accessible. However, the authors feel that the underreporting of maritime accidents, incidents, and near-misses is an issue that still needs to be managed and
that accident reports are not often available to the general public.36 Second,
PSC inspections are performed 365 days a year, which makes the considerable
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amount of data available an added value to develop quantifĳiable indicators.
To date, its accessibility and transparency makes PSC the only available and
quantifĳiable indicator readily applicable to determine FSP.
Quality of the Research Study
Validity, reliability, objectivity, and generalizability are considered to be core
concepts in evaluating the quality of research. In recent years, however, a
large body of research suggests that those concepts traditionally used might
not be the best fĳit to deem the quality of qualitative inquiries.37 Therefore,
alternative criteria for determining the soundness and quality of research have
been developed by Guba and Lincoln,38 among others. The criteria credibility,
dependability, confĳirmability, and transferability are applied in great detail in
this study.
To establish credibility and confĳirmability of the results, the manuscript
was submitted to the thirteen focus group participants and, at the same time,
to two disinterested maritime experts with flag and port State experience. In
parallel, to ensure a high degree of dependability, three diffferent researchers
were involved in the coding process and the results discussed together. Finally,
to provide transferability, thorough information regarding the boundaries, the
participants, the context, the methods employed, and the length of the study
are described to the reader.
Limitations and Future Research
This study represents the pilot for a broader study that will include validation
from a large population and, more importantly, a quantifĳication phase. This
exploratory study has proposed the fĳirst elements necessary to develop an
instrument for measuring how well flag States meet their obligations under international conventions. It explicitly advocates a combination of criteria from
both the merchant shipping fleet and the maritime administration.
37
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One of the main limitations of this study relates to the interpretation of the
subject itself since it has been exclusively associated with the main responsibilities stated in the international legal framework. This stand in the discussion
was taken in order to fĳind common ground among researchers and increase the
readability and interpretability of the concept under investigation. Business,
fĳinancial, and environmental performance, among others, are all diffferent concepts that may complement FSP in other domains, but are not discussed here.
A second limitation is that the focus groups’ results are collected based on
the perception of policy-makers only, which makes the sample limited to a
single stakeholder group. The current study recommends enlarging the sample
of the research to other groups of stakeholders such as shipowners, classifĳication societies, seafarers, and others. In addition, these fĳindings are limited
to EU policy-makers who enjoy a favorable environment due to the fact that
in case of non-compliance, EU maritime legislation is directly enforceable
by the European Commission. Although this may not present an issue due to
the experience of the participants with non-EU maritime administrations, it
is suggested that the policy-makers sample be expanded to take into account
other international actors and entities.
A secondary objective of the study is to supplement the measurability of
FSP in future research and help in the development of a specifĳic taxonomy.
For this reason, the reliability and validity of the items listed under Table 18.2
should be tested in further studies.
The next step in this research endeavor will take into consideration three
additional focus groups representing diffferent stakeholders such as shipowners, classifĳication societies, insurance companies, as well as international and national policy-makers. At a later stage, once the main fĳindings are
aggregated into categories and subcategories and validated by a larger population, the elements that are quantifĳiable in terms of output will be identifĳied
and appropriate measurable performance indicators will be developed (e.g.,
number of surveyors, number of ships inspected, and number of defĳiciencies, etc.). In cases where an element is not measurable but deemed necessary, expert judgment methods such as Delphi or multi-criteria analysis shall
be considered.

Conclusion
In the last decade, the topic of FSP and the demand for new indicators has become increasingly popular. The WBG list developed and published by the Paris
and Tokyo MoUs has, by default, become the most widely accepted benchmark
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to determine FSP. However, the computational issues of the formula and the
excessive simplicity of its criteria call into question the depth and thoroughness possible for using the WBG list. Hence, the call for a comprehensive set
of indicators to go beyond the WBG list has found support from international
policy-makers and shipping industry.
It is evident that PSC represents the only transparent indicator currently
available to determine FSP. However, the focus of the WBG list alone is too
narrow to determine the full spectrum of FSP, and there may be factors outside
the influence of a maritime administration that may have an impact on fleet
performance. Elements such as the practice of delegating authority, overseeing
of the fleet, and implementing international conventions are part of a long list
of elements deemed complementary to broadening the concept of FSP.
The general results of the study suggest that the traditional approach to
FSP, the one based on fleet performance, should be diversifĳied and include a
higher degree of complexity by considering factors such as maritime administrations’ performance. The participants of the two focus groups suggested that
FSP is bi-dimensional in nature and encompasses a wide range of elements
belonging to vessel and administration performance.
Apart from looking at diffferent options to determine more quantifĳiable indicators, it is necessary to address factors that result in uncertainty with respect
to PSC results. Elements such as lack of harmonization, diffferences in quality
across the regimes, and subjectivity of inspection practices may hamper the
efffectiveness of such an instrument to measure FSP. A thorough and parallel
investigation of PSC’s main problem drivers could help to make PSC results a
more reliable indicator for FSP. Nonetheless, the main outcome of this pilot
study is the shift from a unidimensional concept for FSP to a bi-dimensional
one, and to lay the foundation for further research, including quantifĳication.
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Port State Control (PSC) is the major global strategy for ﬁghting substandard shipping since the signature of The
Hague Memorandum in 1978. In the last years, the increased volume of trade, the enlarged number of main
international conventions and the highlighted diﬀerences among the various Regimes have posed new
challenges to the modern system of PSC, which may need to ﬁnd its new course.
This paper examines the point of view of key maritime stakeholders with regard to the EU PSC regime. Elite
interviews (n = 14) were conducted with subject matter experts ranging from policy makers, to industry and
seafarers’ representatives. The study aims to determine factors leading to diﬀerence in treatment among EU
Member States. The study concludes that PSC in Europe seems to be the most eﬃcient and reliable of the
regional agreement on PSC. However, some discrepancies during the inspection process and outcome can be
highlighted due to diﬀerences at the inspector and Member State level.

1. Introduction
Since the emergence of the various regional agreements, Port State
Control (PSC) has become a robust and omnipresent reality in the
maritime day-to-day operations, or what Bloor et al. (2006) deﬁne as
an ‘enforcement agency’. On March 2018, the shipping industry will
approach the 40th anniversary of the Amoco Cadiz disaster, which
accelerated the emergence of those agreements for coordinated ship
safety inspections. Accidents such as the Aegean Sea (1992), Braer
(1993), Estonia (1994), Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002), caused a
strong political and public outcry for more stringent regulations
regarding safety of ships and protection of the maritime environment.
In line with this appeal, regional cooperation and coordination for ship
inspections were established and responded to the general belief that
many of the existing ﬂag States were ineﬀective to thoroughly fulﬁl
their obligations on their vessels (Anderson, 1998; Bloor et al., 2006;
Özçayır, 2009; van Leeuwen, 2015).
The Hague Memorandum had been just signed when two weeks
after, the Amoco Cadiz ran aground oﬀ the coasts of France spilling
more than 200,000 t of oil and making clear, out and loud, that
shipping failed in coping with new challenges and, more importantly,
in self-controlling its vessels (Anderson, 1998; Bell, 1993; Mansell,
2009; Özçayır, 2004; Vorbach, 2001). It was at the Ministerial
Conference held in Paris in 1982 that 14 European states conceived

⁎

the ﬁrst regional coordinated system of ship inspections by signing the
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris
MoU) in the attempt to stem the proliferation of substandard shipping.
However, it was not until 1995 that PSC became a European Union
(EU) initiative with the implementation of Directive 1995/21/EC on
PSC which made the Paris MoU system mandatory for EU Member
States (MSs). The Directive represents the predecessor of the current
legislative instrument, in force since 1st of January 2011: Directive
2009/16/EC, as amended by Directive 2013/38/EU.
Since its introduction, the areas of application of PSC have greatly
increased. While enforcement provisions have been included in recent
conventions, such as the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) or the
Ballast Water Management (BWM) Convention, inspection results are
also widely used to determine Flag State performance resulting in the
compilation of a Black-White and Grey (BWG) list. However, despite
the major eﬀorts, discrepancies in harmonization eﬀorts were found by
diﬀerent studies (Anderson, 2002; Bloor et al., 2006; Cariou et al.,
2009; Hjorth, 2015; Knapp and van de Velden, 2009; Knudsen and
Hassler, 2011; Ravira and Piniella, 2016; Sampson and Bloor, 2007)
asserting that PSC ‘does not have uniform application in all diﬀerent
regions and sometimes not even within the same MoU’ (Özçayır, 2009).
This article does not aim to be a historical review of PSC; it is taken
for granted that the increased use of coordinated and harmonised ship
safety inspection eﬀorts has profoundly impacted the shipping industry
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While the literature has shown that some inconsistencies may be
found in the various regions, this study focuses on those which emerge
within the same region and, speciﬁcally, the EU region. Lastly, this
article aims not only at unrevealing disparities, if any, but also to the
underlying contributory factors.

and increased safety standards (Anderson, 2002; Cariou et al., 2008;
Hare, 1997; Özçayır, 2009; Vorbach, 2001). Rather, the purpose of this
article is to investigate what are the main factors contributing to the
disparities in harmonization among EU MSs by focusing on Directive
2009/16/EC, as amended. According to this objective, ten elite interviews with fourteen key experts in the maritime domain were conducted covering a large spectrum of policy-makers (European
Commission, EMSA, Paris MoU Secretariat), ship-owner representatives (BIMCO, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, INTERMANAGER),
classiﬁcation societies representatives (IACS) and seafarers’ representatives (Nautical Institute, CESMA).

3. Methodology
The reported ﬁndings are derived from an interview study designed
to accommodate ten elite interviews with fourteen participants.
3.1. Elite Interviews and purposive sampling

2. Literature review – A glance at the past

An elite interview is a type of interview mainly used in political
science to understand hidden elements of policies and/or legislation by
interviewing high-oﬃcials or people holding a prestigious role in
society (e.g. politicians, civil servants, legislators, etc.) (Boucher
et al., 2013 citing Dexter 1970; Richards, 1996). For this reason ‘elite
interview samples tend to be a lot smaller’ (Richards, 1996). A
purposive sampling was deemed appropriate for this study due to the
narrow research focus and the speciﬁc and unique context/case (Miles
et al., 2013).
The key requisite for the choice of participants was to cover the
wide spectrum of stakeholders involved in PSC. The demographic could
not be presented in this paper and will not be shared to the readers for
conﬁdentiality reasons and due to the high-proﬁle of the interviewees.
All information that could be shared is presented in Table 1.
A semi-structured interview was chosen in order to unveil a broad
amount of themes/areas to be explored during the interview. The
interview guide (Appendix A) was developed and tested with one
representative of the United States Coast Guard with long-standing
experience in PSC inspections and one senior researcher in the area of
communication and sociology. The interview is part of a larger study on
Port State Control. This paper focuses on questions relevant to Section
4 and Section 5 of the Interview Guide in Appendix A.
Prior to the interview, all participants were informed of the average
time for the interview (30–45 min). The interviews started by presenting the overall scope of the study and by providing information on the
participants’ rights. Thereafter, the informants were asked to sign a
consent form and complete the demographics sheet. The interviews
were recorded with permission.

Two of the main reasons to develop regional cooperation for PSC
were undoubtedly the need for sharing information between states
about the safety records of vessels and to avoid that a vessel was
inspected at every port within the same region (Hare, 1997). At the
same time, this was underpinned by providing harmonised rules and
standards for inspection procedures. By setting a common standard,
MoUs’ goal is to avoid unilateral action by Port States which could have
a negative impact on the neighbourhood ports within the same region,
reducing their commercial attractiveness (Molenaar, 2007), and distorting the market (Knapp and Franses, 2007a). In parallel, discrepancies may inﬂuence the outcome of performance measurement such
as the BWG list (Perepelkin et al., 2010), by diﬀering safety records and
targeting factors.
Issues in the harmonization and standardization process have been
identiﬁed since the emergence of the ﬁrst MoUs. While major academic
studies have focused on the legal basis for Port State jurisdiction
(Anderson, 1998; Bang, 2009; Bell, 1993; Keselj, 1999; Molenaar,
2007; Özçayır, 2004; Payoyo, 1994) and the improvement of the
targeting system (Anderson, 2002; Cariou et al., 2009; Cariou and
Wolﬀ, 2015; Degré, 2007, 2008; Sage, 2005), inconsistencies in the
application of PSC were already highlighted by Plaza (1994). In the
study conducted by Sampson and Bloor (2007), the perception of
inconsistencies in inspection practices between diﬀerent countries in
diﬀerent MoUs emerged during stakeholders interviews and ﬁeld
studies. Diﬀerences in treatment were also underlined by Knapp and
van de Velden (2009) and Knudsen and Hassler (2011), which
concluded that a degree of harmonization and uniformity across the
various PSC MoUs is far from being reached. Nevertheless, studies
targeting inconsistencies within the same region are scarce (e.g., Cariou
et al., 2009) and none of those regard the EU as their main focus.
Özçayır (2009) was concerned by the lack of uniform application of
inspection standards. The author suggested that if, on the one hand,
insuﬃcient funds and lack of personnel are the main contributors for
diﬀerences among states, the subjectivity of PSC Oﬃcers (PSCO) for
detaining vessels on the basis of their professional judgment represents
a major drawback rooted in their background and training. This aspect
of discretion in PSCOs is re-evoked and reinforced by Bloor et al.
(2006) in the results of an ethnographic-inspired study which involved
3 maritime authorities, more than one hundred observations on board
and around 30 interviews with key stakeholders. In their study on
cross-national (rather than within-national) diﬀerences in inspection
practices, the background of the inspector emerged as one contributing
factor.
Following the stream of PSCO's background and training, Knapp
and Franses (2007b) suggested that the probability of detention
appears to be slightly higher if the inspection is conducted by an
inspector with engineering background compared to nautical background. Similarly, Ravira and Piniella (2016) analysed the inﬂuence of
the professional background of PSCOs within the framework of the
Spanish Administration. The authors concluded that both professional
background and the use or lack of teams for the conduction of an
inspection has an inﬂuence on the inspection outcome.

3.2. Critical case study
The focus of this paper on the Paris MoU lies in the peculiar nature
of the regime which makes it arguably a ‘critical case’ scenario
(Goldthorpe, 1968). In their study on whether empirical evidence
would support the emergence of the notion of embourgeoisement, the
Table 1
Elites participating in the interviews, their Organization and Background.
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Participant ID

Organization

Background

P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
P10
P11
P12
P13
P14

European Commission
EMSA
EMSA
BIMCO
INTERTANKO
IACS
INTERMANAGER
NAUTICAL INSTITUTE
INTERCARGO
CESMA
Paris MoU Secretariat
Paris MoU Secretariat
CESMA
CESMA

Law
Master Mariner & PSCO
Other & PSCO
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Naval Architecture
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Naval Architecture
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
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credibility, transferability, dependability and conﬁrmability (Trochim
and Donnelly, 2006). For this purpose, an analytical triangulation has
been conducted through a review by inquiry participants and an
independent expert audit review (n = 3).

authors designed the most favourable setting. They argued that should
embourgeoisement not be found in the most favourable setting, it
would be safe to say that it would be unlikely to occur in less-favourable
settings. In other words ‘if it happens here, it will happen anywhere’ or
‘if it doesn’t happen here, it won’t happen anywhere’ (Patton, 2015; p.
275).
Similarly, the nature of the Paris MoU itself suggests that the
regime constitutes a critical case study for four main reasons:

4. Results & discussion
The following section provides the results and discussion of this
study with a focus on the challenges/discrepancies that can be found in
the Paris MoU regime. In the original template (Table 2), the a priori
code “Challenges/Discrepancies” was changed into “Challenges/
Discrepancies Paris MoU” to distinguish the Paris MoU from the other
regions of the World. However, the “Challenges/Discrepancies” highlighted for other MOUs have not been included in this paper as well as
other clusters such as “Background History”, “Eﬀectiveness of PSC”
and “Areas of Improvement” because it is not in the scope of this
article.

1. Since the Paris MoU is the ﬁrst regional agreement on PSC signed in
1982, the level of experience and maturity is higher than other more
recently signed MoUs.
2. While MoUs are, ipso facto, gentlemen's agreements, the Paris MoU
is supported by the EU Directive 2009/16/EC as amended, which is
legally binding for all the EU MSs.
3. Lastly, the Paris MoU beneﬁts from a set of tools such as a targeting
database system (THETIS), an online distance-learning programme
(DLP), an inspection support software (RuleCheck) and others,
which have only recently been adopted by some other MoUs.
4. All other MoU's have observer status in the Paris MoU meetings and
trainings, and routinely receive for information all Instructions,
Guidelines and other information. Although these arrangements are
reciprocal, they are highly conducive to the dissemination of the
Paris MoU way of working.

4.1. An overview of discrepancies and challenges in the European
Union region
Fig. 1 shows the main themes and how often certain codes can be
found in the interviews’ transcriptions. The more often the code has
been assigned to a participant, the larger the square. The size of a single
square is determined by its relation to all other squares in the matrix
and gives a general overview of the distribution of the segments for all
codes and participants (the ﬁgure can be read both vertically and
horizontally).
Contrarily, Fig. 2 illustrates the distribution of the codes for the
individual participant (the ﬁgure must be read vertically) which
indicates for every participant (P stands for participant) which were
the most used codes and the size of the square is compared to the other
squares in the same column. (confusing)
In general, the software counts how many times a code has been
used, regardless of the length of the sentence and number of words.
This means that the following two quotes are both regarded as one
code:

For these four main reasons, it is presumed that if discrepancies can
be found in the Paris MoU regime, it is likely that those can be found in
more recent MOUs.
3.3. Data analysis
All audio-recordings were verbatim transcribed and anonymized.
All collected data and transcriptions were entered in MAXQDA 10
software and analysed using template analysis.
In essence, the method structures the collected data through data
coding aiming at identifying the main themes of the study. This method
works well in studies where a comparison between diﬀerent groups
within a speciﬁc context is performed (Patton, 2015). The term
‘template analysis’, however, does not refer to a clear and uniquely
identiﬁable method but rather a ‘group of techniques for thematically
organizing and analysing textual data’ (King, 2004). It suggests
identifying some a priori codes which then will be modiﬁed and
updated through in vivo codes during the analysis.
Since the study follows a deductive-inspired approach, the analysis
did not begin with a tabula rasa, but with a set of pre-deﬁned
categories or codes, known as template (Table 2). They were later
reﬁned and revised with the in vivo codes. An extract is shown in
Appendix B and pertains to Section 4 and Section 5 of the interview.
The a priori codes were derived from previous literature and were
discussed with three experienced Port State Control Oﬃcers (PSCOs).
Given the pragmatic approach underpinning the research philosophy of this study and the intended recipients of the ﬁndings, the
authors adopted an output oriented approach (Patton, 2015; Reynolds
et al., 2011) to determine the quality of the ﬁndings in terms of

“I think they made a huge diﬀerence. And it would be very wrong to
not accept that. They ach-achieved something which is maybe more
important for me. There is a standardization, there is cooperation,
there is a body where we can lodge our complain, where we can have
a discussion. It's not arbitrary like it was ‘you can’t-you can’t talk to
me, I am guru and I know what I am talking about’. So they
deﬁnitely achieved that. By doing that, if you look at the safety
record of shipping industry it's bloody excellent. And compare us
with air industry and you would be surprised. We are really, really
good and Port State Control must be congratulated on that.”
(INTERMANAGER)
And:
“Some countries ahem have an elaborate system which requires that
the Port State Control Oﬃcer almost ﬁnishes like ahem a university
degree in Port State Control before Master's Degree before he's
allowed to work as a Port State Control Oﬃcer.” (EMSA)
This is because the objective of the visualization is to show how
often a certain topic has been discussed by the participants, regardless
of the size of the sentence.
The two ﬁgures are divided according to their stakeholder group:
Policy Makers (P1 – P2 – P3 – P11 – P12), Seafarers representatives
(P10 – P13 – P14 – P8 – P7), Industry's representatives (P7 – P4 – P5
– P9 – P6). Due to the current active role of P7 in two stakeholder
groups, the participant has been included in both seafarers and shipowners’ representative groups.
As shown in Fig. 1, Participants 2 and 7 were the most active in
highlighting discrepancies in Europe, mainly focusing their attention

Table 2
A priori codes used for the data analysis.
1st level code

2nd Level code

Background history
Challenges/Discrepancies

N/A
Background of PSCOs
Inspection procedures
Detention Criteria
Training of PSCOs
N/A
N/A

Eﬀectiveness of PSC
Areas of improvement
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Fig. 1. Discrepancies and Challenges in the EU region (overall).

get away with issues (.) detected and all, where they should not. And
in the past would not have gone away with it, so (ahem) the
inspectors have become more relaxed to dealing with problems”
(EMSA).

on Background of PSCOs, Diﬀerences between MSs, MSs level and
Training of the PSCOs; the results of both participants alone represent
31% of the overall coded segments. An outcome which might suggest
that these actors are particularly involved in these themes. In addition,
the most frequently discussed themes among the participants were:
Attitude/Approach on board, Background of PSCOs, Diﬀerence between MSs and Training of PSCOs.
In general, policy makers were the most active group in focusing on
the discrepancies in the regime. This might be a consequence of the
availability of non-public information they have access to through the
management of the regional PSC database THETIS, by training PSCOs
and by conducting visits to the various MSs on the implementation of
the PSC Directive. Topics such as Training of the PSCOs, Team/No
Team on board and the inﬂuence at the MSs level (e.g. resources,
national or local legislation, etc.) were thoroughly addressed by policy
makers while the same cannot be said for other stakeholders. This is
also why the former tend to have a more critical approach towards the
harmonization and uniformity of the MoU while industry (with the
exception of INTERMANAGER) and seafarers had a very positive
attitude towards the Paris MoU and its equal treatment. An outcome
which was interpreted by one of the participants as an outcome of the
regime's reputation:

Fig. 3 organizes the ﬁndings in a brief diagram where the three
main clusters found are summarised in: Inspector Level, MS Level
and Diﬀerences Among MSs. While the details of the ﬁndings will
be further explained in the next sections, it is crucial to conceptualise
the meaning of the ﬁgure. The two clusters on top of the ﬁgure (input),
namely Inspector Level and MS Level, encompass the main factors
identiﬁed by the interviewees which could lead to discrepancies during
a Ship Inspection. Conversely, the bottom of the ﬁgure, namely
Diﬀerences Among MSs, illustrates the output of a PSC inspection
where the two clusters on top had a negative inﬂuence on the
inspection process (output).
4.2. Member states level
At the MS level the participants have highlighted some factors, or
better, local factors, which could negatively inﬂuence a PSC inspection.
Those are:

•
•
•
•
•
•

“I think the Paris MoU still today is regarded as the most eﬀective
region which I think it's not the case. What we have created is an
area around us, a maritime area, where there is a big a high level of
self-control by shipping companies, by ﬂag States, by ships in
general. Because of the reputation of the Paris MoU. So that is the
indirect eﬀectivity, you have created a name for yourself and we still
use that reputation […] So (ahem) to say it in normal words (.) ships

Use of Teams on Board
Resources (Human & Financial)
Local/National Legislation
Training of PSCOs
Internal Administrative Structure
Political Inﬂuence/Support

Fig. 2. Discrepancies and Challenges in the EU Region (participants).
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Fig. 3. Input and Output of a discretionary ship inspection system.

country (ﬁnancial and human resources), by the internal organization
of the country, the distance between ports, the presence or absence of
regional PSC oﬃces, among others.

Some of those local diﬀerences were already suggested by Plaza
(1994) and further by Bloor et al. (2006) and Knudsen and Hassler
(2011).
Among the various legal acts through which the EU achieves its
goals, Directives and Regulations are the most common. While both
legislative acts are binding for the EU MSs, the level of ﬂexibility
changes greatly. A Directive sets out a goal or result that then the
individual MS is still free to choose how to pursue its implementation
through transposition into national legislation. Conversely, a
Regulation must be applied entirely into national legislation throughout the union without further transposition (Coleman and Jessen,
2016). In other words, a Directive ensures a higher degree of ﬂexibility
for MSs which may leave wide gaps in the implementation process
(Falkner et al., 2004). It is therefore assumed that the choice of
enacting common PSC procedures by means of Directive 2009/16/EC,
as amended, represents the origin of part of the highlighted disparities
in the implementation and enforcement eﬀorts. This has also been
highlighted by some of the policy makers during the interview study.
Since
Resources,
Local/National
Legislation,
Internal
Administrative Structure and Political Inﬂuence/Support have mainly
been discussed in relation to Training of PSCOs and Use of Teams on
Board, those two factors are explored in more detail in the following
sections.

“[…] in some countries it depends on the distance to travel. You
send one person in a car for four hours or do you send two?” (Paris
MoU Secretariat).
With regard to the travelling distance that needs to be covered by
the PSCO to inspect a vessel, some participants suggested to investigate
the existence of a travelling policy within the country compared to the
miles of coastline or the travelling time from one port to another
compared to the miles of coastline.
It seemed clear that inspections conducted in isolation do not only
accentuate the cultural and/or background diﬀerences, but leave the
subject exposed to the ship's crew and the shipowner. The use of a team
dims the eﬀects of external pressure on the inspectors while allowing
for interaction between the team members (peer review and complementary expertise). This interaction tends to mitigate negative eﬀects
connected to the use of professional judgment in uncertain/unclear
situations.

4.2.2. A (non-)harmonised training policy
Same as for the decision to make use of teams for PSC inspections,
the training of PSCO is a national prerogative. In their annexes, the
PSC Directive (Annex XI) and the Paris MoU text (Annex VI) determine
the professional proﬁle of the inspectors and establish the so-called
“minimum criteria” for PSCO. Those criteria, such as having an
appropriate qualiﬁcation from a nautical institution and having
completed a minimum of one year of service as a ﬂag State inspector,
have become mandatory for EU MSs so that PSCO would have
appropriate theoretical knowledge and practical experience of ships
and their operation. While the Directive establishes the minimum
criteria, the Paris MoU has developed the Paris MoU Policy on the
training of the new entrant PSC Oﬃcers and the professional
development scheme for PSC Oﬃcers which establishes a convergent
training policy for both new and experienced PSCOs. Although this

4.2.1. The use of teams – an issue of resources?
The use of teams of PSC oﬃcers on board to perform a PSC
inspection was indicated as a factor that could lead to diﬀerent
inspection outcomes compared to single PSCO inspections. Knapp
and Franses (2007b) suggested that the inspector background is
reﬂected in particular deﬁciencies while Ravira and Piniella (2016)
strongly advocate for multidisciplinary team on board. However, some
participants from the policy making group have highlighted that the
decision of using teams of two or more inspectors is not part of the EU
legislation and therefore is a decision of the MS whether to avail of one
or more PSCOs during a single inspection (P11-P12-P2-P3). This
decision is strongly inﬂuenced by the availability of resources of the
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4.3.1. Professional judgment
Discretion, subjectivity, individuality, professional judgment and
other equivalent concepts have broadly been interpreted as one of the
circumstances leading to diﬀerence in treatment across countries and
ports (Bloor et al., 2006; Özçayır, 2009; Sampson and Bloor, 2007).
The deﬁnition suggested by Coles (2002) states that professional
judgment is exercised when a practitioner, in this case the PSCO,
makes judgment calls in an uncertain situation. The text of the Annex I
of the Paris MoU itself states that:

policy determines a thorough professional development scheme and a
syllabus, it neither speciﬁes how to conduct the training nor the
number of hours necessary to accommodate the various elements of
the policy. As pointed out by several policy makers, the implementation
of the training policy is still a national responsibility and cannot be
enforced by the EC. It is not included in the text of the Directive, which
would make it legally binding.
“What training is implemented nationally? Because actually on a
national level we don’t really know how they do it. It's their
responsibility […] Let's say on the other side as soon as they are
port state control oﬃcer from that moment on they become either a
new entrant in our training policy or they are the experienced
PSCOs and they go for the professional development scheme. That's
all laid out, what are the requirements, what are the minimum
standards, what is the material (ahem) so that's let's say something
that we are much better able to monitor” (Paris MoU Secretariat)

“The Port State Control Oﬃcer will (…) use his professional
judgement in deciding whether and in what respects the ship will
be further inspected” (Paris MoU, 2017)
and also, in the PSC Committee instructions on “Guidance on
Detention and Action Taken”:
“The PSCO will exercise professional judgment in determining
whether to detain the ship until the deﬁciencies are rectiﬁed or to
allow it to sail with certain deﬁciencies without unreasonable
danger to the safety, health, or the environment, having regard to
the particular circumstances of the intended voyage” (Paris MoU,
2016)

According to the group of the Policy Makers, the participants were
almost unanimous in suggesting that training procedures among EU
MSs are not harmonised. Some considered the training policy of the
diﬀerent MSs as a ‘black hole’ (P1), while others made a clear-cut
diﬀerence between those countries with developed training schemes
and those with a ‘training on the job’ policy:

Some participants have expressed severe criticisms on the overreliance on expert judgment which inherently does not contribute to
the harmonization process. Others, such as some industry and seafarers’ representatives, seem to appreciate the ﬂexibility which would
not be achievable if other strategies would be applied (e.g. checklists,
etc.).
Overall, two main issues can be raised. Firstly, professional judgment may undermine the main objective set by Directive 2009/16/EC,
as amended, which is to enforce rules and standards of international
applicable conventions. Allowing for subjectivity can cause inconsistencies in decision outcomes (Hawkins, 1992 as cited in Bloor et al.,
2006). Secondly, the exercise of professional judgment implies that the
PSCO must be a professional. The existence of minimum criteria for
PSCO has already been clariﬁed above. However, inconsistencies in the
training policy of MSs and diﬀerent professional backgrounds may
aﬀect the level of professionalism matured by the PSCO.
Several factors may inﬂuence expert judgment: prejudices, cultural
attitude, professional background, training, ego, personal opinions
among others (P1 – P2 – P3 – P6 – P7 – P8 – P9 – P11 – P12 –
P13). Some of these factors, for example, were identiﬁed also in a study
conducted by Carter (2006) on the variance of police behaviours.
Taking into consideration the input provided by the participants, a
mitigation could be achieved by means of a soft or hard approach. The
soft approach focuses on harmonising the training policy pertaining
inspection procedures, detention criteria and convention requirements.
Conversely, the hard approach would suggest more prescriptive
procedures and, ultimately, the use of checklists during inspections.

“Some countries (ahem) have an elaborate system which requires
that the Port State Control Oﬃcer almost ﬁnishes like (ahem) a
university degree in Port State Control before Master's Degree
before he's allowed to work as a Port State Control Oﬃcer […] there
are other countries where they hire a new guy who is then left alone
from day one. And only has to call back to the oﬃce when he has a
problem. Which is a massive diﬀerence of course and this is then
(ahem) visible in inspection results, it is visible in reactions of
companies towards inspection and it's damaging or not to the
reputation of the organization, the Paris MoU in general or the MoU
in general” (EMSA)
However, with other stakeholders, with the exception of
INTERMANAGER and IACS, the topic of training was rarely mentioned.
The participants convened that a harmonised training policy is the
most eﬀective tool to ensure common treatment. In fact, it was
suggested that the national attitude towards training has a deep impact
on the way PSCO approach their job, what methodology they learn and
apply, what knowledge of the relevant conventions they have, etc. In
order to develop a comprehensive picture of the training commitment
of the various MSs, the total number of training hours (both desk and
practical training) per person, provided to new and existing personnel,
should be investigated through the reports compiled by EMSA at the
end of the visits to MSs investigating the implementation and enforcement of Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended.

4.3.2. Background of the PSCOs
The background of the inspector has dominated the discussion in
all interviews. It seemed clear that whether nautical, engineering or
naval architecture, the background has a leading role not only in
determining the outcome of the inspection itself (e.g. detaining or not
the vessel, type of deﬁciencies found, etc.), but sometimes even on the
attitude and approach on board. As a criterion, it was pointed out that
since an engineer ﬁnds himself/herself more comfortable in the Engine
Room as well as a Captain ﬁnds himself/herself more comfortable on
the Bridge, the inspections and eventual deﬁciencies would reﬂect their
proﬁciency in these arenas:

4.3. Inspector level
The second main cluster of codes, which summarizes some of the
circumstances that may determine discrepancies in the output of the
inspection process, entails the inspector level. In detail:

•
•
•
•

Background of the PSCOs
Cultural inﬂuence
Professional Judgment
Attitude/Approach on Board

“You’ve done 30 years as a deck oﬃcer therefore your Port State
Control is always limited to an inspection of the bridge. You’re never
going to the Engine Room” (IACS)

Since Cultural inﬂuence, and Attitude/Approach on board have
mainly been discussed in relation to the Professional Judgment and
Background of the PSCO, these two factors will be explored with more
detail in the following sections.

Or also:
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“[…] if you are if you are, say, you are technical background. Your
comfort zone is engine room. Ok? So our so you-the tendency is if I
am a ships ‘captain, as a Port State Control I’ll tend to spend more
time on the bridge because I know what hole I can ﬁnd wrong. The
opposite can happen if you’re engineer you will spend more time in
the engine room. If you’re a naval architect, you might spend more
time on the structural issues rather than (ahem) the operational
issues related to… and not more on navigation. He will might look
into the ship structure and the (ahem) the steel work et cetera.”
(NAUTICAL INSTITUTE)

PSC in Northern countries has been considered more robust in
terms of maritime knowledge since PSCOs are generally ex-seafarers.
However, a structured approach towards procedures seems challenging
to be achieved. The consequence is that the perception of quality is
higher for seafarers and industry (P4-P7) but not for policy makers.
Conversely, in Southern countries, the subjectivity of the inspectors
and the lack of seafaring experience may play a larger role in the
conduction of inspections. However, whereas seafaring knowledge may
be lacking, adherence to structured procedure seems easier to achieve.
This way, the perception of quality seems higher for policy makers but
not for seafarers and industry.

This issue could be avoided by sending two inspectors with diﬀerent
background to perform a PSC inspection. It seemed clear that if the
inspection would be conducted by an individual (and not a team) with
one of the background mentioned above, the type of deﬁciencies and/or
the areas visited on board could be the result of their professional skills
developed before becoming a PSCO. Conversely, inspectors lacking a
seafaring background have the tendency to conduct the inspection by
the rules, having less technical and operational knowledge (P2-P4-P13P8) yet a very good knowledge of the inspection procedures of their
MoU (P2-P3).
Following the discussion on the background, a diﬀerence in
approaches and attitudes has been underlined. Experts have indicated
that ex-seafarers seem to be more indulgent towards the ship and the
crew; it is easier to “get away with deﬁciencies” (P4). This might be
explained by being more empathetic with the crew and by believing in
the skills and the capability of the crew to ﬁx deﬁciencies on their own
(P2). To summarize, two inspection approaches have been identiﬁed:
the ﬁrst is where the PSCO on board tends to determine whether the
vessel is safe to sail (approach more related to PSCOs with a seafaring
background), while the second is to ﬁnd deﬁciencies strictly following
guidelines and procedures (approach more related to PSCOs lacking
seafaring background, P2-P4-P8-P7-P6). However, this diﬀerent perception may suggest that PSC has diﬀerent perceived objectives
according to the group of stakeholders dealing with it. Policy Makers
seem to aim at ﬁnding substandard ships and increase the safety
standard of the vessels sailing across EU waters by using common
procedures which is in line with the rationale of the Directive, IMO
Resolutions and the MoU text. Contrariwise, ship-owners seemed
keener on targeting issues and in making sure that the general
demeanour of PSCOs was to verify the seaworthiness of the vessel
rather than compliance with the international legislation. While this
approach may seem more reasonable, it does not take into consideration the main objective of PSC: determining compliance of vessels with
applicable international rules and standards.

4.5. Quality of the research
In recent years, some authors have suggested that validity, reliability, objectivity and generalisability may not be the best suitable
criteria to evaluate qualitative inquiries (Hammersley, 2007; Hoepﬂ,
1997; Patton, 2015; Yilmaz, 2013). For this reason, alternative criteria
such as those of credibility, dependability, conﬁrmability and transferability were initially developed by Guba and Lincoln (1989) and
adopted for this study. The overall work was subject to an analytical
triangulation conducted through a review by inquiry participants an
independent audit review (n = 3).
In detail, to establish high level of credibility, the manuscript was
submitted to three independent experts which evaluated the methodology and the quality of the ﬁndings. At the same time, to determine
conﬁrmability, the manuscript was submitted to the 14 participants to
collect their views and potential post-comments in the paper discussion. Dependability was achieved through a code-recode procedure
throughout the analysis of the data after waiting at least two weeks
from the initial coding. Lastly, to provide transferability, thorough
information regarding the participants, the context and the methods
employed are illustrated to the reader.
4.6. Limitations and future perspectives
It should be noted that this paper has been primarily focused on the
identiﬁcation of discrepancies and challenges (if any) in the Paris MoU
region, targeting EU countries only, and does not address other areas
explored during the interview study.
Although the use of elite interviews is highly beneﬁcial to gain
insights into the decision-making process, to provide information nonrecorded in oﬃcial reports and to shed light on hidden elements in the
area under investigation (Richards, 1996), the results can be aﬀected
by biases. Overall, issues of accessibility of the participants and the
power relationship between interviewer and interviewee may shape the
data and the reliability of the data collected (Boucher et al., 2013).
While no accessibility issues were reported in the study, Berry (2002)
suggests that the most eﬃcient way to steer the conversation is for the
interviewer to become an expert in the subject; experience which is
covered by the authors of this paper. Moreover, the authors favoured
semi-structure interviews instead of fully open-ended interviews (as
generally suggested for elite interviews) to ensure a higher degree of
transferability and dependability.
The ﬁndings of this study are restricted to individuals/experts
which have a broad knowledge of the topic under investigation and also
hold a position of prestige in the hierarchy of the contacted agency,
entity, company or association. This also suggests that due to their
public/private roles, the participants may have refrained to give strong
statements and opinions. It is suggested for future studies to expand
the scope of the study to other subject-related experts such as PSCOs,
Administrators and multiple seafarers. In addition, it must be taken
into consideration that the participants may have wanted to cover only
some issues rather than others by focusing their attention on topics
they are more involved into.
On a higher level, since EU policy makers are embarking on the

4.4. Diﬀerences between EU member states. Diverse structure and
knowledge towards a north-south slope?
While the legal texts of the diﬀerent MoUs are virtually identical,
the enforcement of these provisions may change due to ﬁnancial
resources, training capabilities and/or infrastructures (Bang and
Jang, 2012; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; Plaza, 1994). Shipowners’
and seafarers’ representatives were almost unanimous in deﬁning the
Paris MoU as the best PSC regime where discrepancies are infrequent.
However, slight diﬀerences between EU MSs have been highlighted
(Sampson and Bloor, 2007); this is true especially when the debate
pertains southern and northern countries in what has been called
‘north-south slope’ (P2). Some participants, such as P4-P2-P6-P7, have
portrayed the southern countries of Europe as the keenest on detaining
ships while in the north of Europe, MSs tend to perform an inspection
‘less by the rules’:
“Let me say that the barrier for where you are detained is less in the
South and higher in the North. In the North, you can in more cases
talk your way out of it” (P4 - BIMCO).
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revision of the relevant legal framework, the ﬁndings of this article may
highlight areas needful of amendments for a new Directive on PSC and
steer the regime towards a new course.

diﬀerences identiﬁed. Above all, advocating for a single training policy
for PSCOs, multidisciplinary teams on board and more structured
inspection procedures appeared the main mitigation approaches
suggested by the participants. In addition, it is our belief that the
introduction of a diﬀerent legal system, such as a Regulation, would
prevent transposition and application concerns and favour harmonization. The authors hope that this study and its ﬁndings can contribute to
the corpus of reference materials that will inform EU policymakers as
they embark on a recast of the relevant legal framework. An initiative
which could represent a new point of departure for EU Port State
Control.

5. Conclusions
The body of literature dealing with PSC in the last years has greatly
focused on demonstrating whether diﬀerences in treatment would exist
among MoUs. However, few studies have discussed whether diﬀerences
appear within the same MoU. This article complements other scientiﬁc
work by highlighting the main factors leading to diﬀerences in
approach at the inspector and MS level in the EU region.
According to the results, it is fair to say that the Paris MoU appears
the most eﬀective and reliable of the regional agreement on PSC. This is
true especially for seafarers’ and shipowners’ representatives while
policy makers maintain a more neutral assessment.
Nonetheless, a diﬀerence in maritime knowledge and structure of
the inspection process was identiﬁed between Northern and Southern
EU countries. PSCOs from the former group of countries tend to have a
thorough maritime knowledge due to their professional background.
Still, they lack a structured ship inspection approach due to overreliance on experience and expertise. On the contrary, PSCOs from the
latter group of countries seem to rely more on a structured ship
inspection approach due to their lack of seafaring experience.
Despite the positive achievements reached in 40 years of coordinated PSC by the EU, some strategies were suggested to overcome the
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Appendix A. Interview guide
General objective: What is the perception of PSC among diverse actors within the maritime domain?
1. Demographic:

•
•
•
•
•

What is your age?
What is your nationality?
What is your current position/occupation?
What training/qualiﬁcations do you have that are of relevance to your current position or occupation? (e.g. Master degree, etc.)
How long have you worked in this position or occupation?

2. Inquiry about the participant's general perception on Port State Control, covering objectives and eﬀectiveness:

•
•

When discussing about PSC regimes, how would you deﬁne their primary goals/objectives?
What aspects would make you consider eﬀective a PSC regime?

3. Inquiry about the challenges/diﬀerences, if any, among PSC regimes across the World. Determine in what aspects and what factors:

•
•

Do you believe diﬀerences exist among PSC regimes across the World?
Follow up with probing questions such as “in what aspects?” – “what factors would inﬂuence these aspects?”

4. Inquiry about PSC in the European Union. Determine the general evaluation of the PSC regime and what aspects and/or factors would
determine challenges/diﬀerences in the current regime:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

How do you evaluate the overall PSC regime in Europe in reaching its objectives?
How would you consider the application of PSC in Europe in light of consistency?
According to your professional experience, in what aspects PSC is applied less/more consistently?
What factors would inﬂuence these aspects?
Do you think that the inspector background could inﬂuence the inspection outcome? In what way?
Do you think that the inspector training could inﬂuence the inspection outcome? In what way?
How would you evaluate the detention criteria across Europe?

5. Inquiry about what would be needed to be changed in the current PSC Regime in Europe.

•

What aspects would you modify in the current PSC regime in Europe?
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General probing questions used in the study:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Could you elaborate more on that?
What could be the inﬂuencing conditions?
What do you mean by […]?
I’d like to hear more about […]?
May I ask you to think back and elaborate more on that?
According to your professional experience […]

Appendix B. Extract of the ﬁnal template

1st level code

2nd Level code

3rd Level code

Challenges/Discrepancies in Europe

Inspector Level

Professional Judgment (subjectivity)
Cultural Inﬂuence
Background of PSCOs
Attitude/Approach on board
Inspection Outcome/Detention criteria
Inspection procedures
Use of teams on board
Training of PSCOs
Political inﬂuence and/or support
Internal Administrative Structure
Resources
National or Local Legislation

Diﬀerence between MSs
MSs Level

Comp. Law 26 (3), 571–594.
Hjorth, F., 2015. Complexity and ambivalence in ship safety inspection - the view of
Swedish port state control oﬃcers. Växjö: Linna. Univ. Press, 2015.
Hoepﬂ, M.C., 1997. Choosing qualitative research: a primer for technology education
researchers. J. Technol. Educ. 9 (1), 47–63.
Keselj, T., 1999. Port state jurisdiction in respect of pollution from ships: the 1982
United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea and the memoranda of
understanding. Ocean Dev. Int. Law 30 (2), 127–160.
King, N., 2004. Using templates in the thematic analysis of text. In: Cassell, C., Symon, G.
(Eds.), Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research. SAGE
Publications Ltd, London, 256–270.
Knapp, S., Franses, P.H., 2007a. Econometric analysis on the eﬀect of port state control
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Knapp, S., van de Velden, M., 2009. Visualization of diﬀerences in treatment of safety
inspections across port state control regimes: a case for increased harmonization
eﬀorts. Transp. Rev. 29, 499–514.
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Challenges and successes of the European Directive on Port State
Control: a holistic analysis
As a response to the strong political and public outcry for more stringent
regulations regarding safety of ships in the wake of a series of maritime disasters
in the 1980s and 1990s, the European Commission adopted a number of
Directives on Ports State Control (PSC) that has made the provisions of the Paris
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on PSC binding on all EU Member
States (MSs). Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended, which entered into force on
January 2011, is the latest version of those Directives. Aside from specifying
targeting, inspection, and detention procedures, this piece of legislation
establishes that each Member State (MS) shall be inspected every five years by
the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to monitor the level of
implementation and enforcement of the Directive. We analysed 25 inspection
reports prepared by the Agency in connection with MSs inspections, to determine
levels of implementation, compliance, and harmonisation with the provisions of
the Directive 2009/16/EC. This article summarizes the main shortcomings and
observations as identified in the inspection reports and concludes that while the
Directive has been properly implemented by the MSs, there remain areas where
harmonisation is yet to be achieved. In detail, this article detects gaps between
policy and practice for EU policy makers which aim at ensuring a level playing
field in Europe and avoid safety competition among countries.
Keywords: Port State Control, Implementation, European Union Law, Maritime
Policy, Harmonisation

1

Introduction

Maritime safety and marine environmental protection are promoted through an
international legal framework that consists primarily of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, and a number of safety conventions adopted
under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These
international instruments provide comprehensive standards that serve as bases for the
formulation of domestic laws that regulate the design, manning, equipment, operation,
management, maintenance, and disposal of ships (Mejia Jr., 2005).
At the regional level, the above framework also served as one of the bases for the
adoption in 1993 by the European Union (EU) of “A Common Policy on Safe Seas.”
The EU’s Common Policy included a “coherent action programme on priority measures
to be taken by the Community and its Member States to enhance maritime safety and
pollution prevention” (Council of the European Communities, 1993). However,
growing frustration with the seemingly endless string of serious maritime accidents in
the final decades of the 20th century1 and the perceived lethargic pace of change in the
international legal framework at IMO (Nengye and Maes, 2012; Tan, 2005; van
Leeuwen and Kern, 2013) prompted the European Commission (EC) to adopt a series of
legislation2 designed to induce significant improvements in the level of safety of ships
of all flags calling in European ports and of all European-flagged vessels sailing around
the world. This series of legislative acts enabled the EU to address the perceived lacuna
in the enforcement of global shipping standards. One of the key pieces of legislation
was Directive 95/21/EC (Council of the European Union, 1995) that established a
common set of criteria for the control, as well as harmonized procedures for the
inspection and detention, of ships calling in EU ports. 95/21/EC has been recast several
times, the latest version being Directive 2009/16/EC (European Parliament and the

1

Amoco Cadiz (1978), Scandinavian Star (1989), Aegean Sea (1992), Braer (1993), Estonia
(1994), Sea Empress (1996), Erika (1999), Prestige (2002) to name a few.

2

The series was based on four pillars: convergent implementation of existing global
international rules; uniform enforcement of global international rules by the port states;
development of navigational aids and traffic surveillance infrastructures, and; reinforcement
of the EU’s role as the driving force for global international rule making.

Council, 2009)3, in force since 1 January 2011. The Directive drew upon the experience
of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU), the first
ever regional agreement on port state control (PSC).
While IMO is responsible for the development of the international legal framework
for the shipping industry, the implementation and enforcement of its different elements
remain the responsibility and prerogative of its member states primarily through the
exercise of flag state administration and regulatory functions over ships in their registry.
However, under the so-called open registries, “it is not uncommon for a ship to rarely, if
ever, visit its port of registry in its service life, thereby keeping it beyond the reach of
surveyors and inspectors of the flag state” (Mejia Jr. et al., 2007). In such situations,
when flag states who “have the primary responsibility of safeguarding against
substandard ships… fail to meet their commitments, port states must act as the last
safety net in the control system” (Özçayır, 2009). Focusing on compliance with the core
IMO conventions, port states have joined efforts through regional agreements, known as
PSC Memoranda of Understanding (PSC-MoUs or simply MoUs), to coordinate and
optimize effectiveness. The aforementioned Paris MoU was the first of these, having it
been established in 1982 (Özçayır, 2004).
It has been argued that the non-binding nature of MoUs4 constitute an inherent
weakness and challenge to their stated objectives (Bang, 2008; Bang and Jang, 2012;
Molenaar, 2007; Molenaar and Pons, 1996). This weakness has been overcome in the
European context because Directive 2009/16/EC has made the provisions of the Paris
MoU binding for all EU Member States (MSs). The PSC regime in Europe is enforced
by virtue of Directive 2009/16/EC through visits and inspections and, as a last resort,
through procedures before the European Court of Justice (König, 2002). As a practical
effect the Directive promoted a harmonised approach to PSC as well as introducing a
risk-based system for targeting and selection.
This article seeks to establish the level of implementation and harmonisation with
Directive 2009/16/EC as amended by Directive 2013/38/EU(European Parliament and
the Council, 2013), across EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states.
This is undertaken through a content analysis of the reports of the 2009/16/EC3

The Directive was amended by Directive 2013/38/EU to accommodate the Maritime Labour
Convention (MLC) provisions for PSC.

4

PSC-MoUs are gentlemen’s agreements rather than legally binding treaties.

mandated visits conducted by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in 25
EU/EFTA MSs during 2012 to 2016. Observations and shortcomings for every MS are
aggregated and discussed by magnitude and topic. The authors conclude that while
compliance with the objectives are clearly being achieved in many areas specified in
Directive 2009/16/EC, the EU/EFTA MSs are still not harmonised. Therefore, the study
highlights gaps between policy and practice and suggest a review of the Directive to EU
policy makers.
2

Background

The sections that follow cover three main aspects of this study namely, an overview of
past literature on PSC, a review of the main discrepancies common to PSC regimes, and
a summary of the enforcement powers of the EC and of the main features of Directive
2009/16/EC.
2.1

Port State Control

The body of literature covering PSC is quite broad and covers various aspects such as
elements of law, effectiveness, targeting, discrepancies in implementation, among
others.
Part of the literature developed during the 1990s acknowledges the emergence of
regional agreements on PSC as a positive phenomenon and investigates its
effectiveness. Scepticism was raised in the initial years of the Paris MoU due to the
perception of a

‘discriminatory enforcement’ (Blanco-Bazán, 2004) of IMO

conventions by EU countries. Many scholars explored the extent to which PSC was
being a successful strategy in decreasing substandard shipping (Bell, 1993; Cuttler,
1995; Kiehne, 1996; Payoyo, 1994; Plaza, 1994; Vorbach, 2001) many investigating the
legal basis for PSC and port state jurisdiction (Ademuni-Odeke, 1997; Hare, 1997;
Keselj, 1999; König, 2002; McDorman, 1997, 2000; Molenaar and Pons, 1996). In the
early 2000s, when the “enforcement agency” (Bloor et al., 2006) and “third-party
control” (Mejia, 2005) functions of PSC became clearly entrenched, the literature
shifted towards new topics and authors evaluated the tangible effects of PSC on
shipping. Knapp and Franses (2007a), for instance, estimated the effect of PSC
inspections on the probability of casualties as well as consequent saved costs (Knapp et
al., 2011). Cariou et al. (2008) determined the effectiveness of PSC in reducing the

number of deficiencies in subsequent inspections. Others contributed to developing
and/or testing an improved targeting/selection system (Cariou et al., 2007, 2008; Cariou
and Wolff, 2011, 2015; Knapp and Franses, 2007a, 2008). van Leeuwen (2015) even
claimed that the gaps in the implementation process left by flag states had slowly and
effectively closed because of PSC.
This study embraces the “conventional wisdom” (Bang, 2008) that PSC has played,
and continues to play, a prominent role in ensuring compliance with international
regulatory efforts (Ademuni-Odeke, 1997; Bell, 1993; McDorman, 2000; Molenaar,
2007; Payoyo, 1994), and in increasing the standards of safety (Li and Zheng, 2008; van
Leeuwen, 2015), pollution prevention (Bang, 2008; Cuttler, 1995), and labour
protection.
2.2

Discrepancies in PSC
Significant inroads against substandard shipping notwithstanding, PSC has had to

deal with cross-national discrepancies in implementation since its early stages of
development (Bloor et al., 2006; Cariou et al., 2009; Keselj, 1999; Knapp and Franses,
2007b; Knapp and van de Velden, 2009; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; Mansell, 2009;
Özçayır, 2009; Sampson and Bloor, 2007).
As early as 1994, Plaza (1994) had already highlighted how discrepancies were
becoming evident due to disparities in stages of development and other peculiarities
among countries in some regions. Anderson (2002) also recognised that “substandard
vessels trading in the poor regions of the world have a significantly lower chance of
being detained by PSC.” This may be aggravated by unequal participation of states
within the same region (Anderson, 2002), lack of resources (Anderson, 2002; Bang and
Jang, 2012; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; Özçayır, 2009), and scarce infrastructure,
technology, and policies (Bang and Jang, 2012). From the point of view of the
inspector, part of the literature attributes this to the heavy influence of the individual
PSCO’s subjectivity and professional judgment (Bloor et al., 2006; Özçayır, 2009).
Others, such as Knapp and Franses (2007b), Ravira and Piniella (2016), and Bloor et al.
(2006) claim that differences in the training and experience may lead PSCOs to focus
on certain areas of competence rather than others.
A question then arises as to why differences in treatment would have to be an issue.
On a higher level, the development of a harmonised system of inspection and targeting
procedures is one of the most important goals of PSC regional agreements. Needless to

say, having different standards for inspection can represent a failure of the system as a
whole. On a deeper level, the crux can be both technical and economical. From a
technical point of view, differences can undermine the targeting system, based on
previous inspection’s results (Knapp and van de Velden, 2009), and weaken the
effective implementation of international regulations (Bloor et al., 2006; Knudsen and
Hassler, 2011). From an economical one, discrepancies may promote the so-called “port
shopping” (Bang, 2008; Keselj, 1999; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; McDorman, 2000).
This is a strategic behaviour adopted by some operators which consists of choosing
certain ports (Knudsen and Hassler, 2011) or certain regions (Bang and Jang, 2012)
over others, based on divergent enforcement standards.
2.3

Directive 2009/16/EC and its Enforcement

Directive 2009/16/EC is part of the series of legislative measures adopted by the EC
under the so-called Third Maritime Safety Package aimed at improving the EU
maritime regulatory framework. With its entry into force on 1 January 2011, the
Directive introduced what has been referred to as the New Inspection Regime (NIR)
featuring an array of requirements and provisions to improve the current system of PSC
and strengthen its three main components: Harmonisation, Targeting/Selection and
Inspection (Figure 1).

Figure 1 – Main PSC components

For this and other purposes, a priority and a risk profile are assigned to every vessel.
The former indicates whether a ship entering into EU ports should not be inspected (No
Priority), must be inspected (Priority I) or may be inspected (Priority II). The latter,
whether High, Standard, or Low risk, establishes time windows for inspection. For
example, a High Risk ship becomes Priority II after 5 months since the previous
inspection and Priority I after 6 months. These are called periodic inspections.
However, regardless of the period since the last inspection, in lieu of overriding5 (must
be inspected) or unexpected6 (may be inspected) factors, ships could be subject to
additional inspections.
Pertaining its enforcement prerogatives, the EC has assigned EMSA the task of
conducting visits to MSs in order to evaluate and monitor the effective implementation
of Directive 2009/16/EC and to monitor the overall functioning of the Union’s PSC
regime. The rationale behind the visits is to review the infrastructure and legislative and
administrative provisions adopted by the MS to ensure the fulfilment of the
requirements of the Directive. The visits examine the following five processes and
areas:
1. Organization;
2. General Commitments;
3. The Cycle of PSC Inspection – Information System;
4. Personnel – Logistics;
5. Enforcement and Sanctions.
Under the heading Organization, EMSA examines the manner in which maritime
authorities have organized their national PSC systems. The second area considers the
General Commitments undertaken by MSs for complying with the main requirements of
the Directive together with the necessary arrangements, activities, and actions taken.
The Cycle of PSC Inspection – Information System process considers activities
undertaken in respect of performing the actual PSC inspection, the procedures followed
by PSCOs, and the insertion of all relevant information in the database system. The
examination of the Personnel – Logistics process covers the professional profile,

5

List of overriding factors in Annex I, Part II 2A.

6

List of unexpected factors in Annex I, Part II 2B.

qualification and competence of inspectors and their compliance with the minimum
criteria laid down in the Directive. Finally, the Enforcement and Sanctions process
covers the requirements of the Directive on the right of appeal and for enforcement and
sanctions.
Table 1 below shows the 5 different processes, with a detailed description of the
articles examined.
Table 1 – Overview of the areas covered during the EMSA visits to EU Member States.
PROCESS

ARTICLE

DESCRIPTION

ORGANIZATION

1

Purpose

2

Definitions

3

Scope

4

Inspection powers

GENERAL

5

Inspection system and annual inspection commitment

COMMITMENT

6

Modalities of compliance with the inspection commitment

7

Modalities allowing a balanced inspection share within the Community

8

Postponement of inspection and exceptional circumstances

9

Notification of arrival of ships

11

Frequency of inspections

15.1 & 15.2

Safety and security guidelines and procedures

16

Access refusal measures concerning certain ships

23

Reports from pilots and port authorities

25

Exchange of information and cooperation

OF

12

Selection of ships for inspection

PSC INSPECTIONS

13

Initial and more detailed inspection

–

14

Expanded inspections

19

Rectification and detention

21

Follow up to inspections and detentions

15.3

Safety and security guidelines and procedures

24

Inspection database

28

Reimbursement of costs

-

22

Professional profile of inspectors

ENFORCEMENT &

29

Data to monitor implementation

SANCTIONS

18

Complaints

18.a

Onshore MLC 2006 complaint-handling procedures

20

Right of appeal

34

Penalties

THE

CYCLE

INFORMATION

SYSTEM

PERSONNEL
LOGISTICS

3

Methodology

This section outlines the content of the collected documents, and it clarifies how the
analysis was conducted.

3.1

Data overview

This study analysed 25 reports inspection produced between March 2012 and April
2016 by a team of two to three inspectors from EMSA. All the findings were duly
anonymised and an ID from 1 to 25 was randomly assigned to the concerned MSs.
Confidentiality was required by EMSA to granting access to the documents and for
publication purposes.
Each report has the following table of contents:
•

List of Tables;

•

List of Figures;

•

List of Abbreviations;

•

Executive Summary;

•

Acknowledgments;

•

Cross-Reference for Directive Articles;

•

1. Introduction;

•

2. Background;

•

3. Detailed examination of the port state control system in relation to the
Directive
o 3.1 Organisation
o 3.2 General Commitments
o 3.3 The Cycle of the PSC inspection – Information System
o 3.4 Personnel – Logistics
o 3.5 Right of Appeal – Enforcement and Sanctions

•

4. Summary of Findings;

•

Appendix A – Visit programme;

•

Appendix B – List of persons involved;

•

Appendix C – Pre-visit questionnaire on the implementation of the Directive

Since all reports have the same structure and the visits adopt the same methodology, no
comparability issues were highlighted.
3.2

Data analysis

The inspection reports, which were regarded as official documents, were analysed to

perform a systematic and holistic evaluation of the implementation of the Directive in
the since its introduction. The authors availed of document analysis to analyse the
inspection reports provided in this study.
The analytical procedure included selecting, aggregating, interpreting and synthetizing
the data contained in the documents (Bowen, 2009). In this context, data are the
number and type of shortcomings and observations recorded. The narrative, content
meaning, frequency of words and/or the themes were not analysed since deemed not
within the scope of the study. Particular attention was given to the ‘textual organizations
of the documents’ (Coffey, 2014) and their structure.
The analysis has focused on Chapter 4 Summary of Findings to determine number, type,
description and linked Article of the various shortcomings and observations. All the
reports were initially skimmed, then thoroughly read before any interpretation and data
aggregation. Whereas further information was regarded as necessary, the authors
consulted the applicable subchapters of Chapter 3 Detailed Examination of the Port
State Control System in relation to the Directive. Lastly, all data were then aggregated
into their process/area of significance by following the structure and the articles of the
Directive as previously shown in Table 1.
All findings, observations, and shortcomings were then presented to two EMSA
officials involved in the MS visits in order to gather further comments, perceptions, and
insights.
3.3

Quality of the Data and Limitations

The EMSA inspection reports were viewed as authoritative sources which are
documents produced with ‘an explicit goal of unbiased knowledge’ (O'Leary, 2004,
p.178) and entail a certain level of credibility, authenticity and representativeness
(Bowen, 2009). However, even official sources may not be a firm evidence of what is
reported (Coffey, 2014). The composition of the EMSA team may vary in terms of
number of inspectors, background, experience and nationality. The authors do not have
control over the inspection practices of EMSA and it is recognised as limitation that
discrepancies in the inspection teams may have an influence on the way results were
produced and included in the reports (O'Leary, 2004, p.183).
Overall, a high degree of stability is given due to the fact that the documents ‘exist
independently’ of our action (Rapley, 2007, p.9) and the presence of the authors does

not influence the results but provides further exactness (Bowen, 2009). Moreover, the
homogeneous structure of the reports ensures that, regardless of the authors analysing
the reports, the results will remain consistent and accurate (Golafshani, 2003; Yilmaz,
2013).
4

Results & Discussion

This section provides and discusses the results of this study. It begins with a complete
overview of shortcomings and observations recorded during the visits (Section 4.1).
Subsequently, this section continues by exploring specific areas marked by a
considerable number of findings (Sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). This section then ends
with a summary on the (in)-adequacies of port state control followed by suggestions for
policy-makers (Section 4.6).
4.1

A Summary of the findings concerning compliance with Directive
2009/16/EC

Table 2 offers an overview of shortcomings and observations recorded during the visits
conducted by EMSA in the concerned MSs. The left side of the table indicates the
relevant processes and articles of the Directive scrutinised during the visits. The top row
indicates the assigned IDs of the 25 anonymised MSs. The columns on the far right
hand side summarises the number of shortcomings7(S) and observations8(O) for each of
the articles, as well as the sum total (T) for the two. Shortcomings are represented in
red, while observations are in orange; where neither shortcomings nor observations
were found, the cell is left green. In circumstances where two or more findings were
recorded, the number logged in the cell indicates the total.
As shown in the table, majority of the findings were discovered in Article 24 –
Inspection Database (23% - 61) followed by Organization (10% - 26), Article 22 –
Professional profile of Inspectors (10% - 26), Article 15.1/.2 – Safety and Security
Guidelines Procedures (9% - 25), Article 14 – Expanded Inspections (8% - 22), Article
9 – Notification of Arrival (7% - 18), and lastly Article 8 – Postponement of Inspection

7

A shortcoming is a clear violation of provisions stated in one of the Articles of the Directive.

8

An observation is a violation pertaining the application of a procedure outlined in the Paris
MoU Manual and/or guidelines and/or instructions

and Exceptional Circumstances and Article 5 – Inspection System and Annual
Inspection commitment (6% - 16). Given their nature and objectives, the Articles were
grouped into three main areas of interest:
•

Inspection Commitment/Information: Articles 5, 8 and 24

•

Quality of Inspections: Articles 15.1, 15.2 and 14

•

Training of PSCOs: Article 22

Article 9 and Organization were considered to be of a more administrative nature,
and thus assessed separately (Section 4.5).
It is worthwhile to note that these findings show a twofold outcome. On the one
hand, many processes of the Directive are fully implemented. Only sporadic, if any,
findings were recorded in some of the articles, suggesting success in the implementation
of the legislation at the national level. On the other hand, some processes are deficient
for the majority, if not all, of MSs involved. This suggests challenges in the
implementation and harmonization activities of specific areas of the Directive. Article
15.1/.2 and Article 24, for instance, seem consistently deficient for all MSs, implying
underlying issues related to the Directive itself. Others, such as Article 22 which
highlights inadequacies in the professional background of PSCOs or Article 5
portraying discrepancies in the inspection commitment, may otherwise expose the
inspection practises to criticism. The following sections undertake thorough discussions
for each of the main findings.

Organiz.

Process

29
18
20
34

1

No findings

Observation

Shortcoming

22

Personnel Logistics

23
25
12
13
14
19
21.1
15.3
24
28

16, 21.4/5

5
6
7
8
9
11
15.1/.2

Article

2

2

3

2

4

2 3

5
3

6

Table 2 – Summary of shortcomings and observations

MS ID

Commitment

The cycle of PSC
inspection – Information
System

Right of
Appeal –
Sanctions

7

4

2

2

8

2

9

2

10

2

2

11

2

12

14

2 2 2

13

15

3

16

3

17

2

18

2

2

19

2

2

2

20
2

2

21

22

3

23

2

3

24
S

TOT

3

0
0
2
1
124

142

19

18
0
0
0
0
6
6
25
3
4
6
5
1
9
7
0
0
13
0

O

5
0
0
3

7

2 8
16
1
5
16
12
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
13
4
1
0
3
48
0

25

267

5
0
2
4

27

26
16
1
5
16
18
8
25
4
4
6
5
1
22
11
1
0
61
0

T

4.2

Inspection Commitment/Information

This section contains a commentary of Article 5 (in combination with Article 6
and 7), Article 8, and Article 24.
4.2.1

Articles 5, 6 and 7 - Inspection commitment & compliance with the
inspection commitment

Table 2 shows that in respect to compliance with Article 5, 14 (56%) out of 25 MSs
visited by EMSA between 2012 and 2016 did not meet their annual inspection
commitment for at least one of the years since the entry into force of the Directive.
Although the majority of the findings were recorded for Article 5, merit should be given
to the overall set of requirements and modalities for compliance with the annual
inspection commitment (or fair share) as laid down in Articles 5, 6, and 7 as a whole.
Except for specific and exceptional circumstances, MSs shall inspect all Priority I
vessels and conduct a number of inspections equal to the MS’s annual inspection
commitment. In this regard, the Directive abandons the previous 25% quota which is
replaced by a system considering the individual ships calling at ports of the MS
concerned in relation to the regional commitment. This is calculated by taking the
average number of inspections required in the previous 3 years in consideration.
Nevertheless, an allowance is granted for missing such an inspection ratio. Article 6
provides that this ratio shall not exceed 5% of the total PI ships with a High-Risk Profile
(HRP) and 10% of the total PI ships other than HRP.
In case the number of PI calls exceeds the annual inspection commitment, the MS is
identified as overburdened (OB), and the missed rate of PI inspections shall not exceed
30% (given that its annual quota is fulfilled). Conversely, if the number of PI and PII
calls is inferior to the annual inspection commitment, the MS is identified as
underburdened (UB) and it shall inspect all PI ships and 85% of the PII ships calling at
its ports and anchorage.
Non-compliance with the provisions of Articles 5, 6, and 7 has profound implication
on the foundations and goals of the regime. In case of a missed inspection, for example,
the interested MS makes the vessel a burden for the next port of call and it allows a
potential substandard vessel to sail. Similarly, MSs that over-inspect vessels beyond

their annual commitment, expose the regime to complaints by the industry and distort
the calculation for the regional commitment.
It must be made clear that the majority of the shortcomings were recorded in the first
years of the entry into force of the Directive, suggesting that MSs were still adjusting to
the new system. What attracts greater concern, however, are those shortcomings
recorded in recent years, which highlight the struggle by some maritime administration
to find adequate resources to meet their annual commitment.
4.2.2

Article 24 – Inspection Database

Article 24 sets provisions for the EC to develop, maintain and update the inspection
database (THETIS), as well as other general provisions for MSs. Under this article, MSs
are required to:
•

Ensure that information concerning the actual time of arrival (ATA) and the
actual time of departure (ATD) are transferred in the database;

•

Ensure that information related to inspections are transferred to the database as
soon as the inspection report is completed or the detention lifted. Within 72
hours, MSs shall ensure that the information transferred to the inspection
database is validated for publication purposes.

Table 3 shows the percentage of missing information recorded during the visits. Ship
Info indicates the percentage of ship calls that, either at ports or at anchorage, were
not/incorrectly transferred to THETIS by the individual MSs. Reports Validation
denotes the percentage of reports which were not validated within the prescribed timeframe. Lastly, ATD/ATA reveals more specifically the amount of ships calling at the
MSs’ ports where an ATA, but not an ATD, was recorded. It must be noted that not all
reports cover the last aspect.

Table 3 – Overview of shortcomings and observations in Article 24 (MSs’ IDs on the horizontal axes)
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Regardless of the various degree of compliance, some considerations must be made.
According to subject-matter experts, delays in Reports Validation are quite consistent
but do not represent a critical factor since it does not affect the inspection priority of the
ship. In contrast, Ship Info and ATD/ATA can be quite critical. Although some of these
figures may seem relatively low compared to the overall number of ship calls,
incomplete, incorrect or missing registration of ship calls have a detrimental effect on
the inspection commitment calculations and MSs daily operations. An incorrect
registration of a vessel in port otherwise registered as ‘at anchorage’, influences the
annual inspection commitment since calls ‘at anchorage’ are not included in the general
calculation. A missed registration means that a vessel is virtually not in the port.
Although this may seem a virtual exercise, a missed registration is beneficial for the
interested MS since the port authority does not have to inspect the vessel and it makes it
a burden for the next MS. Lastly, in cases of an incomplete registration with missing
ATDs, ships remain virtually in port even though these may have departed.
It is evident that Article 24 is the challenging to implement and harmonisation in this
respect is not achieved. However, just like with Article 5, the high value of missing
information was mainly recorded in the first two years of the entry into force of the
Directive. The visit reports often noted a decreasing trend in the missing ship call
information in more recent years.

4.2.3

Article 8 – Postponement of inspections under exceptional circumstances

Article 8 provides clear guidance for MSs which may decide to postpone the inspection
of a Priority I ship under specific circumstances and operational reasons.
Table 2 shows that 15 out of 25 MSs breached the provisions of the article and 16
observations were recorded. The majority of the observations indicated that the
postponement justifications were not used or not properly conducted. In many cases, for
example, the vessel was either recorded ‘at anchorage’ while in port, ‘call during night
hours’ while outside night hours or ‘inspection would create a risk’ with no specified
reason; all circumstances, those, in which a postponement of inspection is permitted
under Article 8.
If misused, the postponement of inspection has consequences on the fairness of the
regime. To begin with, a postponement is allowed only if the inspection may be carried
out in the next port of call of the ship in the same MS or in another port of call within
the Union or the Paris MOU region within 15 days, provided the State in which such
port of call is located has agreed in advance to perform the inspection9. Needless to say,
the latter scenario imposes a burden on the next MS. Furthermore, a postponement of
inspection is not counted as a missed inspection which can be an advantage if
considering the allowed ratio of missed inspections.
For the above-mentioned reasons, it is clear that failures in the execution of the
provisions of Article 9 still occur and harmonisation in implementation has not yet been
achieved.
4.3

Quality of Inspection

This section contains a commentary of Article15.1, Article 15.2 and Article 14.
4.3.1

Article 15.1 and 15.2 – Safety and Security Guidelines procedures

Article 15.1 and 15.2 focus on the safety and security guidelines procedures provided by
Annex VI of the Directive and the Paris MoU for the control of ships. In the preparatory
phase of the visit, a sample of inspection reports are scrutinised in order to verify
whether the concerned MS abides by these procedures. The findings reported in Table 2
9

The only exception to this provision is whether a ship is calling exclusively at night hours and
the situation is judged dangerous by the relevant authority.

showed that all MSs, with the exception of MS24, were deficient in implementing and
following harmonised inspection procedures.
Table 4 provides further detail and summarizes which specific procedure was not
followed by the correspondent MS. This is indicated by an ‘x’. Among the several
findings, subject-matter experts highlighted some of those which can be critical to
ensure a harmonised PSC regime (italics in the table). A lack of Compliance with the
ISM instructions, for example, and wrong Attribution of RO responsibility has a tangible
effect on the calculation for Company and RO performance and it suggests that some
administrations yield towards avoiding conflicts with ROs. Missing or incorrect
convention references to detainable deficiencies deprives the industry of appropriate
feedback in case of detentions and, more importantly, allows discretion by recording
deficiencies not supported by legal references. Last but not least, both the facts that Not
all areas were covered during an inspection and that the decision concerning the Type
of inspection conducted was not always made according to the rules, highlight a lack of
understanding and/or adequate training in PSC procedures.
While the magnitude of the observations could not quantitatively be estimated, the
results of Table 4 indicate that inspection procedures are not consistent among MSs and
harmonisation has not been achieved.

MS ID:
Procedures not followed correctly:
Attribution of RO Responsibility to deficiencies
Compliance with the ISM instructions
Improper implementation of the provisions for ‘accidental
damage’
Keel-laying date recorded in the inspection reports
Inappropriate use of the inspection action ‘inspection
suspended’
Initial inspection with more than 5 deficiencies
Insurance certificate not checked
Missing or Incorrect Convention references to detainable
deficiencies
Not all areas covered during the inspection
Operational control ‘other’ using during more detailed and
expanded inspection where a test or other different controls
had been carried out
Operational control missing in expanded inspection
Operational control missing in more detailed inspection
Procedures for assigning the action taken ‘at agreed repair
port’
Ship certificate data missing or incorrectly inserted in
THETIS
Ship type incorrectly recorded in the inspection report
Suspension of inspection (with no detainable deficiencies)
Type of inspection conducted (i.e. initial instead of more
detailed when ships flag had not ratified a convention)
Use of action taken codes 15 and/or 99
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Table 4 – Overview of observations noted with regard to Article 15.1 and Article 15.2
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4.3.2

Article 14 – Expanded Inspection

Article 14 specifies what categories of ships are eligible for expanded inspections and
the scope of the inspection, including the risk areas to be covered (Annex VII as
supported by Regulation 428/2010).
Table 2 shows that the provisions of the article are generally deficient for the
majority of the MSs examined, specifically 20 (80%) out of 25. Most of the findings are
related to either missing evidence for not performing an expanded inspection (e.g. local
limitations related to the terminal, cargo operations, etc.) or to specific items not
verified during the inspection. Three items were recurrent in the reports:
•

The fire drill was not performed;

•

On passenger ships, the abandon ship drill was not performed;

•

On bulk carriers and oil tankers, the ballast tanks inspection, either internally
or from the manhole, was not performed.

Beside the impact that lack of compliance with Article 14 bears in terms of
harmonization, the non-verification of these items may be rooted in factors that are less
evident. EMSA experts asked to provide comments in this respect have highlighted that
performing an expanded inspection with a single inspector, especially for demanding
vessels such as passenger ships, can be challenging and deteriorate the quality of the
inspection process. Performing and assessing a drill is time consuming for both the crew
(in terms of working and resting hours) and the inspectors (e.g. check bridge operations
and communications, the master stations, the cargo areas, etc.), especially if the PSCO
is performing the inspection alone. Similarly, the visual inspection of ballast tanks, by
definition, can be a dangerous activity. For this reason, a PSCO may refrain from
performing this activity especially without the support of a colleague.
These results lead to a threefold interpretation. First, harmonization for expanded
inspections practice has not yet been achieved. Second, empirical evidence suggests that
to perform an effective expanded inspection, the presence of minimum number of
inspector is advisable and should be mandatory under this article. Third, the Directive
should take into consideration the recently growing limitations that terminals are posing
to vessels.

4.4

Training of PSCOs

This section comments solely on Article 22.
4.4.1

Article 22 – Professional profile of inspectors

Article 22 provides stringent provisions on the qualifications of PSCOs.10 To be
specific, the article requires the EC to promote a harmonised Community scheme for
training and assessment of competences. The scheme was ultimately developed by the
Paris MoU Secretariat and named “Paris MoU Policy on the training of the new entrant
PSC Officers and the professional development scheme for PSC Officers” (hereafter
referred to as Harmonised Community Training Scheme or simply “Policy”) which
establishes a training policy for both new and experienced inspectors and criteria11 to be
fulfilled by PSCOs in order to maintain their qualification. While the Policy is detailed
in terms of subjects to be covered, it neither specifies how to conduct the training nor
the number of hours necessary to deliver it. This implies that the EMSA team can verify
the existence of a national training program and records of the training, but cannot
comment on the veracity or accuracy of its application.
Referring to the results given in Table 2 above, a harmonised implementation of
Article 22 has not yet been reached. While only six out of 25 MSs did not comply with
the minimum requirements for PSCO provisions (MSs 1, 2, 3, 9, 21), 16 MSs did not
fulfil some of the requirements of the Harmonised Community Training Scheme (MSs
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25); this is mainly related to performing the
Distance Learning Programme (DLP) modules. Furthermore, two MSs lacked both a
structured national training program and records of the training, while two other MSs
were admonished for the deployment of PSCOs across the territory in a manner which
was not in line with the number of ship calls eligible for inspection.
Several authors have alluded to the influence that the background and training of
PSCOs may have on the outcome of the PSC inspection being it the type of deficiencies
10

The minimum requirements for PSCOs are laid down in Annex XI of the Directive

11

These criteria comprise both compulsory activities, such as carrying out at least ten PSC
inspections per year and carrying out the Distance Learning Programme (DLP) on Paris
MoU procedures, and others that contributed to gaining the minimum number of points (30)
required in a five-year period.

detected and/or leniency during inspection procedures (Bloor et al., 2006; Knapp and
Franses, 2007b; Ravira and Piniella, 2016). Table 5 shows the training hours (practical
and theoretical) for new entrant PSCOs (NE in the table) and total training hours for
existing PSCOs (EX in the table) as offered by the national training scheme of the
various MSs.12
As clearly shown, national training efforts are not consistent across the 25 MSs. In
some countries, the theoretical training appears to have a more significant role than the
practical one (e.g., MS12, MS14, MS15, MS16, MS25), while in others it is the
contrary (e.g., MS1, MS5, MS9, MS17, MS23). With the exception of some MSs
(mainly MS1, MS9, MS12, MS14, MS17, MS25) and the very limited efforts for
existing PSCOs, the majority of the MSs invest less than 500 hours in training for entrylevel PSCOs. The lack of training for existing PSCOs may be explained by the fact that
MSs rely heavily on training offered by the Paris MoU Secretariat and EMSA.
Both the results from Table 2 and Table 5 portray dissonant training programmes
among the 25 EU/EFTA MSs. This imbalance may impact not only the outcome of the
inspections, but more importantly the key objective of ensuring harmonised inspection
procedures to vessels entering regional ports and avoid port shopping.
Table 5 – Training hours for New Entrant and Existing PSCOs according to the MSs’ National Training Scheme.
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No data available for MSs 13 - 20 – 21.

Practical (NE)

Total (EX)

4.5

Other Areas of Concern

This section comments on shortcomings and observations recorded in Article 9 and
Organization.
4.5.1

Article 9 – Notification of Arrival

Article 9 provides that the operator, agent, or master of a ship, which under Article 14 is
eligible for an expanded inspection and bound for a port or anchorage of a Member
State, shall notify the port authorities of the concerned MS of its arrival (72 hours prearrival notification). In practice, the article requires companies and/or operators to be
aware of their vessel(s)’ eligibility to an expanded inspection.
The majority of shortcomings and observations recorded for this article relate
mainly to the lack of evidence that all ships liable for an expanded inspection provided
the required pre-arrival notification. Although there is no indication that breaches in
Article 9 trigger concerns in the context of harmonisation, it is worthwhile mentioning
that these provisions seem to discharge part of the responsibilities of targeting and
notification to the shipping company rather than to the MS.
Two approaches may be adopted to mitigate the high number of findings in this
process. Either the provisions should be applicable only to the MSs rather than to the
shipping company. Otherwise, the operator, agent or master of a ship which is entering
a port of anchorage of a MS, shall always provide a 72 hours’ pre-arrival notification
and the article should be deleted by the Directive.
4.5.2

Organization

This process examines the way in which the maritime authorities have organised the
national PSC system and includes Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Directive. The visit
includes an overall assessment of the national maritime organization and, specifically,
the national PSC Organization (e.g., whether centralised or decentralised).
While the legal conformity verification of the transposition of the Directive into
national legislation is the sole prerogative of the EC, the only activity conducted in this
regard during the visits is a sample verification of the operational aspects of the
Directive as transposed into national legislation. In other words, shortcomings and
observations in this process mainly indicate MSs which transposed the directive beyond

the deadline (MSs 11, 14, 20, 25) or those which did not incorporate all amendments or
relevant instruments into national legislation (MSs 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 22, 25).
Other types of observations regarded either issues related to human resources (MSs 16,
19, 24), unclear processes for amending and implementing IMO Conventions (MS 20)
or, lastly, limited oversight, coordination and monitoring of PSC activities (MS 23).
In general, the findings suggest that the Directive has been largely transposed into
national legislation with minor, if any, issues for 11 (44%) of the 25 MSs examined.
These are issues that have not been considered serious or critical to the proper
operational conduct of PSC inspections. However, observations related to problems of
resources and oversight may have a stronger impact on PSC activities as pointed out in
other studies (Anderson, 2002; Bloor et al., 2006; Özçayır, 2009; Sampson and Bloor,
2007), and should be further investigated for short-time and long-time effects.
4.6

(in)-adequacy of EU Port State Control?

In order to summarize the main results, the study has found that Articles 5, 8, 9, 14,
15.1, 15.2, 22 and 24 are the articles where the majority of the findings were recorded.
The high number of observations and shortcomings suggests that the Directive has not
yet fostered harmonisation among MSs for these aspects. In detail, three major areas of
improvement and simplification may be considered by policy makers in a future
revision exercise: Inspection Commitment/Information, Quality of Inspections, and
Training of PSCOs.
In general, it is evident that some MSs struggle with meeting their annual inspection
commitment. Despite the provisions for overburdened (OB) and underburdened (UB)
maritime authorities, the calculation for the fair share itself can be eroded by an
unbalanced application of some key provisions. The number of missing information
reported under Article 24, for example, or MSs that inspect in excess of their annual
share are factors that have a significant impact on the overall prediction of the fair
share. As a consequence, some MSs may face undue additional costs in terms of
resources and the regime may be exposed to criticisms by the industry.
Another criticality is represented by the designation of OB and UB MSs. To be
specific, a generic MS is exclusively held to be OB/UB at the end of each calendar year,
once all PI and PII calls are registered. Thus, MSs are unaware whether the provisions
under Article 6 (5% for HRP and 10% for other ship risk profile missed inspection
allowed) are applicable or not. Although the previous year could be taken into

consideration, this ambiguity does not allow the various maritime authorities for the
planning of preventive measures. On an even higher level, since it is clear that OB states
do not inspect PII vessels entirely while UB states are obliged to do so, policy makers
may even wish to rethink the Priority rationale itself.
From an operational perspective, the higher number of shortcomings and
observations observed in Article 14, 15.1, and 15.2 reveal a tendency for inspection
procedures to be applied in a disorderly manner. This outcome is at odds with the
overarching objective of ensuring common inspection standards in the region. If
examined in combination with inconsistencies in training practice, as highlighted during
the commentary of Article 22, these findings call for specific actions to improve the
adherence with inspection procedures. Despite these considerations, improvements in
the area of quality of inspections could be achieved either through a more
comprehensive training policy embedded into the text of the Directive, or a centralised
training centre for EU/EFTA PSCOs. Another approach could be to introduce a system
of external and internal peer reviews. The external review could consider a series of
indicators to identify faulty inspecting behaviours by different port authorities and
inspectors (e.g., pattern of deficiencies detected by individual ports, type of deficiencies
determined at t and t+1 inspections, etc.). In parallel, an internal review could be
adopted through the national PSC Coordinator.
It is also fundamental to reiterate that Directives, as legislative instruments of the
EC, have to be transposed into domestic legislation by the various MSs, with great
latitude for national interpretation (Kurcz, 2001; Twigg-Flesner, 2011). This practice
may, per-se, impair the process of implementation and harmonisation (Lohse, 2011)
while a more stringent legal instrument, such as Regulations, may increase the level of
harmonisation and avoid potential distortion caused in interpretation (Coleman and
Jessen, 2016; Monti, 2010).
The aforementioned findings not only demonstrate that harmonisation has not yet
been achieved in some key areas, but point to the need to undertake a revision exercise
that will, among others, lead to a simplification of some of the Directive provisions.
5

Conclusions

This study has analysed 25 reports produced by EMSA after inspections to EU/EFTA
MSs with the objective of determining the level of compliance with Directive

2009/16/EC as amended by Directive 2013/38/EU. Particular attention was given to the
implementation and harmonisation of the Directive’s provisions and to identify gaps
between policy and practice.
Europe has been at the forefront of regional and organised ship safety inspections
since the establishment of the Paris MoU in 1982. With the adoption of a series of
legislative acts on PSC, the EU has made binding for EU/EFTA MSs provisions of what
was originally a non-binding regional agreement on PSC. The Directive entered into
force on 1 January 2011, boosting and increasing targeting and selection of substandard
vessels, inspection procedures, and overall harmonisation in the region. The level of
harmonisation and implementation more than six years since its introduction is therefore
extremely important to ensure that the standards specified under the Directive are
uniformly applied in the region and to highlight discrepancies to be addressed in the
upcoming revision.
The Directive has been successfully transposed into national legislation by the 25
EU/EFTA MSs investigated. While many of its provisions have been successfully
implemented, challenges in some areas remain an obstacle to the overarching objective
of ensuring common standards in the region. This study has identified Inspection
Commitment/Information, Quality of Inspections, and Training of PSCOs as some of
the weakest links in the on-going process of harmonising PSC systems and procedures.
Port state control has become an indispensable feature in the successful
implementation and enforcement of the legal framework for maritime safety, security,
and marine environmental protection not only in Europe, but worldwide. The possible
amendment of the Directive can only further the cause of PSC harmonization.
Discrepancies in harmonisation may hamper the achievement of a level playing field
across Europe and foster safety competition between neighbourhood countries of the
same region. The authors hope that this study and its findings can contribute to the
corpus of reference materials that will inform European PSC policymakers as they
embark on a revision of Directive 2009/16/EC.
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The Port State Control Directive has been successfully transposed in all Member
States.
A holistic analysis of the implementation of the PSC Directive 2009/16/EC is
performed;
Complete harmonisation of the main elements of the EU Directive 2009/16/EC is not
yet achieved;
Training of Port State Control Officers, Inspection Commitment/Information and
Quality of Inspections are the areas were most shortcomings and observations were
recorded;
Gaps between policy and practice were identified;
A review of the Directive 2009/16/EC is suggested to policy-makers.

Paper IV
Graziano A, Wolff FC, Cariou P, Mejia
MQJr, Schröder-Hinrichs J-U (2018).
Port state control inspections in the
European Union: do inspector’s number and background matter? Marine
Policy, 88:1, 230-241.

Marine Policy 88 (2018) 230–241

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Port state control inspections in the European Union: Do inspector's number
and background matter?

T

⁎

Armando Grazianoa, , Pierre Carioub, François-Charles Wolﬀc,d, Maximo Q. Mejia Jra,
Jens-Uwe Schröder-Hinrichsa
a

World Maritime University, Fiskehamnsgatan 1, 211 18 Malmö, Sweden
Kedge Business School, 680 Cours de la Libération, 33405 Talence, France
LEMNA, University of Nantes, BP 52231 Chemin de la Censive du Tertre, 44322 Nantes Cedex 3, France
d
INED, Paris, France
b
c

A B S T R A C T
The succession of maritime accidents in the last decades of the 20th Century caused a strong political and public
outcry for more stringent maritime safety regulations and measures. One of the most signiﬁcant developments in
this regard was the establishment of several regional agreements on Port State Control (PSC) – the ﬁrst of which
was the Paris MoU – with the speciﬁc objective of ﬁghting substandard shipping through coordinated and
harmonised inspection procedures. This article is based on results from 32,206 PSC inspections carried out by the
European Union and European Free Trade Association Member States within the Paris MoU region from 1
January 2014 to 31 December 2015 to assess whether discrepancies among Member States exist after the entry
into force of Directive 2009/16/EC and the introduction of the New Inspection Regime. Further, the study
proceeds by investigating whether PSC team composition and inspector's background inﬂuence inspection
outcomes. The study has identiﬁed that diﬀerences in detecting at least one deﬁciency and/or detaining a vessel
are signiﬁcant among Member States. With regard to team composition and background, it appears that the
former correlates to the number of deﬁciencies and detentions and the latter, though the signiﬁcance is not
always consistent, to detecting a certain type of deﬁciencies according to the speciﬁc inspector's backgrounds.
The paper concludes by presenting potential policy implications.

1. Introduction
The inspection of foreign ﬂagged vessels in national ports is not a
novel exercise. Provisions for the inspection or control of foreign vessels
by port states have been a feature of enforcement since the 1929 SOLAS
Convention. However, it was not until the emergence of regional
agreements – the so-called ‘Memoranda of Understanding on Port State
Control (PSC MoU)’ – that such practice became a regular element in
the promotion of maritime safety. As mentioned, “the powers used by
Port State Control Oﬃcers (PSCOs) are not new; it is the willingness to
use the power which is new” [1, p.1].
As often occurs in the policy making process, the catalyst for an
increased use of port state control (PSC) is to be found in a series of very
serious maritime accidents which occurred in the ﬁnal decades of the

20th century.1 These accidents highlighted the unsatisfactory degree of
enforcement exercised by certain maritime administration [2–8] and
caused a strong political and public outcry for more stringent regulations regarding safety of ships, protection of the maritime environment
and living and working conditions [1,4].
In response, eight north European states signed The Hague
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1978, promptly superseded
by a more comprehensive gentlemen's agreement in 1982, the Paris
MoU [7,9,10], in order to stem the proliferation of substandard vessels
across European waters. The Paris MoU served as the archetype for
other MoUs which were established in other regions during the 1990s
[10] 2. It also served as the backbone for the three PSC Directives
adopted by the European Union (EU) since 1995.
The main purpose of regional enforcement is to “drastically reduce
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binding provisions may allow for diﬀerences in application while hard
law, such as the EU Directive, may presuppose a more harmonised
approach.
On a country level, regional diﬀerences may be induced by the
various stages of development and peculiarities within diﬀerent regions
[12]. Diﬀerences across Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU, Caribbean MoU, Viña
del Mar Agreement, AMSA and the USCG were identiﬁed by Knapp and
Franses [16] and Knapp and van de Velden [38]. On a cross-national
level, diﬀerences were identiﬁed within the Tokyo MoU [22], between
India, Russia and the UK [2,39] and also among Australia, India, South
Africa and Russia [17]. However, aside from a recent interview study
from Graziano, Schröder-Hinrichs and Ölcer [40] focusing on discrepancies within the EU region, no empirical study based on PSCs have
investigated cross-national diﬀerences in the EU following the entry
into force of Directive 2009/16/EC.
Considering the reason why discrepancies may appear, Anderson
[13] suggested that the lack of appropriate resources and unequal
participation of states in the same MoU are factors to be taken into
consideration. Anderson [13] also calls into question the diversity in
resources, whether manpower, ﬁnancial, or technological as well as the
lack of speciﬁc action plans for proper enforcement. Knapp and Franses
[16] argue that various port authorities seem to adopt diﬀerent inspection philosophies in the detention of vessels which translates to
perceived cross-national diﬀerences.
On a more operational level, ship-related elements play a prominent
role on the inspection outcomes. Authors have identiﬁed age, ship type,
ﬂag of registry as determinants of the number of deﬁciencies recorded
[24]. In spite of the fact that those elements proved to be signiﬁcant
predictors of the inspection results, diﬀerences across inspecting authorities, even when controlled for, remain and are still responsible for
the number of deﬁciencies and probability of detentions [16,17]. A
supplementing conclusion can be reached if considering subjectivity
and reliance on professional judgment as inherent contributing elements to cross-national diﬀerence [2,4,40]. More speciﬁcally, some
authors have suggested that further investigations should be conducted
on the inﬂuence that the background of PSCOs and the number of inspectors on the inspection team have on inspections results [16,41].
This paper contributes to the body of literature investigating crossnational diﬀerences of PSC practices within the EU as a region. Its ﬁrst
aim is to assess whether particular EU countries record a higher number
of deﬁciencies or higher detention rates. For that purpose, an econometric analysis is applied as there may be diﬀerences in the characteristics of the vessel inspected among countries. Following the previous empirical evidence of [16,17,23,24,28,29,39], two research
hypotheses are formulated.

substandard shipping in the waters under the jurisdiction of Member
States” (MSs) by developing, among other factors “common criteria for
control of ships by the port State and harmonising procedures on inspection and detention” [11]. However, issues in the harmonisation
process have been identiﬁed since the emergence of the early MoUs
[2,12–17] that may result in diﬀerent inspection output, either detentions or deﬁciencies, depending on the inspecting port authority.
Asymmetrical inspecting behaviours can undermine the eﬀective implementation of international regulations [2,14] and distort the level
playing ﬁeld within the region.
This paper inquiries into the adequacy in EU Port State controls as
reﬂected by either relative homogeneity or heterogeneity in inspection
outcomes depending on where vessels are inspected. For that purpose,
the study relies on a dataset from the European Union with detailed
records from approximately 48,000 inspections and 130,000 deﬁciencies detected during the time frame 1 January 2014 to 31 December
2015. A unique feature of the database is that it includes complementary information on the number and background of PSCOs who
carried out inspections, giving us the possibility to investigate whether
these elements may be correlated to any inadequacies in the PSC inspection regime.
The data is analysed in the following manner. First, an investigation
is performed on whether single EU countries record a higher number of
deﬁciencies and detention compared to others. An econometric analysis
is used to control for the fact that vessels inspected in diﬀerent countries do not have the same observable characteristics. Second, an exploration of whether inspection outcomes are correlated to the number
and background of PSCOs present on board at the time of inspection is
implemented. Overall, the results show that discrepancies in harmonisation have been encountered and that accounting for PSCO's characteristics have an inﬂuence on inspection outcomes.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature concerning PSCs and presents some
research hypotheses. In Section 3, a description of the data sample is
provided and econometric results are discussed in Section 4. Finally,
conclusions and potential policy implications are presented in Section 5.
2. Background
During the ﬁrst years of its implementation, the Paris MoU underwent some criticisms as it was perceived as a ‘discriminatory enforcement’ of International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions [18].
This led several scholars to verify the eﬀectiveness of PSC
[2,4,7,12,13,19–29] and its legal foundation [6,10,21,30–34]. According to these investigations, it is nowadays conventional wisdom
that PSCs contribute to ensuring compliance with international regulatory eﬀorts [6–8,19,35] and increase safety standards [5,36], pollution prevention and standards for seafarers on board vessels [20,21].
Despite the numerous positive eﬀects observed, even at the early
stages of the introduction of regional initiatives on PSC, cross-national
diﬀerences have emerged in inspection practices and results, whether
number of deﬁciencies or probability of detention. Discrepancies in
inspection practices have a profound impact on the credibility of the
regional MoUs on PSC. These can distort the market [16] by promoting
the so called “port-shopping” phenomenon [10,14,21,35], a strategic
practice by some operators who choose certain ports/regions [14,15]
over others because of their less stringent safety enforcement standards.
Moreover, diﬀerences can undermine the targeting system that relies on
the accuracy of inspection results [16]. Reasons for discrepancies can be
multiple and diverse.
In the context of international law, an MoU is not a treaty but an
administrative agreement [4,15,37] which implies that its provisions
are, de jure, non-binding for the signatory parties. In the case of the EU,
however, the provisions of the Paris MoU have been made mandatory
and enforceable for EU MSs through the issuance of Directive 2009/16/
EC. Clearly, an administrative agreement that does not contemplate

Hypothesis 1. PSCs may lead to country diﬀerences both in number of
deﬁciencies and in rates of detention within the EU region even when
the characteristics of the ﬂeet inspected are controlled for.
Moreover, in line with [16,40,41], an investigation is performed on
whether the number of inspectors allocated for an inspection and the
background of inspectors can help in understanding the potential crossnational diﬀerences in PSC outcomes.
Hypothesis 2. PSC outcomes can be inﬂuenced by the number and
background of inspectors within the EU region.
Numerous studies take for granted that the mandatory nature of the
European PSC regime, by virtue of Directive 2009/16/EC, translates to
a more eﬀective PSC inspection system compared to other PSC MoUs
[5].
3. Data and descriptive statistics
The hypotheses were tested using PSC inspection data carried out
within the EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) region
within the Paris MoU framework. Originally established in 1982, the
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The empirical analysis is based on an exhaustive dataset provided
by the EC with inspection as observation unit. It covers all inspections
carried out from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015.8 Overall, the
sample comprises 32,206 PSC inspections. Out of these, 10,076 are
initial inspections (31.3%), 17,431 more detailed inspections (54.1%),
and 4699 expanded inspections (14.6%). An initial inspection is a visit
on board of a ship in order to check the certiﬁcates and documents
listed in Annex 10 of the MoU text, the overall condition and hygiene of
the ship, if the vessel meets generally accepted international rules and
standards and to verify, whether deﬁciencies found by an Authority at a
previous inspection have been rectiﬁed. A more detailed inspection is
carried out whenever there are clear grounds for believing, during an
inspection, that the condition of the ship or of its equipment or crew
does not substantially meet the relevant requirements of a relevant
instrument. An expanded inspection includes a check of the overall
conditions, including human element where relevant, in 14 diﬀerent
risk areas.9
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample. The
proportion of inspections with at least one deﬁciency is 53.5%. The
average number of deﬁciencies detected during an inspection is 2.4
(with a standard deviation of 4.0). The proportion of inspections
leading to detention is equal to 3.4%. As expected, the PSC outcome is
strongly aﬀected by the type of inspection. The proportion of vessels
with at least one deﬁciency is 29.3% for initial inspections, but around
65.0% for more detailed and expanded inspections. By deﬁnition, detention follows a more detailed or an expanded inspection and the
conditional detention rate is 5.0% in both cases.
General cargo is the type of vessel that is the most frequently inspected with 29.9% of inspections, followed by bulk carrier (18.3%).
There are substantial diﬀerences in PSC outcomes depending on the
vessel type. There are more deﬁciencies detected for general cargo
(62.7%), passenger vessels (58.3%) and bulk carriers (58.3%).
Detention is also much more frequent for general cargo (5.9%) and to a
lesser extent bulk carrier (3.5%) than for other vessels. The average age
of vessels subject to inspection is 15.1 years. There exists a positive
correlation between inspection outcomes and age at inspection. Having
at least one deﬁciency is found for 45.9% of vessels aged between 5 and
10, but 71.6% for vessels older than 30 years.10 In the same vein, ﬂags
of registry performance is playing on the likelihood of having more
deﬁciencies and a detention. The average number of deﬁciencies is 2.1
for the white category, 4.0 for the grey category, 5.7 for the black
medium risk category and even 8.1 for the black medium to high and
high risk categories.
To detect potential disparities across the various locations where
inspections are taking place, let n be the total number of inspections
and nj that for country j . The average proportion of vessels with any
deﬁciencies DEF for the whole sample may be expressed as:

Paris MoU includes 27 maritime authorities covering the coastal waters
of the European states and the North Atlantic from North America to
Europe.3 These authorities agreed to implement a harmonised system of
PSC in the aftermath of the Amoco Cadiz accident in 1978. In this framework, only the 25 EU and EFTA countries belonging to the Paris
MoU have been included in the study since they abide by the provisions
of Directive 2009/16/EC. Canada and the Russia Federation were excluded from the original dataset.
The selection of vessels to be inspected is based on results from a
ship risk proﬁle calculator and a company performance calculator.4 The
inﬂuential parameters are the type of ship, whether the ship is older
than 12 years, the ﬂag and its performance (from white to black high
risk), whether the ﬂag is IMO audited, whether all certiﬁcates are issued
by ﬂag, the recognized organization and its performance (from very low
to high), whether the organization is EU recognized, and the ISM
company performance (from very low to high).5 The ship risk proﬁle
also depends on historical parameters from the last 36 months: at least
one inspection, all inspections with 5 or less deﬁciencies, and number of
detentions. A high risk proﬁle is assigned to ships whose score is at least
5 points.
Based on a ship's risk proﬁle, the Inspection and Selection Scheme
determines the scope, frequency and priority of inspections. According
to the risk proﬁle of ships, the PSC Database THETIS informs the PSC
authorities of the priority of a ship entering their ports, whether No
Priority (ship should not be inspected), Priority II (PII - ship may be
inspected) or Priority I (PI - ship must be inspected). Ships become due
for periodic inspection in the following time windows: for high risk
ships (HRS), the ship is PII during the ﬁrst 5 months following the last
Paris MoU inspection and PI after 6 months. For standard risk ships
(SRS), the ship is PII during 10 months following the last inspection and
PI after 12 months. Lastly, for low risk ships (LRS), the ship is PII during
24 months following the last inspection and PI after 36 months.
Each inspection leads to a report, publicly available on THETIS, that
includes the following information: date of inspection, type of inspection (initial, expanded, more detailed inspection), country of inspection, ISM company performance, vessel ﬂag of registry, ﬂag performance (white-grey-black list) and risk proﬁle (high, medium, low).6
The database also includes information on the year when the vessel was
built (from which the age at the time of the inspection is calculated),
ship's total length and ship type (general cargo, oil tanker, container,
etc). A unique feature of the dataset is that it also includes the inspector's identiﬁcation number.7 As discussed later, this will allow to
account for the background of inspectors when explaining PSC outcomes. Due to this speciﬁc information on inspectors, the various
Members States are anonymized in the dataset.
For each inspection, the number of deﬁciencies and the number of
deﬁciencies leading to detention are reported. The PSC outcomes are
deﬁned in the following manner. DEF is a binary variable equal to one
when, following an inspection, a speciﬁc vessel had at least one deﬁciency detected (and it is equal to 0 otherwise). DEFN is the number of
deﬁciencies recorded. DET is a binary variable which takes the value of
one when a vessel is detained and is equal to 0 otherwise. For each
deﬁciency, each type of deﬁcient or defective item is also recorded.

DEF =

nj

∑j ⎛ n ⎞ DEF
⎝

⎠

j

(1)

This corresponds to a weighted sum of the average proportion of
vessels with any deﬁciencies in each country DEFj .
Fig. 1 sheds light on heterogeneity in the number of inspections nj
between the various countries and for the 32,306 PSC inspections
carried out by the 25 diﬀerent EU and EFTA countries. Due to anonymization, the various Members States are relabeled using codes ranging from MS1 to MS25. The average number of inspections per country
is 1288, with a standard deviation of 991. It ranges from 138 (MS11) to

3
The current member states are Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. For further details on the Paris MoU,
see www.parismou.org.
4
These calculators are available online at https://portal.emsa.europa.eu/web/thetis/
calculators.
5
The International Safety Management (ISM) Code is a mandatory international
standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention.
6
Inspection results can be found at https://portal.emsa.europa.eu/web/thetis/
inspections.
7
Access to the data used in this paper was made possible through an agreement with
the EC.

8
In this administrative dataset ﬁlled in by maritime authorities, there is no issue of
missing data. Data are re-checked by national coordinators once ﬁlled in the system. In
case of mismatches, the data are veriﬁed once more by EMSA personnel dealing with ship
inspection support.
9
See https://www.parismou.org/inspections-risk/library-faq/inspection-types.
10
The proportion of detained vessels is higher for vessels older than 30 years (8.5%)
compared to vessels aged between 15 and 20 years (4.1%).
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the sample.
Source: anonymized data from the EU region 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
Variables

Type of inspection
Initial inspection
More detailed inspection
Expanded inspection
Type of vessel
Bulk carrier
Oil tanker
Chemical/gas tanker
Containership
General cargo
Passenger
Ro-ro
Other
Age at inspection
0–5
5–10
10–15
15–20
20–30
30+
Flag Performance
White
Grey
Black medium risk
Black medium to high
risk
All vessels

DEF (in
%)

DEFN

DET (in
%)

Distribution (in %)

29.3
64.1
66.4

0.7
3.0
3.6

0.0
5.0
5.0

31.3
54.1
14.6

54.8
39.4
42.9
47.6
62.7
58.3
52.3
52.9

2.5
1.3
1.4
1.7
3.3
2.5
2.2
2.1

3.5
1.4
1.5
1.6
5.9
1.8
2.0
3.1

18.3
7.7
11.3
10.8
29.9
2.2
7.7
12.2

37.8
45.9
51.4
61.3
65.5
71.6

1.1
1.6
2.0
2.8
3.5
4.5

0.9
1.9
2.3
4.1
5.7
8.5

16.5
27.1
15.6
14.7
13.5
12.5

51.1
69.3
82.7
94.7

2.1
4.0
5.7
8.1

2.7
8.8
12.1
15.7

91.2
4.3
2.9
1.6

53.5

2.4

3.4

Note: DEF is for any deﬁciency, DEFN is for number of deﬁciencies, and DET is for detention.
Fig. 1. Number of inspections, by member country.
Note: MS1-MS25 refer to the diﬀerent inspection
countries. Source: data from EU region 2014–2015,
authors’ calculations.

while it is below 30% in 5 states (MS12, MS7, MS6, MS24, MS20). On
average, the number of deﬁciencies per inspection is larger when inspections are carried out in a port located in MS19 (4.2), MS10 (3.8)
and MS2 (3.5).11 The probability of detention is more likely when inspections are conducted in MS4 (11.8%), MS10 (6.9%) and MS11
(6.7%). Conversely, there is no detention when vessels are inspected in

3520 (MS23). There are large country diﬀerences by type of inspections. The average is 403 for initial inspection (with a standard deviation of 339) and 697 for more detailed inspections (with a standard
deviation of 546).
Fig. 2 represents the various PSC inspection outcomes for each
member state. The data shows large diﬀerences in the region. The
average proportion of deﬁciencies ranges from 69.2% when vessels are
inspected in MS4 to 20.4% in MS12. This proportion exceeds 60% in 8
member states (MS4, MS10, MS19, MS2, MS25, MS1, MS21, MS13),

11
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The lowest ﬁgures are in MS7 (0.4), MS12 (0.7), MS24 (0.7) and MS6 (0.7).
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Fig. 2. Results of inspections, by member country.
Note: MS1-MS25 refer to the diﬀerent inspection
countries. Source: data from the EU Region
2014–2015, authors’ calculations.

stress that although there are diﬀerences in the average PSC outcomes
between countries, there are still large diﬀerences in PSC outcomes
within each country. This pattern is consistent with two main explanations. On the one hand, there may be some lack of consistency in
inspection procedures under the authority of each individual port state.
On the other hand, there may be some heterogeneity in vessels calling
within each country. In the next Section, the role of vessels’ characteristics is taken into account using an econometric analysis.

MS6 and MS12. In addition, detentions are not necessarily higher in a
country where more deﬁciencies are detected on average. For instance,
in MS11, the detention rate is 6.7% while the average number of deﬁciencies is 1.4.
From a descriptive viewpoint, a variance decomposition analysis is
implemented to assess the extent to which diﬀerences in PSC outcomes
stem from diﬀerences between countries (due to diﬀerences in the
average outcomes of countries) or diﬀerences within countries (due to
variation in the outcomes for each country). Let DEFji a dummy variable indicating whether inspection i occurring in country j leads to the
report of any deﬁciencies. Denoting by V (.) the variance operator,
V (DEFji ) can be expressed as:

V (DEFji ) = V (DEFj ) + V (DEFji − DEFj )

4. Results
4.1. Diﬀerences by country of inspection

(2)
The average number of deﬁciencies detected within a given country
can be higher if vessels inspected in this country are, on average, in bad
condition. To account for this eﬀect on the various PSC outcomes, linear
probability models for DEF and DET and an OLS regression for DEFN 12
are estimated. In addition to country of inspection dummies, the following list of control variables is included in the various regressions:
type of inspection, type of vessel, age at inspection and ﬂag of registry.
Table 2 focuses on the inﬂuence of country of inspection and reports the

The ﬁrst term V (DEFj ) is the between variance and refers to differences in the average proportion of having any deﬁciencies between
countries. The second-term V (DEFji − DEFj ) is the within variance and
corresponds to diﬀerences in the PSC outcome observed in any given
country with respect to the average level of that country.
For the likelihood of having a deﬁciency detected, the contributions
of the between and within terms to the total variance (equal to 0.248)
represent 6.5% and 93.5%, respectively. Very similar results are found
for the number of deﬁciencies with weights equal to 5.3% and 94.7%
for the between and within variances, respectively. These ﬁndings

12
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Similar conclusions were reached using Probit models for DEF and DET .
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second for detention. If these empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm the ﬁrst hypothesis on PSC country diﬀerences, both in number of deﬁciencies and
in rates of detention, they also conﬁrm that vessels’ characteristics
impact PSC outcomes. The R2 associated to the model explaining the
probability of having any deﬁciency is more than three times higher
with both vessels’ characteristics and inspection country dummies (R2
= 0.221) than with country dummies only (R2 = 0.065). The same
ratio is around 4.3 both for number of deﬁciencies and detention. As
expected, vessels’ characteristics are the most important factor explaining the PSC outcomes.
For instance, age is positively related to deﬁciencies or detention.
Compared to the reference age category which is less than 5 years old,
the probability of having a vessel detained increases by 4.7 percentage
points when the vessel is more than 30 years old, and by 2.1 percentage
points for the number of deﬁciencies. Also, Passenger and Ro-Ro vessels
are subject to less detention and deﬁciencies compared to the “other
vessels” category, while general cargo are more often detained and with
more deﬁciencies detected.
In order to assess the within-country diﬀerences, a variance decomposition based on the regression estimates was calculated from the
random eﬀect regression which describes the number of deﬁciencies
DEFji . Let Xji be the control variables and β̂ the estimated coeﬃcients.
The predicted number of deﬁciencies,

Table 2
Estimates of inspection results – marginal eﬀects for member countries.
Source: data from the EU Region MoU 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
Country of inspection
MS1

DEF (in %)
Ref

DEFN
Ref

DET (in %)
Ref

MS10
MS11
MS12
MS13
MS14
MS15
MS16
MS17
MS18
MS19
MS2
MS20
MS21
MS22
MS23
MS24
MS25
MS3
MS4
MS5
MS6
MS7
MS8
MS9
Type of inspection
Type of vessel
Age at inspection
Vessel ﬂag
Number of observations

−10.8***
−29.9***
−48.5***
−11.4***
−13.4***
−28.6***
−24.3***
−11.0***
−39.3***
−8.6***
−21.7***
−41.1***
−22.0***
−14.7***
−14.2***
−44.7***
−6.2***
−29.1***
−13.8***
−31.4***
−42.7***
−43.9***
−16.8***
−14.5***
YES
YES
YES
YES
32,206

−0.6***
−2.3***
−2.6***
−1.0***
−0.7***
−2.3***
−1.2***
−0.9***
−2.5***
0.3*
−1.7***
−2.1***
−1.9***
−0.4*
−0.6***
−2.6***
−0.3**
−2.7***
−1.0***
−2.0***
−2.6***
−2.7***
−1.6***
−0.7***
YES
YES
YES
YES
32,206

1.7***
3.3
−3.2***
2.8***
3.3***
−3.5***
1.6
−0.6
−2.3***
1.7**
−4.8***
−1.1**
−2.4***
−0.9
0.8*
−2.1***
1.6***
−3.6***
6.1***
−2.1***
−2.8***
−2.0***
−0.2
1.0**
YES
YES
YES
YES
32,206

ˆ ji = Xβˆ
DEF

(3)

ˆ j ) , which refers to
is decomposed in a between observed variance V (DEF
the average diﬀerences between countries, and a within observed varˆ ji − DEF
ˆ j ) , which refers to the diﬀerences in deﬁciencies
iance V (DEF
with respect to the average level within each country of inspection. A
much larger contribution of the within variance (88.7%) compared to
the between variance (11.3%) is found, meaning that even net of the
vessel characteristics, substantial heterogeneity remains in the PSC
outcomes within each country of inspection.

Note: estimates from linear probability and linear regression models. Signiﬁcance levels
are 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).

corresponding marginal eﬀects for each outcome.13
Estimates show that almost all country of inspection ﬁxed eﬀects are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. This means that, net of the
type of inspection and of vessel characteristics (type, age, ﬂag), there
are still diﬀerences across countries of inspection, a result similar to
[16,17]. Turning to the likelihood of having at least one deﬁciency
detected (column 1, Table 2), all marginal eﬀects are negative. This
implies that the probability for a vessel of having at least one deﬁciency
detected is higher when the inspection is carried out in MS1. The gap is
impressive for some countries. Compared to MS1, the probability of
having a vessel without deﬁciency is more than 40 percent points lower
in MS6, MS7, MS12, MS20 and MS24.
Similar results are found for the number of deﬁciencies (column 2,
Table 2). Compared to MS1, inspections completed in MS3, MS6, MS7,
MS12, MS18 or MS24 are associated with less deﬁciencies (with a gap
exceeding 2.5 deﬁciencies per vessel). The situation is diﬀerent for
detention (column 3, Table 2). Compared to the reference country MS1,
the probability of having a vessel detained increases by 6.1 percentage
points when the vessel is inspected in MS4 and by 3.3 percentage points
in MS14. Conversely, detention decreases by 4.8 percentage points
when the vessel is inspected in MS2 and by 3.6 when inspected in MS3.
The comparison of the three PSC outcomes (DEF , DET , DEFN )
shows that there is an impact from being inspected in a country instead
of another, though there is no clear hierarchy. On the one hand, some
countries such as MS10, MS19 or MS25 rank higher compared to MS1
in terms of all three PSC outcomes. Speciﬁcally, MS19 ranks third in
terms of any deﬁciency, it ranks ﬁrst in terms of number of deﬁciencies
and it ranks ﬁfth in terms of detention. Diﬀerently, MS11 ranks 18th in
terms of any deﬁciency and number of deﬁciencies but it is ranks

4.2. Number of inspectors
This subsection investigates whether the number of inspectors allocated to carry out an inspection could explain the cross-country differences identiﬁed in the previous section and in former studies
[16,17]. As reported in Fig. 3, there are indeed large disparities in the
number of inspectors mobilized for an inspection. For the whole
sample, more than one-half of inspections (56.8%) were carried out
using one inspector. They are two for 36.9% of inspections and three
and more for 6.3% of inspections.
More inspectors are mobilized for more detailed and expanded inspections. The proportion of inspections with exactly two inspectors is
31.4% for initial inspections, 37.3% for more detailed inspections and
47.5% for expanded expansions. The decision of engaging one or more
inspectors on board is not part of the EU legislation and is a sovereign
decision remaining in each individual member state. This ﬂexibility
may be positive since MSs are in a position to allocate the number of
inspectors on the foundation of ﬁnancial circumstances, personnel and
territorial extension.
Fig. 4 shows some statistics on the average number of inspectors per
inspection for each member country and by type of inspection. These
averages are calculated because of the correlation between the number
of inspectors and the type of inspection evidenced in Fig. 3. Again, there
are large diﬀerences by country. For initial inspections, the average
number of inspectors per inspection ranges from 1.0 in MS16 and MS20
to 1.8 in MS8 and 2.1 in MS2. Almost the same rankings are found for
more detailed inspections, with the lowest averages in MS20 (1.0) and
MS16 (1.1) and the highest averages in MS8 (1.9) and MS2 (2.2). For
expanded inspections, the highest average numbers of inspectors are
found in MS8 (2.4), MS4 (2.6) and MS7 (2.7) and the lowest are still in
MS16 (1.1) and MS20 (1.1).

13
Detailed results for all covariates with coeﬃcients, t-values and marginal eﬀects are
available from the authors upon request.
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Fig. 3. Number of inspectors, by type of inspection.
Source: data from the EU Region MoU 2014–2015,
authors’ calculations.

Fig. 4. Number of inspectors per inspection, by
member country and type of inspection. Source: data
from the EU Region 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
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Fig. 5. Results of inspection, by number of inspectors. Source: data from the EU Region
2014–2015, authors’ calculations.

that the data obtained does not provide any information on the time
and eﬀort spent by each inspector during each inspection. So, at that
stage, it can only be concluded that the number of inspectors assigned
to each inspection is one element explaining the country diﬀerences in
PSC outcomes observed in our data. However, the study is not able to
explain through which mechanisms this eﬀect operates.

The number of inspectors is likely to inﬂuence the PSC outcomes. A
higher number of inspectors aﬀords the inspection of more speciﬁc
areas within the same amount of time spent on board the ship. For
instance, a single inspector with a deck background might spend 20 min
inspecting the navigation bridge and life-saving appliances and then
another 20 min to sweep through the engine room, cargo spaces, and
marine pollution prevention related logs and records. On the other
hand, a team of three inspectors could concentrate the same 40 min on
only one or two speciﬁc areas. This invariably leads to closer examinations and therefore higher probabilities for noting deﬁciencies
and even ordering detentions.
Fig. 5 conﬁrms the relevance of such an assumption. The mean
number of deﬁciencies detected is 4.6 when three or more inspectors
are mobilized against 2.8 when there are two inspectors and 1.9 when
there is only one. The gap is even larger when examining the impact on
the detention rate, which is 13.8% with three inspectors against 4.3%
for two inspectors and 1.7% for one. Interpreting these results remains
nonetheless diﬃcult as they may be subject to the issue of reverse
causality. As explained above, the decision to dispatch one or more
inspectors on board depends on the MS according to the travelling
distance from the oﬃce to the port, the internal organization of the
maritime administration, the national policy and the size of the vessel,
among other reasons.
Table 3 assesses whether the number of inspectors has an inﬂuence
on PSC outcomes once vessel characteristics are introduced as explanatory variables in the various regressions. When considering the
whole sample of inspections (panel A), the probability of having any
deﬁciencies is 8.8 percentage points higher when there are two inspectors rather than one and even 13.4 percentage points with three
inspectors. In the same vein, the probability of having a vessel detained
is 3.8 percentage points higher with two inspectors (rather than one)
and 14.0 percentage points with three inspectors. Detailed results per
type of inspection conﬁrm the positive correlation between the number
of inspectors and the PSC outcomes, with large marginal eﬀects for
detention.
The results are in line with the second hypothesis as well as with
former studies. In their study on the Spanish Maritime Administration,
Ravira and Piniella [41] strongly advocated for multidisciplinary teams
on board given the enhanced likelihood of detecting deﬁciencies as well
as a more eﬃcient decision-making process. Nevertheless, it is clear

4.3. Background of inspectors
As the database includes an inspector identiﬁer, additional information on the educational background of the 845 inspectors involved in the 32,206 inspections was collected through the questionnaire that each MS ﬁlls in during the preparatory phase of the ﬁve
years’ cycle of visits. Those visits monitor compliance and performance
of MSs with regard to the PSC Directive [11] following the provisions of
Article 30. There are 24 initial diﬀerent educational backgrounds that
were grouped into the ﬁve following categories: seagoing (deck), seagoing (engine), architect/engineer, other university degrees, and
others/unknown.14
Out of the 845 inspectors, 33.4% have a seagoing (deck) background, 23.4% have a seagoing (engine) background, 11.2% are architects or engineers, 19.1% have another university degree and 12.9%
are in the other/unknown category. At the country level, there exist
large disparities in both the total number and background of inspectors.
The average number of inspectors per country is 33.8, with a standard
deviation of 35.9. The number of inspectors ranges from 2 in MS16 to
120 in MS14. Five countries have 60 inspectors or more: MS10 with 65,
MS8 with 93, MS23 with 106, MS25 with 100, and MS14 with 120. In
MS14, 75.8% of inspectors have a university-related degree while those
with the same background represent 17.0% in MS25. In that country,
40.0% of inspectors have a seagoing (deck) background against 2.5% in
MS14.
To study the relationship between the inspector's background and
14
Information for 35 inspectors (4.1% of inspectors) could not be obtained. The detailed categories are: Seagoing (deck); Seagoing (Radio Oﬃcer); Seagoing (Deck – Radio),
Seagoing (engine); Naval Architect – Seagoing (deck), Architect or engineer (Naval
Architect: Naval Architect; Naval Engineer; Marine Engineer (MSc)), Other University
(Law and Economics, the other Engineers not related to Maritime; Nautical Science;
Nautical (University Degree); Nautical - Marine Technology (MSc) and Others (0 or unknown).
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Table 3
Marginal eﬀect of number of inspectors on inspection results.
Source: data from the EU Region 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
Variables
A. All inspections (N=32,206)
One inspector
Two inspectors
Three and more inspectors
Controls
B. Initial inspections (N=10,076)
One inspector
Two inspectors
Three and more inspectors
Controls
C. More detailed inspections (N = 17,431)
One inspector
Two inspectors
Three and more inspectors
Vessel characteristics
D. Expanded inspections (N = 4699)
One inspector
Two inspectors
Three and more inspectors
Controls

DEF (in %)

DEFN

Table 4
Marginal eﬀect of background of inspectors on inspection results.
Source: data from the EU Region 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.

DET (in %)

Ref
8.8***
13.4***
YES

Ref
1.0***
2.7***
YES

Ref
3.8***
14.0***
YES

Ref
8.9***
6.0**
YES

Ref
0.3***
0.2**
YES

YES

Ref
8.4***
16.5***
YES

Ref
1.3***
3.9***
YES

Ref
5.7***
21.0***
YES

Ref
11.4***
14.1***
YES

Ref
1.3***
2.6***
YES

Ref
4.5***
11.2***
YES

Variables
A. All inspections (N=48,636)
Seagoing (deck)
Seagoing (engine)
Architect or engineer
Other university
Other or unknown
Controls
B. Initial inspections (N = 13,787)
Seagoing (deck)
Seagoing (engine)
Architect or engineer
Other university
Other or unknown
Controls
C. More detailed inspections (N = 26,196)
Seagoing (deck)
Seagoing (engine)
Architect or engineer
Other university
Other or unknown
Vessel characteristics
D. Expanded inspections (N = 8653)
Seagoing (deck)
Seagoing (engine)
Architect or engineer
Other university
Other or unknown
Controls

Note: estimates from linear probability and linear regression models. Signiﬁcance levels
are 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Each regression also includes type of inspection, type
of vessel, age at inspection, vessel ﬂag and state of inspection as explanatory variables.

the PSC outcomes, the data is transformed so that the unit level is now
the inspector. In this new sample, a vessel inspected by two inspectors
therefore contributes to two observations. This way, a sample of 48,636
individual inspections is obtained.
The results illustrate little variation for the proportion of vessels
having at least one deﬁciency (DEF), and for the average number of
deﬁciencies (DEFN), according to the inspector's background. The
average number of deﬁciencies is for instance 2.6 for inspectors with
seagoing (deck) background, 2.9 with seagoing (engine) background
and 2.7 for architect or engineer. Concerning detention, the likelihood
is somewhat higher for inspectors being either architects/engineers
(5.6%) or with other university background (5.8%) than inspectors with
seagoing (deck) background (3.8%). At a more detailed level, inspectors
with a background in either law or political sciences have a higher
probability of being part of an inspection leading to a detention (8.4%
and 7.6%, respectively).
Next, regression models are estimated to study the inﬂuence played
by the inspector's background on PSC outcomes. Table 4 reports only
marginal eﬀects of the inspector's background.15 For all outcomes, the
background has in general a very small eﬀect in magnitude on the ﬁnal
PSC outcome. The largest eﬀect on the number of deﬁciencies is for
instance equal to 0.2 for initial inspections. When considering all inspections, the likelihood of having a vessel detained is higher when
inspections are carried out by inspectors with a seagoing (engine)
background (+0.5 percentage point) and by inspectors with a background of architect or engineer (1.0 percentage point). Those results are
similar to Knapp and Franses [16] who estimated the probability of
detention for inspectors with nautical background versus those with
engineering background as oscillating between 1% and 3%.
A last concern is whether the background of inspectors has an inﬂuence on the type of deﬁciencies registered during the inspection. As shown
in the last column of Table 5, the most frequent deﬁciencies are related to
certiﬁcate and documentation (15.8% of total deﬁciencies), ﬁre safety
(14.0%), safety of navigation (12.3%) and labor conditions (10.2%). A
Chi2 test shows that the type of deﬁciencies and the background of

DEF (in %)

DEFN

DET (in %)

Ref
−1.7***
−0.8
−1.2
2.0**
YES

Ref
−0.0
−0.0
−0.1*
0.1**
YES

Ref
0.5**
1.0***
0.2
−0.1
YES

Ref
−3.9***
0.4
−2.9*
1.8
YES

Ref
−0.1***
0.0
−0.1**
0.2***
YES

Ref
−1.1*
−2.1**
−1.5
1.9*
YES

Ref
0.0
−0.1
−0.1
0.1
YES

Ref
0.4
1.0*
0.2
−0.4
YES

Ref
−1.2
0.4
1.3
3.0*
YES

Ref
−0.1
−0.0
−0.0
−0.0
YES

Ref
0.4
1.8*
0.3
−0.3
YES

Note: estimates from linear probability and linear regression models. Signiﬁcance levels
are 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Each regression also includes type of inspection, type
of vessel, age at inspection, vessel ﬂag and state of inspection as explanatory variables.

inspectors are not independent. For instance, inspectors with either a
seagoing (deck) or seagoing (engine) background report more often deﬁciencies related to safety or navigation. The reverse pattern is found for
inspectors being either architect or engineer or having other university
diploma. Architects or engineers more often report deﬁciencies related to
labor conditions, while inspectors from other university backgrounds more
often report deﬁciencies related to certiﬁcate and documentation.
Table 6 shows the estimated probability for an inspector to report a
given type of deﬁciency.16 Again, linear probability models are used to
take into account the role of vessel characteristics. When the country of
inspection is not controlled for (panel A), some signiﬁcant impacts related to the background of inspectors (other or unknown backgrounds
being the reference category) are found. For instance, deﬁciencies related to certiﬁcates and documentation are more likely for inspectors
with a background from other university. Deﬁciencies related to safety
of navigation are more frequent when inspectors have a background in
seagoing (deck) or seagoing (engine).
However, these results are not any longer signiﬁcant when the
country of inspection is controlled for (panel B). The results which are
consistent across panel A and B are related to ﬁre safety-related deﬁciencies which are less likely for inspectors with a university degree,
labor conditions-related deﬁciencies which are less likely for inspectors
with a nautical background while living and working conditions-related
deﬁciencies are more likely for these inspectors. Finally, as expected,
inspectors with a seagoing (engine) background are more likely to detect propulsion and auxiliary machinery-related deﬁciencies.
It is clear that, beside their background, PSCOs may be inﬂuenced by
bureaucratic and cultural practices in their country, the extent of their
training, the administrative and political support of their administration
among other factors already discussed in the literature.

15
The list of explanatory variables includes type of inspection, type of vessel, vessel
age, ﬂag of registry, country of inspection and number of inspectors when the vessel is
inspected.

16
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Table 5
Type of deﬁciencies by background of inspectors.
Source: data from the EU Region 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
Type of deﬁciencies

Certiﬁcate and documentation
Fire safety
Safety of Navigation
Labor conditions
Life saving appliances
Emergency systems
Pollution prevention
Living and working conditions
Propulsion and auxiliary machinery
Structural conditions
ISM
Water/weathertight conditions
Radio communications
Alarms
ISPS
Other
Cargo operations including equipment
Dangerous goods

Background of inspectors

Proportion

Seagoing (deck)

Seagoing (engine)

Architect or engineer

Other university

Other or unknown

(in %)

15.4
14.3
13.1
9.9
8.8
4.9
4.9
5.2
4.5
4.6
4.3
4.4
2.5
1.0
0.6
0.8
0.5
0.2

15.1
13.1
13.3
9.1
8.5
5.2
5.4
6.3
5.5
4.4
4.3
4.4
2.4
1.3
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.2

16.4
12.7
10.0
12.1
7.3
6.2
5.9
3.8
5.6
5.0
4.4
4.6
2.5
0.9
0.8
1.0
0.5
0.3

17.7
14.9
10.2
10.3
8.4
6.1
5.3
4.8
4.0
4.0
5.0
4.1
1.7
0.9
1.2
0.5
0.6
0.3

16.1
15.8
11.1
12.4
9.0
5.9
4.7
2.9
4.6
4.7
4.2
3.7
2.1
0.8
0.7
0.9
0.3
0.2

15.8
14.0
12.3
10.2
8.5
5.4
5.2
5.1
4.9
4.5
4.4
4.3
2.3
1.1
0.7
0.7
0.4
0.2

5. Concluding comments and policy implications

[16,40,41]. While the signiﬁcance is not always consistent, it is clear
that some backgrounds are more likely to detect certain types of deﬁciencies. For example, inspectors with a seagoing (engine) background
are more likely to detect propulsion and auxiliary machinery deﬁciencies compared to other inspectors.
A potential drawback of this study is that it sheds light on correlations between the role of inspectors and PSC outcomes. As previously
emphasized, the interpretation of some results is subject to reverse
causality issues. If for instance two or three inspectors are systematically chosen when vessels are presumed to be in bad conditions, then
the positive correlation between the number of inspectors and the
number of deﬁciencies sounds obvious. What matters is knowing
whether choosing ex ante a higher number of inspectors increases in a
causal way the number of deﬁciencies during the inspection or whether
assigning an inspector with some speciﬁc background indeed leads to a
higher number of reported deﬁciencies.
A simple empirical strategy to further examine the relevance of
causal eﬀects is to turn to randomized experiments. Starting from a list
of vessels to be inspected, a randomized allocation of either the number
of inspectors (either one, or two, or three) or the background of inspectors would provide the ideal framework. Once inspectors are randomly selected, then a comparison of the PSC outcomes between different groups of vessels (those being inspected by one inspector only
versus those being inspectors by exactly two inspectors for instance)
will provide the causal eﬀect of the number of inspectors. Such random
experiments can certainly be implemented at low cost by port authorities and would provide very useful information. A random allocation
of inspectors between ports could be of interest to assess whether PSCOs
have an inﬂuence on the diﬀerences observed within each EU MS.
However, this exercise could be easier for smaller MSs while challenging for MSs with a signiﬁcant length of coastline.
In conclusion, discrepancies in harmonisation have been encountered. In the ﬁrst part, diﬀerences across MSs have raised doubts
encompassing the PSC system as a whole. However, particular attention
should be given to some neglected areas such as team composition and
inspectors’ background. Despite the valid grounds for an arbitrary team
composition by MSs, the harmonisation of such process should be
considered in future policy considerations. These results would beneﬁt
any policy study that might consider recommending a review of
Directive 2009/16/EC.

The rise of the various memoranda of understanding since 1982 has set
the ambitious aim of harmonising the enforcement standards within the
region where the MoU was established [42]. However, the limits and
complexity faced trying to achieve this goal has been highlighted by
several publications in the past thirty years [2,4,10,14,17,22,38,39,43].
Taking as a reference the EU region, the purpose of this paper was to
determine whether single EU countries record a higher number of deﬁciencies and or detention net of the characteristics of the vessel inspected.
Also, an attempt was made to determine whether discrepancies in the
output of an inspection are inﬂuenced either by the team composition at
the time of the inspection or by the background of the PSCOs.
With regard to the ﬁrst aspect, results have made clear that some of
the diﬀerences in terms of detecting at least one deﬁciency and/or
detaining a vessel are signiﬁcant with some MSs showing a probability
40% lower of reporting zero deﬁciencies compared to others. Such
ﬁndings raise doubts on whether the establishment of harmonised
procedures on inspection and detention, as stated in the Article 1 of the
EU Directive on PSC [11], is being achieved. Moreover, the results
enable policy makers to ﬂag those countries which are struggling with
the implementation process of harmonised standards and, in view of
reviewing the 2009/16/EC, ascertain overhaul strategies.
Results also emphasize that diﬀerences in PSC outcomes are much
more important within each MS than, on average, between MSs. This
result holds even when the characteristics of inspected vessels are taken
into account. Still, there may exist substantial heterogeneity between
ports where vessels are inspected within a given country. This could be
due to the endemic traﬃc characteristics, whether in terms of size or
type, of some ports compared to others. Hence, it would be beneﬁcial to
investigate more closely inspection's diﬀerences between ports within
the same MS, especially for bigger MSs with signiﬁcant length of
coastline and number of ports. A topic, this, which could be addressed
in further studies after being able to access speciﬁc ports data which
could not be retrieved as part of this investigation.
Considering the team composition element in the inspection process, the results conﬁrm, at the European Union level, the ﬁndings of
previous studies [40,41]. The analysis clearly shows that the likelihood
of detecting deﬁciencies and detaining vessels is higher if the number of
inspectors on board is more than one. Finally, the extent to which inspectors report certain types of deﬁciencies according to their background is investigated, as suggested already by some authors
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0.0
−0.8**
−1.2***
−0.2
Ref
YES

−0.3
−0.1
−0.7
−2.2***
Ref
YES
YES
131,039

0.8*
−0.2
−0.6
0.6
Ref
YES

YES
131,039

YES
131,039

YES

YES

YES

1.9***
2.0***
−1.0**
−0.7
Ref
NO

Safety of
navigation

−1.4***
−2.3***
−3.2***
−1.2**
Ref
NO

Fire safety

−0.8
−0.8*
−0.3
2.0***
Ref
NO

Certiﬁcate and
documentation

YES
131,039

−1.7***
−1.5***
−0.6
1.0**
Ref
YES

YES

−2.5***
−3.5***
−0.1
−2.1***
Ref
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Labor
conditions

YES
131,039

0.3
0.2
−0.6
0.3
Ref
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−0.1
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−1.6***
−0.5
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Life saving
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YES
131,039

−0.0
0.2
0.3
−0.5
Ref
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YES

−0.8***
−0.7**
0.5
0.1
Ref
NO

Emergency
systems

YES
131,039

−0.3
0.1
1.0***
0.2
Ref
YES

YES

0.2
0.9***
1.2***
0.6**
Ref
NO

Pollution
prevention

YES
131,039

0.6**
0.5*
1.2***
0.0
Ref
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2.3***
3.2***
1.1***
1.8***
Ref
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Living and working
conditions

YES
131,039

−0.4
1.0***
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−0.3
0.8***
0.9**
−0.8***
Ref
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YES
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−0.1
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0.2
−0.2
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YES
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−0.0
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0.3
−0.7***
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Structural
conditions

Note: estimates from linear probability models. Signiﬁcance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Each regression also includes type of inspection, type of vessel, age at inspection, vessel ﬂag and state of inspection as explanatory variables.

Panel A. No control of
MS
Inspector's background
Seagoing (deck)
Seagoing (engine)
Architect or engineer
Other university
Other or unknown
Country of inspection
MS
Controls
Panel B. Control of MS
Inspector's background
Seagoing (deck)
Seagoing (engine)
Architect or engineer
Other university
Other or unknown
Country of inspection
MS
Controls
Number of observations

Variables

Table 6
Linear probability estimates of the main type of deﬁciencies.
Source: data from the EU Region 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
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